BANGALORE WOOLLEN COTTON AND SILK MILLS COLTD Vs. LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL OF INDIA AND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) C. P. No. 4/52-53 is an application by the Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co., Ltd., Bangalore under Article 225. Constitution of India, praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order of Respondent 1 dated 14-3-52 only in so far as it imposes certain conditions on the petitioners while granting permission to discharge some workmen who were employed in the petitioners' Mills. Respondent 1 is the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India constituted under the Indian Appellate Tribunal Act, 1950 and is described as having its office at Fort, Bombay and Respondent 2 is the Binny Mills Labour Association with its office in Bangalore City. The application is accompanied by an affidavit wherein the circumstances under which the present application has come to be made are set out. In May 1950, the Government of Mysore referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Act XIV of 1947) for adjudication, several disputes which were pending between the management of the Petitioners-Mills and Respondent 2 as regards the workmen's demands. During the pendency of those proceedings, the Petitioners felt the necessity to retrench 179 workmen who were engaged in their Woollen Department, and under Section 33, Industrial Disputes Act. they made an application to the Tribunal for permission to do so. That Tribunal after hearing the parties passed an order refusing to allow the Petitioners to pay off these workmen. The Mills then preferred an appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India who, sitting at Bangalore, heard the parties and passed a considered order on 14-3-1952. By that order they gave permission to the Petitioners to retrench the 179 workmen but made it subject to the condition that they should be paid by way of "retrenchment relief" a sum equivalent to one month's basic wage, for every year of completed service in the Company; and they went on to define how that basic wage was to be calculated. They also directed that those workmen should be deemed to have been in service and entitled to the usual emoluments till the date of their order. The Petitioners feel aggrieved on account of the first of the conditions attached to the order and have prayed that the same may be quashed. The Labour Association has filed a similar application (C.P. No. 21/52-53) praying for the quashing of the entire order permitting retrenchment.

(2.) We have heard Mr. O. T. G. Nambiar, learned Counsel for the" Petitioners', and Mr. G. V. Ramachar, learned Counsel for Respondent 2. Mr. Ramachar has raised a preliminary objection to the hearing of this application. He contends that the office of Respondent 1 is located in the Fort area at Bombay and that any writ which is to be effective against them can only be issued by a High Court having territorial jurisdiction over that Tribunal, In that view he urges that this application should have been made in the High Court of Bombay. It appears to us that there is no force in this contention. In -- 'Ryots of Garabandho v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi', AIR 1943 PC 164 (A), a similar question came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Privy Council. In that case the Madras High Court had issued a writ at the instance of some ryots against the Board of Revenue whose office was situate within the town of Madras quashing an order which had been passed by the Board in connection with a settlement of (rents) dispute between the ryots and the zamindar of Parlakimedi which was in Ganjam District. Though, on appeal to the Privy Council, their Lordships of the Privy Council found that the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court to issue writs was confined to the local limits of the ordinary original Civil jurisdiction of that High Court, they held that in spite of the circumstance that the Board of Revenue had its office in Madras town, the Madras High Court could not issue a writ as the zamindari lands in respect of which the Board of Revenue had passed such an order was situated beyond the local limits of its original jurisdiction. Their Lordships pointed out that the question of jurisdiction must be regarded as one of substance and not merely one of form; although the Board of Revenue was situated within the Presidency town of Madras and had issued their order in that town the parties as well as estate concerned in the dispute were not within the original civil jurisdiction of the Madras High Court; the mere location of the Revenue Tribunal within the town of Madras according to their Lordships afforded no ground to claim jurisdiction for the Madras High Court to issue a writ in a matter of the kind concerned in that case.

(3.) The Bombay High Court had recently to consider a similar though converse question in -- 'The Madras Electric Tramway Ltd. v. M. K. Rangenattian', reported in , AIR1952 Bom 449 , (1952 )54 BOMLR552 , ILR1952 Bom 974 , (1952 )I LLJ176 Bom (B). In that case, the Labour Tribunal had passed an order refusing to reinstate certain dismissed employees of the Company. Against that order, an application for a writ of certio-rari was made by the concerned workmen and Shah J. took the view that the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was without jurisdiction and quashed the order. On appeal Chagla C. J. and Gajendragadkar J. upheld the objection on behalf of the Company that the Bombay High Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ in that matter; the fact that the Labour Appellate Tribunal had its office in Bombay they said would not afford any ground for such jurisdiction; it was an All India Tribunal acting as an appellate authority from the decisions of various Labour Tribunals all over the country and it also sits at other places in India; both the Company and the workmen were not within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court and the -subject-matter of the dispute between the parties was not also within its jurisdiction. The Bombay High Court could not, therefore, issue a writ though the Madras High Court may be able to quash the order and make a decision binding upon the parties who would be before the Court as being within its jurisdiction. Reliance was placed in this connection on -- 'AIR 1943 P C 164' (A).