J. VENKATESH REDDY Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS
LAWS(KAR)-2017-4-16
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Decided on April 19,2017

J. Venkatesh Reddy Appellant
VERSUS
State of Karnataka And Others Respondents


Referred Judgements :-

CLARKE V. BRADLAUGH [REFERRED TO]
VATTICHERUKURU VILLAGE PANCHAYAT V. NORI VENKATARAMA DEEKSHITHULU [REFERRED TO]
DEVINDER SINGH V. STATE OF PUNJAB [REFERRED TO]
K.T. PLANTATION PRIVATE LIMITED V. STATE OF KARNATAKA [REFERRED TO]
KRISHNABAI V. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER (CLAIMS),UPPER KRISHNA PROJECT,ALMATTI [REFERRED TO]
N. SOMASHEKAR V. STATE OF KARNATAKA [REFERRED TO]
OFFSHORE HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED V. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [REFERRED TO]
RAJAHMUNDRY ELECTRIC SUPPLY CORPORATION LIMITED V. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [REFERRED TO]
SMT. K.M. CHIKKATHAYAMMA V. STATE OF KARNATAKA [REFERRED TO]
STATE OFBIHAR VS. KAMESHWAR SINGH:STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH:GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH:KAMESHWAR SINGH [REFERRED TO]
ZAVERBHAI AMAIDAS VS. STATE OF BOMBAY [REFERRED TO]
GARIKAPATI VEERAYA VS. N SUBBIAH CHOUDHRY [REFERRED TO]
RUSTOM CAVASJEE COOPER RUSTOM CAVASJEE COOPER T M GURUBUXANI VS. UNION OF INDIA [REFERRED TO]
RAMTANU CO OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LIMITED VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [REFERRED TO]
RAMTANU CO OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LIMITED VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [REFERRED TO]
NAGPUR IMPROVEMENT TRUST VS. VITHAL RAO [REFERRED TO]
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH VS. M V NARASIMHAN [REFERRED TO]
M KARUNANIDHI VS. UNION OF INDIA [REFERRED TO]
ISHWARI KHETAN SUGAR MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED R B LACHMANDAS SUGAR AND GENERAL MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH [REFERRED TO]
BABU LAL VS. HAZARI LAL KISHORI LAL [REFERRED TO]
T BARAI VS. HENRY AH HOE [REFERRED TO]
HOECHST PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED JUMNA FLOUR AND OIL MILLS PHARMA ASSOCIATES VS. STATE OF BIHAR [REFERRED TO]
VIJAY KUMAR SHARMA G ABAL ALI AND K MOIDEEN K C NAIK HASANABHA K S HEGDE VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA [REFERRED TO]
P L KANTHA RAO VS. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [REFERRED TO]
PRATAP CHANDA SHEO NARAIN VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [REFERRED TO]
U P AVAS EVAM VIKAS PARISHAD VS. JAINUL ISLAM [REFERRED TO]
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA VS. LALJIT RAJSHI SHAH [REFERRED TO]
PADMASUNDARA RAO DEAD VS. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [REFERRED TO]
GIRNAR TRADERS VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [REFERRED TO]
M NAGABHUSHANA VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA [REFERRED TO]
PRAHLAD SINGH VS. UNION OF INDIA [REFERRED TO]
RAJIV SARIN VS. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND [REFERRED TO]
STATE OF KERALA VS. MAR APPRAEM KURI CO. LTD [REFERRED TO]
PATASI DEVI VS. STATE OF HARYANA [REFERRED TO]
STATE OF U.P VS. HARI RAM [REFERRED TO]
ARESH ALIAS ASHOK J MEHTA VS. SPL TAHSILDAR [REFERRED TO]
PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION VS. HARAKCHAND MISIRIMAL SOLANKI [REFERRED TO]
ANIL KUMAR GUPTA VS. STATE OF BIHAR [REFERRED TO]
KSL & INDUSTRIES LTD. VS. M/S. ARIHANT THREADS LTD. [REFERRED TO]
MAGNUM PROMOTERS P. LTD. VS. UNION OF INDIA [REFERRED TO]
HANUMANRAO MORBAJI GUDADHE AND ORS. VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. [REFERRED TO]
ALIGARH DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. MEGH SINGH AND ORS. [REFERRED TO]
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, MYSORE & ANR. VS. ANASUYA BAI (D) BY LRS. & ORS. [REFERRED TO]


