PAMELA MANMOHAN SINGH Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This application under Order 1 Rule 10 has been fjil by S. Gurcharan Singh, son of late S. PatwanSingh, through his counsel Shri Kailash Chand Dewan. It is prayed that he should be impleaded as a party in the present proceedings which are for the grant of Letters of Administration with the Will attached, relating to the estate of Mrs. Raseel Kohli, the deceased mother of the Petitioner and her deceased brother, the original Respondent No. It has been pleaded that when the Applicant came to meet his uncle, S. Raja Singh he came to learn, in the course of conversation, of the pendency of these proceedings. He was then informed by his counsel that "he should move an application for becoming a party so that the Will dated 1.10.1987 executed by the testatrix Dr. (Mrs.) Raseel Kohli, now deceased in respect of properties mentioned as 7/29, Darya Ganj, New Delhi, and property No. 6-B, Mathura Road, New Delhi that the Applicant is moving the present application before this Hon'ble Court for the purpose of determination of the right, title and interest which the Applicant has acquired by virtue of a Will dated 1.10.1987 executed in his favour by the testatrix Dr. Mrs. Raseel Kohli, now deceased". It has been further pleaded that the application is being moved from the date that he gained knowledge of the pendency of these proceedings. The legal submission that the Applicant is a necessary and proper party and has a right to be heard in the pending probate petition is thereafter made.

(2.) Various objections have been raised by the Petitioner but in my opinion these do not call to be dealt with in specific and separate detail. Admittedly, the alleged Will dated 1.10.1987 has not seen the light of day heretofore. Considering the fact that there was no blood relationship between late Dr. (Mrs.) Raseel Kohli and the Applicant and also because the Applicant is not in possession of property bearing No. 6-B, Jangpura Extension, Mathura Road, New Delhi, probate proceedings, for giving judicial imprimatur to the Will dated 1.10.87 ought to have been initiated much earlier. It would be reasonable to assume that any prudent person would immediately initiate probate proceeding of the alleged Will dated 1.10.1987. It would also be further reasonable to presume against the genuineness of this Will since no proceedings have heithertofore been started by the present applicant. I am fully mindful of the fact that it is not mandatory that a probate be obtained in respect of Wills executed in and dealing with properties in Delhi, but this cannot be stretched to the extremity that even where there is a overwhelming probability of the Will being disputed there is still no obligation for initiating these legal steps. In the present case, numerous proceedings are pending between the petitioner, who is the daughter of late Dr. (Mrs.) Raseel Kohli and her late brother. Disputes are also pending between her and Smt. Harnam Kaur & Ors. since it is alleged that Mrs. Harnam Kaur, Mrs. Mahinder Kaur and Shri Jagjit Singh, all partners of M/s. Texla Service Centre, 6-B, Jangpura Extension, Mathura Road, New Delhi have trespassed into this property and have admitted to purchase titular rights thereof contrary to injunctions passed by this Court. The uncle of the Applicant, S. Raja Singh is a resident of this very property and it would, therefore, be fair to assume that the Applicant had full knowledge of the pendency of these conflagatory litigations. Yet no action has been taken by the Applicant, and no reason has been given why this action has not been taken.

(3.) I have taken this view after considering the decision in Ramanand Thakur v. Permanand Thakur, AIR 1982 Patna 87, where it was observed that the "right to apply for a probate accrues from day to day so long as the will remains unprobated. In other words, the right to apply accrues every day and the cause of action for an application for probate arises every moment so long as the will remains unprobated and, therefore, for such an application there is no period of limitation and for taking this view we find full support from the Calcutta case which also finds support from the view taken by the Madras High Court in the case of Gnanamuthu Upadesi v. Vana Koipillai Nadan, (1894) ILR 17 Mad 379). Therefore, while holding that the Art. 137 of the new Limitation Act applies to any petition or application filed under any Act, we do not feel any difficulty to come to the conclusion that so far as the application for grant of a Probate or Letters of Administration is concerned, they are not governed by any Article of the Limitation Act. The application accordingly fails and, is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances, we shall leave the parties to bear their own costs".