TONY @ THOMAS Vs. STATE OF KERALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The above Crl MC is filed by the petitioner who is convicted in Sessions Case 460 of 2012 under Ss. 450, 394 and 302. Life imprisonment was imposed under Sec. 302 IPC and term sentences under Ss. 450 and 394, respectively of 10 years each. The Sessions Court had also, relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka [(2008) 13 SCC 767], directed that the accused shall not be released from the prison for a period of 20 years. In appeal, the conviction on all counts was confirmed by this Court. The sentence of life imprisonment, which was directed to be without remission for 20 years was interfered with for reason of the Sessions Judges having no such power as declared in Union of India v. V. Sriharan [(2016) 7 SCC 1]. The direction to continue the imprisonment for 20 years without remission was alone interfered with. The sentence of life imprisonment under S.302 and the term sentences under the other two provisions stood confirmed.

(2.) The question raised in this Crl.M.C is as to whether the sentences have to be undergone concurrently or consecutively; especially when no such direction is evident from the judgment. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellant Sri. M. Ravikrishnan relies on the judgment of a learned Single Judge produced as Annexure C. We are of the opinion that the judgment of the learned Single Judge would violate the doctrine of merger, by which the subordinate forum decisions merge in the decisions of the appellate or revisional forum; modifying, reversing or affirming that of the subordinate forum, as held in Kunhayammed and Ors v. State of Kerala [(2000) 6 SCC 359] and reaffirmed and reiterated by a coequal bench in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd. [(2019) 4 SCC 376]. The learned Counsel then placed before us the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ranjit Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh [(1991) 4 SCC 304], Ranjit Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh [(1984) 1 SCC 31] and Muthuramalingam v. State [(2016) 8 SCC 313].

(3.) First we deal with Annexure C judgment which considered the question of whether the sentences imposed by the trial court should run concurrently or consecutively after the judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court and also the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which dismissed the SLP filed by the 3rdaccused. A review petition was filed by A3, the second petitioner in the Crl. MC, before the Hon'ble Supreme Court for the very same relief, relying on Sec. 427(2) of the Cr.PC., which stood rejected. The learned Single Judge while expressing the opinion that even the second petitioner (A3) would have been given the benefit of a concurrent sentence, rejected it all the same since the Hon'ble Supreme Court had rejected a similar prayer in a review filed. However, with respect to A1, the first petitioner in the Crl M.C, the learned Single Judge directed that the term sentence shall run concurrently with the sentence of imprisonment for life. The aforesaid directions were issued based on a judgment of a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Surja Ram v. The State, [AIR 1963 Rajasthan 202]. The learned Single Judge applying the dictum in Surja Ram (supra), held that though, S.427 (2) speaks of a subsequent sentence of imprisonment for a term or for life, awarded to a life convict undergoing the sentence, being concurrent; this principle can be adopted when a life sentence is imposed with term sentences, in the same trial. It was held that when a sentence of imprisonment for life is passed in a particular case, and there is also another sentence of imprisonment for a term, imposed in the same trial, then the principle of S.427(2) kicks in, especially when in the judgment the term imprisonment is imposed subsequent to the life imprisonment. The learned Judge also applied the principle that the term of every sentence starts from the moment the judgment is delivered. With all the respect at our command, we are unable to agree with the interpretation of the provision made by the learned Single Judge for more than one reason.