V P SINGH Vs. CHAIRMAN METROPOLITAN COUNCIL OF DELHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Membership of the petitioner of the Metropolitan Council of Delhi constituted under the Delhi Administration Act, 1966 (Act No. 19 of 1966), at stake. The petition is being disposed of on admitted tacts. On 2nd January, 1969, when the motion for issue of rule nisi was heard, the learned counsel agreed that the matter may be decided on the interpretation of Sec. 18 of the said Act, In the order dated 2nd January, 1969, while admitting the writ petition, this Court recorded:

(2.) Section 11 provides

(3.) The interpretation sought to be placed by the petitioner has, apart from the authority, the support of inherent reasonableness. The section deals with vacation of seats by members and it appears highly unreasonable to tag on the period following the date of the meeting attended by the member for calculating the period of six successive months, absence during which disqualifies a member. Various anomalies would result if the interpretation sought to be placed by the respondents is accepted. Whether the word month in Sections 11 and 18 is taken to mean calendar month as defined in the General Clauses Act or to mean 180 days suggested by Mr. Daphtary as a possible meaning, the anomalies cannot be resolved. For instance, if a session ol the Council is held in the month of March and extends to one day in April the next meeting can be summoned for and held at any time on or before October 1. A member may have attended the meetings up to 29th March and not on 30th March to 1st April, If the next meeting is held even on 30th September the member would have incurred disability by then, in spite of the fact that after 29th March he may have all along been willing to attend the meeting. Similarly if a meeting is held up to 28th March and then for one day on 15th April, he may have rendered himself liable to be disquali- Bed even before the next meeting. Mr. Daphtary said that position would be equally anomalous if the interpretation of the petitioner is accepted inasmuch as a member may attend a meeting in March, absent himself in the next meeting held in September and attend the next meeting held in March of the following year without entailing disqualification. That, in my opinion, is no anomaly at all, for summoning a meeting does not depend on a member and it is the absence from meetings which entails disqualification. If the meetings are so infrequent as suggested by Mr. Daphtary, no blame can be laid on the member. The result of accepting the respondents'contention would be that one day's absence from a meeting, due to some unavoidable cause, can entail disqualification if no meeting is held thereafter for quite some time as appears from the illustrations given by me hereinbefore. I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that period of disqualification starts from the date of the meeting from which a member is absent, in this case 16th September, 1968.