JUDGEMENT

ANAND BYRAREDDY,J. - (1.)These petitions are heard and decided by this common order only on questions of law that arise for consideration. On facts, there are dissimilarities as to the circumstances pertaining, in several cases. However, the legal issues that arise, overlap. The findings arrived at on the legal issues would have to be applied to each given case, which would require this Bench or such other Bench to afford a further hearing to each individual petitioner, on the facts of each case, vis-a-vis the opinion expressed on the legal issues. Hence, it is made clear that this Bench is not expressing any opinion as to the merits, on the facts of each case, except noticing the bare facts, in context.
(2.)W.P. Nos. 59461 and 59462 of 2014: The petitioner claims to be the absolute owner of agricultural land bearing Survey No. 55/1 measuring 5 acres, at Jakkasandra Village, Malur Taluk, Kolar District. He is said to have acquired the land under a sale deed dated 22-10-2011. He is said to be growing horticultural crops on the land. A notification under Sections 3(1), 1(3) and 28(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the 'KIAD Act', for brevity) dated 13-3-2012, is said to have been issued by the State Government, declaring an area comprising about 696 acres of land of Jakkasandra Village, including the petitioner's land, as an industrial area to be developed and proposing to acquire the same. A final notification under Sec. 28(4), dated 4-12-2012, is said to have been issued restricting the area of land to be acquired to 627 acres. It is claimed that notwithstanding the initiation of the acquisition proceedings, the respondents have neither taken physical possession of the land nor have paid any compensation and that with the coming into force of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the '2013 Act', for brevity) with effect from 1-1-2014 and by virtue of Sec. 24(2) thereunder, the acquisition proceedings in question are deemed to have lapsed and seeks a declaration to that effect. Alternatively, it is sought that the petitioner be held entitled to compensation in accordance with the 2013 Act. W.P. No. 18861 of 2013: The petitioner herein claims to be the owner of land measuring 2 acres 1 and 1/2 guntas of land inland bearing Survey No. 42/1 of Jakkasandra Village. The land is said to have been converted for non-agricultural purposes as per an order of the Competent Authority, dated 29-5-2012. He is also said to have obtained a sanction for the formation of a housing layout, from the Assistant Director, Town and Country Planning Authority, Kolar, as on 28-6-2012. He claims to have formed about 38 house sites and some of the sites are said to be the subject-matter of agreements of sale with third parties. The said land is also the subject-matter of the very same acquisition proceedings referred to in the first of these cases. The petitioner has sought amendment of the petition to incorporate pleadings to claim the benefit of Sec. 24(2) of the 2013 Act. (Incorrectly mentioned as, "Section 25(2)") W.P. No. 18890 of 2013: The petitioner herein claims to be the owner of lands bearing Survey Nos. 7,41,73 and 106 of Jakkasandra Village, measuring 3 acres 7 guntas, 1 acre 1 gunta, 2 acres 2 guntas and 1 acre, respectively. His two children are said to be physically handicapped. The lands are said to be his only source of income. They are said to be fertile lands. The land in Survey No. 106 is said to be wet land. He is said to be a sericulturist too. The petitioner is aggrieved by the very acquisition proceedings referred to above. W.P. Nos. 20367 to 20373, 20375 to 20380, 20382 and 20384 to 20388 of 2013: There are 22 petitioners who have filed this common petition. They are all residents of Jakkasandra. Their land holdings vary from very small lands to large extents. The petitioners herein have raised various grounds, questioning the wisdom and the bona fides of the State Government in proceeding with the acquisition proceedings. The petitioners have claimed the benefit of the 2013 Act, by virtue of which, it is claimed that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed. W.P. No. 49228 of 2013: There are 8 petitioners who have filed this common petition. They are all residents of Jakkasandra. They are all said to be actively cultivating their individual holdings. The particulars of the lands which are all situated in Jakkasandra, are furnished as Annexures-Al to A14, to the writ petition. They have raised identical grounds as urged in the writ petition in W.P. Nos. 20367 to 20388 of 2013 and seek similar reliefs. W.P. No. 30920 of 2014: The petitioner is said to be the owner of agricultural lands bearing Survey No. 25/1 measuring 26 guntas and land bearing Survey No. 33/1 measuring 1 acre 9 guntas of Jakkasandra Village. The petitioner being aggrieved by the very acquisition proceedings, claims the benefit of the provisions of the 2013 Act. W.P. No. 35461 of 2014: The petitioner is said to be the owner in occupation of lands in Survey No. 90/2 measuring 1 acre 3 guntas, Survey No. 90/3 measuring 1 acre 8 guntas and Survey No. 90/4 measuring 1 acre 18 guntas, all of Jakkasandra Village. The petitioner is said to have developed horticultural crops on the said lands. The petitioner has sought to amend the writ petition to incorporate pleadings to claim the benefit of the provisions of the 2013 Act, to seek the quashing of the acquisition proceedings. W.P. No. 32416 of 2015: The petitioner is said to be the owner of land bearing Survey No. 148 of Achatanahalli, Narasapur Hobli, Kolar District. The same was said to be the subject-matter of acquisition proceedings under the KIAD Act. Pursuant to a preliminary notification dated 20-10-2012 and a final notification dated 4-1-2013, possession of the land is purportedly taken by the respondents on 11-1-2013. It is claimed that in the matter of payment of compensation, in spite of an assurance that the same would be paid under the provisions of the 2013 Act, the respondents have failed to do so and hence the present petition claiming the benefit of the 2013 Act. W.P. Nos. 51805 to 51807 of 2015: There are 3 petitioners herein. They own lands in Adinarayana Hosahalli, Dodballapur Taluk, Bangalore Rural District. The first petitioner is said to be the owner of land in Survey No. 64/1 measuring 1 acre and 8 guntas, the second petitioner is said to be the owner of land in Survey No. 64/2 measuring 1 acre 12 guntas and the third petitioner is said to be the owner of land in Survey No. 63 measuring 1 acre 16 guntas. They are aggrieved by acquisition proceedings under the provisions of the KIAD Act, initiated vide preliminary notification dated 14-6-2013 and a final notification dated 12-2-2015. The petitioners have raised several grounds of challenge including the benefit of the 2013 Act, in questioning the acquisition proceedings. W.P. No. 859 of 2016: The petitioner is said to be the owner of land in Survey No. 164/2 of Madhugiji Village, Sira Taluk, Tumkur District, measuring about 25 guntas. The said land is said to have been acquired under the provisions