EDMUND N SCHUSTER Vs. ASSISTANT COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS NEW DELHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This order will dispose of Criminal Revision Applications Nos. 157-D of 1965 and 159-D of 1965. By the impugned order dated 8th February, 1965 the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, dismissed the revision petitions of the petitioners against the order of the Additional District Magistrate dated 2nd November, 1964. On 11th August, 1964 the Customs authorities arrested the petitioners under section 135 of the Customs Act, 1982. Both the petitioners were produced before the Additional District Magistrate who admitted them to bail in the sum of 10,000 with one surety in the like amount. Both the petitioners furnished sureties and were released on bail. On 28th October, 1964 the petitioners filed an application requesting that the original surety bonds be substituted by bonds to be furnished by the chartered bank. The learned Additional District Magistrate came to the conclusion that only a natural person could execute a bind as surety and, therefore, the petitioners' application could not be allowed. This order was upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge.

(2.) The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that a legal person is as much competent to execute a surety bond as a natural person and, therefore, the order of the two Courts below is erroneous. He draws I my attention to the definition of the word 'person' in section 11 of the Indian Penal Code, which is in the following terms:-

(3.) It is then contended that the word "sureties" in section 499 must be construed to mean natural as well as artificial persons. The argument is that as a general rule both artificial and natural persons are entitled alike to do an act or a thing unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication requires it to be done by a natural person. The learned counsel draws my attention to section 513 of the Criminal Procedure Code and points out that the intention of the Legislature as manifested therein is that a person may deposit the amount instead of executing a bond and consaquently there would be no justification for holding that a surety required to execute a bond must only be a natural person. The learned counsel further submits that no doubt sub-section (4) of section 514 provides for imprisonment of a surety but that sub-section must be limited to cases where the surety is a natural person but it cannot be used to restrict the language of section 499 so as to permit only natural persons to execute bonds as sureties. Moreover, according to the learned counsel, the intention of the Legislature is clear from the fact that a surety is to be imprisoned only if the penalty, as mentioned in sub-section (4) of section 514, is not paid. He also seeks to supplement his argument by an illustration that in case of an accused person a bond has to be executed by him under section 499. In case where a Corporation is being prosecuted, section 499 will require an execution of a bond by such Corporation. In such a case the bond may be forfeited under section 514 and penalty imposed but yet the whole of sub-section (4) of section 514 cannot be bronght into play since a Corporation is incapable of imprisonment. From this illustration the learned counsel wants me to imply that sub-section "4) is limited only to cases of bonds by natural persons.