ANJALI SHARMA Vs. COUNCIL FOR THE INDIAN SCHOOL OF CERTIFICATE EXAMINATION

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The writ petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed on 20th July 198? and by orders made on 13th August 1987, the Registrar of this Court was directed to make a complaint in writing against the petitioner and Ms. Kamlesh Sharma for having committed offences under sections 191, 192 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code to the Magistrate having jurisdiction. This application though seeks review of these orders but learned counsel has confined her submissions only in regard to the review of order made on 13th August 1987. In para 3 of the application, the petitioner has referred to the orders passed by the Supreme Court on 30th November, 1987 in the following words :-

(2.) The respondents, in their reply, have taken an objection that the application had not been filed within time allowed by the Supreme Court and the court having not passed the orders within 6 weeks from 30th November 1987, no longer has any jurisdiction to bear the Review Application. As stated above, the Review Application was initially filed on 14th December 1987 which was within the time allowed by the Supreme Court. The spirit of the order of the Supreme Court, made on 30-11-1987, is not that if the orders are not passed within 6 weeks, this court will loose juridiction to hear and decide the application. Though the petitioner has been taking some adjournments which resulted in delay of the disposal of the application, but that cannot be made a ground for rejecting this application. In fairness to Mr. Probin Mitra, it may be mentioned that learned counsel did not seriously press the aforesaid objection taken in the reply and left the matter to the discrection of the court. In my opinion, the objection of limita- tion and delay based on the order made on 30th November 1987, cannot be entertained and has to be rejected.

(3.) Turning now to the merits, Ms Rani Jethamalani, learned counsel for the petitioner submits, that the court has committed grave error of law by ordering prosecution for perjury without examining the handwriting expert on oath or without having his opinion on affidavits. It is true that handwriting expert was neither examined on oath nor was his opinion taken on affidavit. It was, prima facie, clear to the Bench that the disputed signatures, initials and handwriting were that of the petitioner but to clear any possible doubt and with the consent of the parties the documents were sent to Central Forensic Science Laboratory for their expert opinion. As noticed in the order made on 13th August 1987 it was not the case of any of the parties that the Senior Scientific Officer (Documents) -cum- Assistant Chemical Examiner of Central Forensic Science laboratory, who had given the report, was interested in giving a wrong report. The bench had the report of an independent person before directing prosecution. That was not the stage for permitting the csoss-examination of the handwriting expert or to examine any private handwriting expert. The expert opinion, no doubt, is not conclusive evidence as contended by the learned counsel, and it has-to yield to the positive in the case. But the question for determination is whether such an exercise is necessary before forming an opinion under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the prima-facie opinion is required to be formed under Section 340. The Court may, in its disceretion, hold preliminary, inquiry, if it thinks necessary. If the Court, on its own or with the aid of expert opinion, forms a prima-facie opinion under section 340, it cannot be inferred that expert opinion is conclusive. It also cannot be said that at that stage expert should be examined on oath and parties given an opportunity to cross examine that expert and to produce other evidence. The parties will have ample opportunity to produce such evidence in proceedings before the Criminal Court. It is obvious that all the defences including that the disputed signatures, initials and handwriting are not of Anjali Sharma would be open to her and her mother in proceedings before the criminal court. All these questions have been considered in the opinion expressed in the order made on 13th August 1987. Accordingly there is no substance in the contention of the learned counsel that prosecution could not be ordered without examining or cross-examining the said expert on oath. There is also no force in the contention that the handwriting expert did not express his opinion on the handwriting of the teacher. I fail to understand how the absence of such an opinion can effect the order directing the prosecution of the petitioner when definite opinion was given in so far as her handwriting and signatures is concerned.