of the KIAD Act, in terms of a final notification dated 19-8-2010. It transpires that the petitioner was notified as regards a meeting for fixing the market value. But it is claimed that even after a lapse of 3 years no progress was made in that direction. The petitioner is said to have approached this Court by way of a writ petition in W.P. No. 11553 of 2013. The same was said to have been summarily disposed of with a direction to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner. It is stated that the respondents had failed to consider the case of the petitioner and had hence initiated proceedings for contempt of Court, which was however dismissed. Hence, the present petition apparently claiming the benefit of the 2013 Act. The petitioner however, has not raised a specific ground in this regard. W.P. Nos. 44987 and 44988 of 2015: The petitioner is said to be the owner of land bearing Survey No. 28/4 of Konappana Agrahara, Bangalore South Taluk, measuring about 4.7 and a half guntas and 4 and three-fourths guntas. The same was proposed to be acquired under the provisions of the KIAD Act, vide final notification dated 6-7-2001. The petitioner was said to have been issued a notice under Sec. 28(6) of the said Act and physical possession is said to have been taken by the respondents. The petitioner claims to have purchased the above lands under sale deeds dated 25-9-1993 and 23-12-1993. He is not said to have indicated his willingness to receive the compensation offered. And that there was no Award passed even as on the date of the petition. In this regard, he has even obtained an endorsement to that effect by recourse to the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005. The petitioner therefore, claims the benefit of the provisions of the 2013 Act. W.P. Nos. 41641 and 41642 of 2015: The petitioners are the joint and absolute owners in possession of land bearing Survey No. 155 measuring about 4 acres, of Archakarahalli, Ramanagara Taluk, and is said to have purchased the same under a sale deed dated 28-9-2005. The said land is said to have been converted for non-agricultural purposes, at the instance of the petitioners vide an order of conversion by the Competent Authority, dated 29-5-2006. The said land, along with other lands of the village, was said to have been notified for acquisition vide notification dated 27-2-2007 issued under Sec. 28(1) of the KIAD Act, for purposes of establishment of the Rajiv Gandhi Medical University and allied institutions. A final notification under the said Act is said to have been issued on 18-6-2007. An award for a sum of Rs. 86 lakh as compensation was said to have been determined in respect of the land. It is claimed that the said award amount has neither been paid to the petitioners nor has been deposited in the Civil Court as required in law. Hence, the present petition claiming the benefit of the 2013 Act. W.P. Nos. 40473 and 40474 of 2015: The petitioner is said to be the owner of land bearing Survey No. 8 of Bale Veeranna Halli, Ramanagar Taluk, measuring about 4 acres. The same was said to have been notified for acquisition viae notification dated 15-7-1997, under Sec. 28(4) of the KIAD Act. As no further steps were taken to determine and pay the compensation due to the petitioner, he is said to have approached this Court by way of a writ petition in W.P. No. 829 of 2000, seeking appropriate directions, this Court is said to have allowed the writ petition directing the respondents to take steps to deposit the compensation in a Civil Court, while noticing that there was a civil dispute as regards apportionment. It transpires there was no such deposit made by the respondents, even as on the date of the petition. Hence the present petition, claiming the benefit of the provisions of the 2013 Act. W.P. Nos. 2907 of 2015 and 46915 of 2016: The petitioner claims to be the absolute owner of land bearing Survey Nos. 70/1 and 70/3 measuring 7 guntas and 4 guntas of Medihalli, Bangalore East Taluk. It is claimed that the lands have long lost the character of agricultural lands as the surrounding area is completely built-up. The petitioner has obtained sanction of conversion of the land for residential purposes from the Competent Authority, vide order dated 22-5-2014. He is said to have formed house sites on the land. It is claimed that he has now learnt, only in retrospect, that the lands have been acquired under the provisions of the KIAD Act, vide preliminary notification dated 27-10-2007 and final notification dated 28-5-2008. It is the petitioner's case that the acquisition proceedings are carried out in the name of the erstwhile owners notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner was the owner as on the date of acquisition. It is claimed that the respondents had failed to pass an award and pay compensation, even as on the date of the petition and hence the present petition. W.P. No. 17272 of 2014: The petitioner claims to be the abs( 'lute owner of land bearing Survey No. 1 of Arebinnamangala, Bangalore North (Additional) Taluk. The land was said to have been granted in favour of the petitioner in the year 1979. However, it is admitted that the petitioner's name is not reflected in the Revenue records. The land is said to have been notified for acquisition under the provisions of the KIAD Act, vide preliminary notification dated 7-8-2006 and final notification dated 25-9-2008. The petitioner seeks to challenge the acquisition proceedings as not being in accordance with law. W.P. Nos. 58807 to 58809 of 2015: The petitioner is said to be the owner of land measuring 9 acres and 7 guntas of land bearing Survey No. 71 of Archakarahalli, Ramanagar Taluk. The said land along with lands of the village was said to have been notified under the provisions of the KIAD Art, vide preliminary notification dated 1-3-2007 and final notification dated 18-6-2007. It is stated that the petitioner had unsuccessfully challenged the acquisition proceedings before this Court and a special leave petition filed by the petitioner before the Apex Court against the dismissal of his appeal before this Court is said to be pending and that the petitioner is also said to have the benefit of an interim order of stay of dispossession. In the meantime, having noticed that adjacent landowners lands which were similarly notified for acquisition having been dropped from the acquisition proceedings on the summary instructions of the then Chief Minister of the State, he is said to have obtained similar instructions from the Minister for Medical Education. However, it is stated that he has been served with a notice to receive the compensation determined in respect of the land in question. The petitioner claims that he has continued in actual physical possession of the land till the date of the petition, thereby indicating that the respondents do not require the land for any development. The petitioner hence claims the benefit of the provisions of the 2013 Act. W.P. Nos. 48824 to 48840 of 2015: These petitions are filed in the following background: The first petitioner-Puttalakshmamma claims to be the owner