DR. R. C. SAKHUJA AND OTHERS Vs. R. P. KOHLI AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This second appeal from order presented under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act No. 59 of 1958 (hereafter called the Act) raises a very short point for consideration. The point arising for consideration and very forcibly pressed by Shri Avadh Behari, Advocate is that when a son gets his father's property under a Will, then he must be deemed to have acquired that property by transfer and, therefore, his case could fall under section 14(6) of the Act. This sub-section reads as under :

(2.) In the written statement dated 10-2-1964, it was denied that Shri R. P. Kohli and Shri V. P. Kohli, were the landlords or the owners of the premises in dispute. It was added that the house had been let out to the joint Hindu family consisting of Shri Sakhuja and his younger brothers and mother the same having been taken on rent by Shri Sakhuja as the Karta of the joint Hindu Family. As regards the heirs and successors of the late Shri Anant Ram, it was admitted that Smt. Jamna Devi was the owner and landlady and it was added that to quote the exact words," the respondent believes that Shri Anant Ram deceased has left a Will in her favour. "There was no pleas raised on the basis of section 14(6) of the Act. It appears that during the course of the proceedings, Smt. Jamna Devi died and thereafter Shri B C. Sakhuja also died. Their legal representatives were brought on the record. The plea based on section 14(6) of the Act does not appear to me to have been specifically raised before the Controller,

(3.) In this Court, the main argument pressed by Shri Avadh Behari on behalf of the appellants is that a Will is a transfer and, therefore, is covered by section 14 (6) of the Act, I am wholly unable to sustain this submission. A Will really means the legal declaration of the intention of a testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried into effect after his death. It regulates the devolution of property of the testator on his death. It is in my opinion not a transfer as is contemplated by section 14 (6). This sub-section appears to me to have been placed on the statute-book with the object of discouraging or making ineffective mala fide transfer of premises for the purpose of evicting tenants on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14. It is for this purpose that a transferee from a landlord is debarred from maintaining an application for ejectment for the period specified in sub-section (6). The devolution of property in the normal way by succession, whether testamentary or non-testamentary, is in my opinion, not intended to be covered by the expression "acquired ............by transfer", as used in the sub-section in question. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Ollala Ambiah v. Avdhnula Mallanna in my opinion, does not help us in construing the word "transfer" as used in section 14 (6) of the Act. In this connection, it may be remembered that the purpose and object of a legislative enactment has always to be looked at for guiding the meaning of the words used therein, when those words are capable of both narrow and wide meaning. It is true that the decision of the Punjab High Court in V. N. Sarin v. A. K. Poplai and the judgment of the Supreme Court on appeal in the same case reported as V. N. Sarin v. A. K. Poplai cited on behalf of the respondents, does not directly deal with the case of a Will, as it is concerned with the partition of joint Hindu family, but the devolution of property by operation of law, such as on death cannot in my opinion be assumed to have been intended the Parliament to be covered by the word "transfer" as used in the sub-section in question. It was the mischief sought to be done to the tenants by the landlords by utilising by transfer intervivos some other person better circumstanced for the purpose of evicting the tenant, which was intended to be remedied. Bald literal meaning, divorced from the purpose, object and scheme of the statutory provision, is likely to be misleading in the present case. The intention of the Legislature is best gathered by construing the word "transfer" in the background of the legislative purpose. No persuasive argument of any cogency has been addressed at the Bar to persuade me to hold that devolution of property by a will could have been intended by the Parliament to fall within the purview of section 14(6). No principle has been relied upon in support of the appellants' submission and of course no precedent has been cited. The argument is, therefore, repelled.