K N SADANANDAN Vs. RAGHAVA KURUP

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The scope of the high prerogative writ of Habeas Corpus as known to English Law, and the grounds on which it should issue are, we think well settled on the judicial decisions. It is enough to extract the classic observations of Brett, M. R. in In re Agar ellis v. Lascelles (1883 (24) Law Reports Chancery, 317.) at page 326:

(2.) With respect to an application for habeas corpus under Art.226, our Supreme Court in Mohamed Ekram Hussain's case ( AIR 1964 SC 1625 ) has ruled that the proceedings are discretionary, that a preliminary enquiry is open, and that although the writ is of right, it does not issue as a matter of course. What then are the facts disclosed in the present writ petition The petitioner, an Ezhava, claims to have married the 3rd respondent, a Nayar lady, aged 21 years. The marriage is evidenced by a rather unusual certificate (Ext. P1) issued by the S. N. D. P. Union, and cash receipts for the marriage charges (Exts. P2, P3, P4, P5 and P6). The 3rd respondent is staying with her own parents, and despite the allegation made by the petitioner, little has been made out before us to show that she is under restraint, or is being illegally detained by the parents. There are criminal proceedings pending between the parties; and in these, the 3rd respondent, on the petitioner's own showing, has filed a petition repudiating her having married the petitioner, and stating that she was staying of her own free will with her parents and was not being wrongfully confined, (vide Para.6 of the petition). This is the background against which a writ of Habeas Corpus is prayed for. These facts, we should think, are sufficient for this Court to refuse the writ prayed for. In this region, where, at best, we see the picture of a woman subjected to the pulls and pressures of marital (or, may be extra marital) attachment on the one side and parental affection or guidance on the other, taking into due account the rights and responsibilities which nature has entrusted to parents in regard to their children, we are not satisfied that any case of illegal detention or custody which calls for redress under Art.226 stands made out. We dismiss the petition.

(3.) We record our thanks to the learned Advocate General and to all the Counsel who assisted us by their arguments at the hearing.