of the lands in Survey No. 66/2 measuring 3 acres 9 guntas, Survey No. 67/1 measuring 3 acres 25 guntas and Survey No. 67/2, measuring 5 acres 30 guntas situated in Nelahal Village of Tumkur Taluk. The second petitioner-H. Prabanna claims to be the owner of lands in Survey Nos. 60/3 and 49/2, respectively, measuring 3 acres 26 guntas and 1 acre 38 guntas, situated in Nelahal Village of Tumkur Taluk and District. The third petitioner-Kirshnappa claims to be the owner of land measuring 3 acres 20 guntas in Survey No. 48 of Nelahal Village. A copy of the Record of Right showing the name of the petitioner as the owner has been produced and marked as Annexure-D. Seebe Gowda-the fourth petitioner claims to be the owner in possession of Survey No. 8/3 measuring 4 acres, Survey No. 80/3 measuring 1 acre 1" guntas and Survey No. 80/1C measuring 1 acre 23 guntas of Nelahal Villa, of Tumkur Taluk and District. Similarly, the fifth petitioner, Hanumantharaya claims to be the owner in possession of land measuring 5 acres 9 guntas in Survey No. 30 of Nelahal Village of Tumkur Taluk and District. The sixth petitioner-Mahadevaiah claims to be the owner in possession lands in Survey No. 11/10 measuring 3 acres 9 guntas, Survey No. 14/5 measuring 0.37.08 guntas, Survey No. 13/4 measuring 0.31 guntas, Survey No. 13/9 measuring 0.16 guntas, Survey No. 13/11 measuring 0.11. guntas and Survey No. 13/10 measuring 0.11 guntas situated in Nelahal Village of Tumkur Taluk and District. Gangadharaiah-the seventh petitioner claims to be the owner in possession of lands in Survey No. 30 measuring 4 acres 18 guntas and Survey No. 32 measuring 2 acres 24 guntas of Nelahal Village, Tumkur Taluk and District. The eighth petitioner-Kenchaiah claims to he the owner in possession of2 acres 24 guntas in Survey No. 32 of Nelahal Village. Lakshmamma-the ninth petitioner claims to be the owner in possession of 1 acre 35 acres of land in Survey No. 40/1 and 0.5 1/2 guntas of land in Survey No. 58/1 of Nelahal Village, Tumkur Taluk and District. The tenth petitioner-Lakshmanna claims to be the owner in possession oi lands in Sy. No. 40/1 measuring 1 acre 35 guntas and Sy. No. 58/1 measuring 0.5 1/2 guntas situated in Nelahal Village of Tumkur Taluk and District. Gaviyappa-petitioner 11, claims to be the owner in possession of land bearing Sy. No. 40/1 measuring 1 acre 35 guntas and Sy. No. 58/1 measuring 0.5 1/2 guntas situated in Nelahal Village of Tumkur Taluk and District. Lakkamma-petitioner 12 also claims to be the owner in possession of lands comprising in Survey No. 40/1 measuring 1 acre 35 guntas and Survey No. 58/1 measuring 0.5 1/2 guntas situated in Nelahal Village, Tumkur Taluk and District. Basavarajaiah-petitioner 13 claims to be the owner in possession of lands bearing Sy. No. 106/P measuring 3 acres 9 guntas and Survey No. 9/2B measuring 0.5 guntas of Chikkasheebi Village, Tumkur Taluk and District. Doddathayamma-petitioner 14 claims to be the owner in possession of 2 acres 26 guntas in Survey No. 26/2A situated in Nelahal Village of Tumkur Taluk and District. Vasant A. Gowda-petitioner 15 claims to be the owner in possession of 3 acres 30 guntas of land in Survey No. 48 of Nelahal Village, Tumkur Taluk and District. Similarly, Siddaramaiah-petitioner 16 claims to be the owner of the land measuring 8 acres 4 guntas in Sy. No. 64/1 of Nelahal Village, Tumkur Taluk and District. Thimmaiah-petitioner 17 claims to be the owner in possession of 3 acres 12 guntas of land in Survey No. 49 at Kempadalahalli Village, Tumkur Taluk and District. The above said lands, along with other lands are said to have been notified for acquisition under the provisions of the KIAD Act vide preliminary notifications dated 10-3-2015 and 23-4-2015, the petitioners are said to have filed objections opposing the acquisition proceedings and that the matter is at the stage of providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. There is an interim order of stay of further proceedings granted by this Court. The petitioners have challenged the constitutional validity of Sec. 3, Chapter II and provisions of Chapter VII of the KIAD Act.
(3.)Submissions of Sri N. Devadas, Senior Advocate: Sri N. Devadas, Senior Advocate appearing for Sri M.R. Rajagopal, Counsel for the petitioners in W.P. Nos. 48824 to 48840 of 2015, contends as follows. That the constitutional validity' of Sec. 3(1) of Chapter II relating to declaration of any Area in the State as an industrial Area, by the State Government under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (Karnataka Act No. 18 of 1996) and also the provisions of Sections 28 to 31 in Chapter VII in the said Act relating to acquisition and disposal of land for the purpose of 60 development of Industries in such Industrial Areas notified Under Sec. 3 of the Act, is questioned as the said provisions are repugnant to the provisions of the 2013 Act (Central Act No. 30 of 2013), which provides for acquisition of land for Infrastructure Projects, which includes projects for Industrial Corridors or mining activities, National Investment and Manufacturing Zones (NIMZ) as designated in the National Manufacturing Policy (NMP). The acquisition notifications issued by the State Government under the KIAD Act have referred to NIMZ, Thus, it is clear that the State Government has implemented the NIMZ contemplated by the Central Government, through National Manufacturing Policy-2011, which is also adopted by the State Government vide its Government order dated 27-2-2015. The Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) has declared a National Manufacturing Policy dated 4-11-2011. The Policy is based on the principle of industrial growth in partnership with the States. The Central Government would create the enabling policy framework, provide incentives for infrastructure development on a public private partnership (FPP) basis through appropriate financing instruments, and State Governments would be encouraged to adopt the instrumentalities provided in the policy. The policy further states, while the NIMZ is an importer instrumentality, the proposals contained in the policy apply to manufacturing industry throughout the Country, including wherever industry is able to organize itself into clusters and adopt a model of self-regulation as enunciated. The preface to NMP states that: "this policy document has been prepared after extensive stakeholder consultation and inputs from the industry', State Governments and experts in the field of manufacturing and business environment". The policy statement provides for the industries which will be given special attention and deals with various aspects. As far as the land is concerned, the policy statement vide Para 1.19 provides thus:
"Land has emerged as a major constraint for industrial growth in recent years. The Government will take measures to make industrial land available, which is critical for sustained industrial growth through creation of land banks by States: digitalisation of land and resources and programs for utilisation of lands locked under non-productive uses, including defunct or sick industries."

