SHRI CHETANYA MOHAN GUPTA Vs. THE PRINCIPAL DESH BANDHU COLLEGE AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This writ petition raises important questions of law regarding the security of tenure of the teaching staff of a constituent College of the Delhi University and incidentally of the legal status of the Deshbandhu College (Evening), Kalkaji New Delhi. The facts are not in dispute. The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Lecturer in Economics in the College by the appointment dated letter 6-11-1964 at annexure & C' to the Writ Petition. His services were later terminated by the letter dated 14-4-1967 at annexure D' to the writ Petition by three months' notice with effect from 15th July, 1967. The petitioner contends that the termination of his employment was void for the following reasons. The Deshbandhu College is a constituent College of the Delhi University and as such is governed by the Delhi University Act. 1922 (hereinafter called the Act) and the statutes and Ordinances made thereunder. The petitioner is a 'Teacher' within the meaning of Sec. 2 (g) of the Act as he is a person imparting instructions in a constituent College. Sec. 28 (h) of the Act states that the Statutes may provide, inter alia, for the condition subject to which Colleges may be admitted to the privileges of the University and the withdrawal of such privileges. Sec. 30 (m and n) state that Ordinances may provide, inter alia, for the supervision and inspection of Colleges and for all matters which by the Act or by the Statutes are to be or may be provided for by the Ordinances. Under Statute 30 (1) (c) a college may be admitted to such privileges of the University as the Executive Council may decide, inter alia, on the following conditions :

(2.) The petition was defended by respondents 1 to 3 Respondent No. 4 has been appointed as Lecturer in Economics in the College in the vacancy caused by the termination of the petitioner's employment He did not take part in the defence. The defence in short is two-fold. Firstly, the appointment of the petitioner is governed not by the Ordinances referred to above, but by a Resolution of the Executive Council, specifically relating to the appointment of the Assistant Lecturers, which is at Annexure 'A' to the written statement. Thereunder, the appointment of an Assistant Lecturer is made on a purely temporary basis. After he works for two years or so his case may be placed before the Selection Committee for consideration of his appointment as a Lecturer. The case of the petitioner was so considered by the Selection Committee, but it did not find him suitable for appointment as a Lecturer. His services were, therefore, terminated by three months' notice as provided for in the appointment letter Annexure 'C' to the Writ Petition. The termination of employment was, therefore, valid. Alternatively, even if the termination is held to be contrary to the terms of the appointment or to the provisions of the Ordinances, if they are held to be applicable, the said termination at the most amounted to a breach of contract of service, for which the proper remedy was a suit for damages. A contract of employment not being capable of being specifically performed, the petitioner cannot insist on continuing the service against the wishes of his employers. Moreover, respondents 1 to 3 are not a public authority. They are subject to Statutes and Ordinances only in the sense that they have to comply with them to be recognised by the University. Their failure to comply with them may result in the withdrawal of the recognition of the College by the University. But, they do not give the petitioner any right to continue in service, much less a right to the issue of writ against the respondents directing them to continue the petitioner in service.

(3.) Basically, therefore, the controversy turns around the following two points, viz. (i) whether the termination of the petitioner's service was merely a breach of contract, which would sound only in damages or whether it was a breach of statutory obligation, which prevents the termination of service except in the manner prescribed by the Ordinances and rendering the purported termination a nullify, and (ii) in either case whether the proper remedy is an award of damages or the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari and mandamus.