VISWANATHAN Vs. REJI PAUL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The landlord is in revision. He sought to evict the respondents in R.C.R. No. 182/2010 invoking grounds of arrears of rent under Section 11(2)(b) and the ground of reconstruction under Section 11(4)(iv). Similarly, he sought to evict the respondent in R.C.R. No. 163/2010 invoking the above two grounds and also the additional ground of sub letting under Section 11(4)(f)- The Rent Control Court tried both the Rent Control Petitions jointly and after enquiry allowed both the Rent Control Petitions on the grounds of arrears of rent and reconstruction. The ground of sub letting, which was urged in R.C.P. No. 4/2003 corresponding to R.C.P. No. 163/2010, was declined and the landlord did not challenge that decision before the Appellate Authority. Thus, we need be concerned in these two revisions only with grounds of arrears of rent under Section 11(2)(b) and the ground of reconstruction under Section 11(4)(iv).

(2.) The Appellate Authority by the impugned judgment confirmed the order of eviction passed under Section 11(4)(iv), but vacated the eviction granted on the ground of arrears of rent on the reason that the statutory intimation notice under the proviso to Section 11(2)(b) was not issued. It had become evident in the case that the statutory notice, which was intended for the respondent in R.C.R. No. 163/2010, was sent to the respondent in R.C.R. No. 182/2010 and the notice intended for the respondent in R.C.R. No. 182/2010 was served on the respondent in R.C.R. No. 163/2010. Obviously, the notices served on the parties did not contain information regarding the default actually caused by the parties. The Appellate Authority, therefore, took the view that the Rent Control Petitions to the extent they pertain to the ground of arrears of rent were not preceded by proper notices. The Rent Control Court also considered the same issue. However, passed order of eviction under Section 11 (2)(b) noticing that on a previous occasion, the landlord had issued statutory notices under the proviso to Section 11(2)(b) to both the tenants and had in fact instituted petitions for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. According to the Rent Control Court, those notices will be sufficient notices for the present proceedings. For taking such a view, the learned Rent Control Court relied on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Narayanan v. Vinod, 2004 3 KerLT 955, which takes the view that it is not necessary to issue a show cause notice to the tenant before a summary order of eviction under Section 12(3) is passed against him and it is sufficient that the tenant gets sufficient time for showing cause against the proposed summary order of eviction. The above decision cannot have any application to the present case where eviction is on the ground under Section 11(2)(b). We notice that the Rent Control Court has made an observation that the earlier Rent Control Petition invoking ground of arrears of rent is notice to the tenant regarding his default. May be the earlier Rent Control Petition was notice to the tenant regarding the landlord's complaint that the tenant is a defaulting tenant. But, question is whether the mandatory notice, as required by the proviso to Section 11(2)(b), has preceded the present Rent Control Petition. That question has to be answered in the negative. The requirement of the statute is that a notice must be sent to the tenant intimating the tenant of the default. The default in the present case is obviously the default which occurred subsequent to the filing of the earlier R.C.P. Hence, the notice sent as prelude for the earlier R.C.P. can not under any circumstances be sufficient statutory notice for the present R.C.P. We therefore do not find any infirmity about the view taken by the Appellate Authority in the context of ground under Section 11(2)(b).

(3.) The Appellate Authority has under the impugned judgment confirmed the order of eviction passed under Section 11(4)(iv) and has also provided that the tenants will be entitled for induction to the reconstructed building subject to their liability to pay fair rent. The landlord cannot have any legitimate grievance regarding this direction by the Appellate Authority since even without such a direction, a tenant who is evicted on the basis of an order under Section 11(4)(iv) is statutorily entitled for such re induction. In short, we do not find any infirmity in the judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority warranting interference of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 20.