Attention is drawn to the following guidelines prescribed under the NMP:

"Following guiding principles will be applied by the State Government for the purpose:

i. Preferably in waste lands; infertile and dry lands not suitable for cultivation.

ii. Use of agricultural land to the minimum;

iii. All acquisition proceedings to specify a viable resettlement and rehabilitation plan;
,
iv. Reasonable access to basic resources like water;

v. It should not be within any ecologically sensitive area' or closer than the minimum distance specified for such an area."

Attention is also drawn to the following Paragraphs of the NMP:

"9.4. requires a State Government to provide for water requirement, power connectivity etc. -

9.4.3. - Infrastructure Linkage provides that the State Government, applying for NIMZ, will ensure that after notifying the area, all physical Infrastructure and utilities linkages under its jurisdiction are provided within one year from the date of notification failing which the NIMZ may be de-notified."

It is contended that the Government of Karnataka has issued a Government order dated 27-2-2013 in the matter of approval for development of NIMZ at Vasanthana asapura, Tumakuru.

The Government order states in the preamble that "Government of India (GOI) announced the 'National Manufacturing Policy' (NMP) 2011, with the main objectives of enhancing the share of manufacturing in GDP to 25% within a decade and creating 100 million jobs". As per the policy, "NIMZ will be developed as integrated industrial townships with state of the art infrastructure and land use on the basis of zoning; clean and energy efficient technology, necessary social infrastructure; skill development facilities, etc. The minimum area of land required or establishing NIMZ is 5000 hectares (12500 acres) as per the NIMZ guidelines".

