UMA SEHGAL Vs. DWARKA DASS SEHGAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Suadrshan Kumar Sehgal took out three policies of insurance on his life, two in 1958 and one in 1959 in which he nominated his father Dwarka Dass Sehgal undersection 39(1) of the Insurance Act, 1938 (herein called 'the Act'). He was married in 1964. He took out the fourth policy in 1966 but this time he nominated his wife, Mrs. Uma Sehgal. He died in 1968 leaving his heirs Mrs. Uma Sehgal, his minor son Sunil and his mother Mrs. Vidya Wati Sehgal. The money of the last policy was received by the widow. She filed on January 2. 1970 a suit on behalf of herself and her minor son to recover 213rd share in the amount of the first three policies against Dwarka Dass Sehgal, his wife Vidya Wati and the Life Insurance Corporation. The amount appears to have been paid by the said Corporation on January 10, 1970 to the nominee. Dwarka Dass Sehgal contends that he was entitled to receive the policy money absolutely on the grounds-

(2.) It may be noticed that if the contention of Uma Sehgal were to prevail, then she was required to surrender 1/3rd share of Mrs. Vidya Wati in the last of the policies and her suit could be decreed only after excluding that share. However, the sole question that has been debated is about the position of the nominee. Cases almost overwhelming in number have taken the view that a nominee is nothing but a person who receives the payment on behalf of the heirs of the assured. The cases referred to are- Amardas v. Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha, AIR 1953 Allahabad 721 (1), Ramballav Dhandhania v Gangadhar Nathmall, AIR 1956 Calcutta 275 (2), D. Mohanvelu Mudaliar and another v. Indian Insurance and Banking Corporation Ltd.; Salem, AIR 1957 Madras 115(3), Mahadara Brahamma v. Kandula Venkataramana Rao and another, AIR 1957 A.P. 757 (4), Smt. Shanti Devi v. Ramlal, AIR 1958 All. 569 (5), Sarojini Amma v. Neelakanta Pillai, AIR 1961 Kerala 126 (6), Life Insurance Corporation of India v. United Bank of India Ltd., AIR 1970 Calcutta 513 (7), Raja Ram v. Mata Prasad and another, AIR 1972 Allahabad 167 (8), Malli Dei v. Kanchan Prava Dei, AIR 1973 Orissa 83(9), Mahadeo Nath v. Smt. Meena Devi, AIR 1976 Allahabad 64 (10), Atmaram Mohanlal Panchal v. Gunvantiben, AIR 1977 Gujarat. 134 (11), Smt. Saraswatibai v. Smt. Malati, AIR 1978 Karnataka 8 (12), and Smt. Raj and another v. Devi Dita Mal and another, (1979), 49 Company Cases 361 (13), All of them more or less resort to the same line of arguments. In spite of that, surprisingly the debate goes on; the legislature too does not intervene. Mr. Rajiv Behl stoutly challenged the soundness of these cases and relies upon Kesari Devi v. Dharma Devi, AIR 1962 Allahabad 355 (14), and B. M. Mundkur v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others AIR 1977 Madras 72 (15), to canvass an opposite thesis. Both sides referred to a few more cases which I have omitted to mention because these were decided prior to the commencement of the Act, section 39.

(3.) Nothing was wiser than to follow without questioning the foot prints of the great and cast one more vote on the side of size. But as I went through the numerous precedents one by one, I felt that was exactly what was being done and that what the young lawyer was advocating had much to commend itself and a departure would be justified. Luckily there was some support available though numerically diminutive but robust in reasoning. I shall presently notice the statutory provisions, then the cases which support Mr. Behl and lastly the cases cited by Mr. Makhija in order of the strength of the Benches.