It is contended that unfortunately, the State Government which identified 2322 acres of Government land, was to identify 9729 acres, so as to provide for the minimum area of 12500 acres, did not bother to adhere to the guiding principles to identify waste lands, infertile and dry land not suitable for cultivation. Though the policy states that the use of agricultural land should be to the minimum, the State Government and its agencies identified only wetlands and garden lands consisting of coconut and arecanut gardens and other wet lands.

The guiding principles require in environmental impact study to be conducted in respect of a prospective NIMZ, in consultation with the Ministry of Environment and Forest. The State Government, after identifying the lands in question to the extent of 7915 acres, chose to issue the Government order on 27-2-2015 adopting NIMZ and immediately followed by declarations under the State Act declaring an industrial area and also issuing acquisition notifications within a span of ten days.

It is contended that the State Government having not invoked the provisions of the appropriate Act, lamely, 2013 Act, which has come into force with effect from 1-1-2014, has erroneously invoked the KIAD Act, which does not contemplate any environmental impact study. It is thus evident that the State Government can recklessly identify any area for industrial development and can declare any area as an industrial area and extend the provisions of Chapter VII to acquire those lands. Thus, it is contended, all the three notifications issued by the State Government pertaining to the petitioners concerned are arbitrary and illegal and directly in conflict with the NMP and its own Government order.

It is further contended that under Sec. 3 of the State Act, the State Government may declare any area in the State to be an Industrial Area for the purposes of the Act. The notifications issued under Sec. 3 shall define the limits of the Area.

How an Industrial Area is identified by the State Government, albeit through its Agency, the KIADB, is not reflected in the notifications issued under Sec. 3(1) or under Sec. 1(3) of the Act. As to what are the criteria adopted to identify an area so as to declare it as an industrial area, is not known. As to what are the factors that are considered by KIADB is also not disclosed. In fact, there are no rules or guidelines under the Act as to how an area has to be identified so as to declare that area as an Industrial Area.

But the State Government having adopted the NMP for the establishment of NIMZ is duty-bound to identify the area for NIMZ, by strictly following the guidelines stipulated in the NMP for acquisition in of lands vide Chapter IX of the policy. But the State Government has not followed the guidelines in the matter. This could be very easily discerned from the tact that the State Government has issued a Government order adopting the NMP on 27-2-2015, which states that the detailed application for final approval in the format prescribed along with the Techno-Economic Feasibility Report-cum-Development Plan to the DIPP, Government of India is required tow submitted by the State Government. There has been no such compliance.

It is contended that the 2013 Act has come into force with effect from 1-1-2014. On or after the said date, no State Government has any power to acquire lands for establishment of Industrial Area, Industrial Estate and Industrial Infrastructural facilities, under any State Acts in force, in view of the parliamentary legislation providing for acquisition of lands for industrialisation and development of essential infrastructural facilities. Sec. 2 of the 2013 Act which provides for the application of the Act to the whole of India, is applicable for acquisition of lands for infrastructure projects, which includes projects for industrial corridor or mining activities, NIMZ, as designated in the NMP.

The land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the '1894 Act' for brevity) which was in force till the 2013 Act, came into force, did not specifically provide for acquisition of lands for Industrial Infrastructural Projects including NIMZ, as designated in the NMP. The 1894 Act provides for acquisition of lands only for public purposes or for a company. 'Public Purpose', is defined by Sec. 3(f) of the act and only for such public purpose, could the lands be acquired under the 1894 Act. The public purpose defined in Sec. 3(f) did not include acquisition of land for Industrial Areas. Hence, the State Government had made a special law for acquisition of lands for Industrial areas.

The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 being a general law in nature, many State Governments, had enacted special laws for establishment and development of Industries in the name of Industrial Area or Industrial Corridor or Industrial facilities. The State Government had enacted the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the 'KIAD Act', for brevity). The said Act has received the assent of the President of India. In tact, Sec. 47 of the KIAD Act deals with "effect of provisions inconsistent with other laws." It provides that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained therein with any other law. Tire 2013 Act specifically provides for acquisition of lands for Industrial Areas. The provisions of the Central Act totally takes away the power of State Governments, hither to exercised under the State Acts for acquisition of lands for Industrial Areas.

Section 3(e) defines "Appropriate Government" as, in relation to acquisition of land situated within the territory of, a State, the State Government.

Section 3(za) defines "Public Purpose" as the activities specified under sub-section (1) of Sec. 2.

Section 3(zb) defines "Requiring Body" as meaning and including the appropriate Government.

Chapter IV of the 2013 Act provides for Notification and Acquisition. Sec. 11 provides for publication of preliminary Notifications and power of the Officers. It, inter alia, provides that the notification issued under sub-section (1) shall also contain a statement on the nature of the public purpose involved, reasons necessitating the displacement of affected persons, summary of the social impact assessment report and particulars of the administrator appointed for the purpose of rehabilitation and resettlement under Sec. 43. It is only thereafter that the land acquisition proceedings can be completed.

Thus, in view of the specific provisions of the Central Act providing for acquisition of land for industrial corridors or for public purposes as specified in Sec. 2(b) of the Act and the State Government being the appropriate Government for the acquisition of lands situated within its territory, the State Government has to exercise power only under the Central Act and follow the provisions of the Central Act and cannot resort to exercising power under the State Act, which has become redundant and invalid in view of the parliamentary legislation.

The provisions of the KIAD Act are repugnant to the Central Act or is otherwise inoperative and the State Government is not competent to exercise power under the State Act anymore, for the purpose of establishing and acquiring land for industrial areas, including NIMZ, which is under NMP. Thus, it may be necessary to compare the provisions of both the laws to find out whether the State Act is repugnant to the Central Act or has otherwise become inoperative and invalid in view of the provisions of the Central Act.

By virtue of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Sec. 1 of the KIAD Act, it is mandatory that the State Government issue a notification published in the Official Gazette specifying the area to which Chapter VII shall apply and the date from which the said Chapter VII shall come into force in such area.

Under the Scheme of the Act, first, it is necessary and mandatory for the State Government to issue notification specifying the area and the date, in respect of which the State Government proposes to declare such area as an industrial area.

Next, it is necessary that the State Government make a notification under Sec. 3 declaring any area to be an industrial area for the purpose of the Act and it is mandatory that such notification shall define the limits of the area to which the Industrial area relates.
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In view of the specific provision of Sec. 103 of the 2013 Act, which clearly states that the provisions of the Central Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being in force, the State Government which is the appropriate Government for carrying out the provisions of this Act, cannot exclusively exercise power under the State Act, de hors the provisions of the Central Act. It is mandatory for the State Government to follow the provisions of the Central Act, in addition to the provisions of the State Act, if necessary, but as far as the acquisition of lands for establishment of industrial corridors or industrial areas, the Central Act is a self-contained code by itself and ignoring the Central Act, the State Government cannot resort to exercise power under the State Act.

The Central Government has made two sets of Rules, namely, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Social Impact Assessment and Consent) Rules, 2014 vide Notification No. 13011/01/2014-LRD, New Delhi, dated 8th Aug., 2014.

The above said Rules provide for various aspects that have to be taken into consideration by the team which undertakes the Social Impact Assessment, the important aspects being the location of land proposed to be acquired and the proposed lands for acquisition is the bare minimum required, possible alternative sites and their feasibility, nature of the land, present use and classification of the land and if it is agricultural land, the irrigation coverage for the said land and the cropping pattern and the special provisions with respect to food security have been adhered to in the proposed land acquisition.

It is contended that it is not open for the State Government to acquire lands for industrial areas under the State Act, especially for the establishment of NIMZ, which is the concept under the NMP of the Government of India. Even otherwise, the entire field of establishment of industrial areas is covered under the Central Act, the provisions of the State Act are redundant and such provisions are directly in conflict with the provisions of the Central Act and as such they are repugnant and inoperative, as contemplated under Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India.

The Central Act is traced to Item 42 in List III - Concurrent List of Seventh Schedule which provides for acquisition and requisitioning of property. Hence in the matter of acquisition of property namely, the lands, is covered under the said provision, the Central Act prevails over the State Act, as contemplated under Art. 246(2) and 246(4) read with the proviso to Art. 254(2) of the Constitution.

A Constitution Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court has declared the law in the matter of Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (Private) Limited and Others Vs. Slate of Uttar Pradesh and Others AIR 1980 SC 1955 : (1980) 3 SCR 331 : (1980) 4 SCC 136. The Bench has referred to, paragraph 17, the different entries in List I, II and III of the Seventh Schedule, that stood before the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, and has held (paragraph 18) that insofar as substitution of a comprehensive entry in list III is concerned, it could hardly be urged with confidence that the power of acquisition and requisition of property was incidental to other power. It is an independent power provided for in a specific entry. Therefore, both the Union and the State would have power of acquisition and requisition of property. This portion is unquestionably established by the majority decision in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper Vs. Union of India (1970) 3 SCR 530 : AIR 1970 SC 564 (11 Judges Bench), where, Shah, J., speaking for the majority of 10 Judges held as under:
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"Power to legislate for acquisition of property is exercisable only under Entry 42 of List III, and not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of three lists."

After discussing the case-law it has been declared thus:

"19. It thus clearly transpires that the observation in 'Rustam Cavasjee Cooper Vs. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 548, extracted above that power to legislate for acquisition of property is exercisable only under Entry 42 of List III and not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three lists, is borne out from Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Limited Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 351 and State of Bihar Vs. Sir Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1952 SC 252."

The law laid down by the 11 judges Bench in R.C. Cooper Vs. Union of India, quoted by the Constitution bench in Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills case (see paragraph 40 in R.C. Cooper's case, AIR 1970 SC 564).

It is contended that insofar as the law laid down by the 11 Judges Bench in R.C. Cooper case, followed by the Constitution Bench in Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills, (1980) 4 SCC 136, is not overruled by any other larger Bench of the Supreme Court. Thus the law laid down by the 11 Judges in R.C. Cooper's case, that power to legislate for acquisition of property is exercisable only under Entry 42 of List III and not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the 3 lists, is the ultimate law laid down by the Supreme Court sofar.

Even the Constitution Bench in Rajiv Sarin and Another Vs. State of Uttarakhand and Others, AIR 2011 SC 3081 : VI (2011) SLT 356 : 2011 (7) SCJ 733 : (2011)8 SCC 708 has reiterated the law in para 70 thus:

"Under the Indian Constitution the field of legislation covering claim for compensation on deprivation of one's property can be traced to Schedule 7, List III, Entry 42 of the Constitution. The Constitution (7th Amendment) Act, 1956 deleted Schedule 7, List I, Entry 33, List II, Entry 3n and reworded List III, Entry 42 relating to "acquisition and requisition of property"."

Thus, in view of the law laid down by the 11 Judges Bench and followed by subsequent Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court mentioned in the above decisions, any argument that the State Act can incidentally provide for acquisition of lands for industrial purposes by a law traceable to Entry 24 in List II (State List) is untenable.

A contention that State is competent to make law under item 24 in List II, which provides for Industries subject to the provisions of Entries 7 and 52 of List I is untenable, inasmuch as the provision providing for Industries does not empower the State to make law providing for acquisition of property for establishment of Industries. The acquisition of property being in the Concurrent List, it is open for both the State Government and the Central Government to make laws through the respective Legislatures. Once the Parliament makes a law providing for acquisition of lands for industries and the Central Act being a self-contained Code by itself, the Central Law prevails over the State Law and as such, the provisions of the KIAD Act are in direct conflict with the provisions of the Central Act and as such, repugnant to the Central Legislation and as such, liable to be declared as unconstitutional.

The KIAD Act, can be divided into 2 parts; one relates to the Industrial areas referred to in Chapter II and establishment and constitution of the Board under Chapters III to VI.

The other part of the Act relates to acquisition of land in Chapter VII. However, the provisions in Chapter VII of the Act cannot be considered as a self-contained code inasmuch as no guidelines are provided for acquisition of lands.

That apart, the entire Act except Chapter VII comes into force at once that is with effect from 26-5-1966. The peculiarity of this Act is that Chapter VII relating to acquisition of lands comes into force in such area and from such date as the State Government may, from lime to time, specify by a notification. Thus, Chapter VII does not extend to the whole of State of Karnataka, but it only extends to different areas that may be notified by the State Government. There are no guidelines in the Act which provide as to the manner and method of identifying the areas which may be notified as Industrial areas under Sec. 3 of the Act. Thus any land anywhere can be acquired by declaring such area as an Industrial Area, at the whim and fancy of the executive. Thus, the provisions of Sec. 1(3) and the provisions of Sec. 28 are unconstitutional being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India.

That apart the constitutional validity of acquisition of lands under Sec. 28 of the Act read with Sec. 1(3) of the Act have not been examined, in view of the fact that the earlier Land Acquisition Act did not include the acquisition of lands for industrial purpose, as a public purpose and accordingly Courts have held that the acquisition of land is incidental to the power of the State Government to establish the industrial areas which is the dominant purpose of the State Act.

Now the object of the 2013 Act is to provide a transparent process for land acquisition for industrialisation and development of essential infrastructural facilities, etc. This is further elucidated by Sec. 2 of the Act read with the definition of 'public purpose' defined in Sec. 3(za) of the Act. Thus the acquisition of lands for industrial purposes is covered under the Central Act, which is the dominant legislation made by the Parliament by virtue of powers under the proviso to Art. 254(2) of the Constitution.

Industrial areas cannot be established without lands, either Government lands or the lands owned by citizens. The right to property is traceable to Art. 300-A of the Constitution. Chapter VII of the Act which provides for acquisition and disposal of land cannot be termed as incidental to establishing Industrial areas. Acquisition of property, as laid down by the Supreme Court can be traced to Entry 42 of List III only and as such the State Act which does not satisfy the law laid down by the Supreme Court relating to acquisition of property, is in conflict with the Central Act and as such, repugnant to the Central Act made by the Parliament under Art. 254(2).

Thus the 'doctrine of severability' is applicable and provisions of Chapter VII read with Sec. 1(3) of the Act which bring the provisions of Chapter VII to force from the date that may be specified by the State Government, are liable to be declared as unconstitutional, being repugnant to the Parliamentary Legislation.

Reference can be made to the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Offshore Holdings Private Limited Vs. Bangalore Development Authority and Others, I (2011) SLT 511 : 2011 (2) SCJ 311 :(2011)3 SCC 139 (paragraphs 107 to 118).

The contention that Sec. 30 of the State Act providing for application of the Central Act No. I of 1894, is a legislation by incorporation has no bearing on the issue involved in examining whether the State Act is repugnant to the Central Act by virtue of proviso to Art. 254 of the Constitution. The Central Legislation is a self-contained code and the State Government which is the Appropriate Government under the Central Act is empowered to make rules in respect of the acquisition of land to achieve the object of the Act and one of the objects of the Act is to acquire lands for industries or Industrial Corridors, which is also the object under the State Act.

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