V C SHUKLA Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal is directed against an order dated 17/09/1979 passed by Justice Joshi, Special Judge appointed under the Special Courts Act, 1979 (No. 22 of 1979) (hereinafter to be referred as the 'act') by which the learned Judge directed a charge to be framed against the appellant under S. 120-B of the Indian Penal Code read with S. 5 (1) (d) and S. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and also under S. 5 (2) read with S. 5 (1) (d) of the said Act. This appeal has been filed by the appellant under Section 11 (1) of the Act. The appeal was placed for preliminary hearing before a Division Bench of this Court where Mr. Soli Sorabjee, the Solicitor General of India, put in appearance on behalf of the respondent and raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal. The preliminary objection raised by the Solicitor General was mainly on the ground that the order impugned being a purely interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 11 (1) of the Act, no appeal lay to this Court. The Division Bench in view of the nature of the substantial question of law involved referred the case to a larger Bench even at the stage of preliminary hearing because if the appeal was admitted for hearing, it would impliedly involve a decision on the question raised by the Solicitor General by way of a preliminary objection.

(2.) We have heard the counsel for the parties at very great length on the various aspects of the respective points of view put forward by the respective points of view put forward by the counsel for the parties. It is manifest that if the preliminary objection raised by the respondent finds favour then the appeal has to be dismissed in limine as being not maintainable. If, however, the preliminary objection is overruled and the contention of the appellant is accepted, the appeal will have to be admitted to hearing. In view of the limited nature of the scope of the appeal we find it wholly unnecessary to go into the facts, circumstances or the evidence on a consideration of which the Special Judge has based his order because that can be done only if the appeal is to be heard on merits.

(3.) The sheet-anchor of the argument of Mr. Mridul, counsel for the appellant, appears to be that the Special Courts Act being a statute in pari materia, the Criminal Procedure Code, the expressions used and the meaning of the words employed in the Act must have the same meaning and signification as used in the various provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 (hereinafter to be referred to as the 'code'). It was submitted in the first instance that on a proper construction of S. 11 of the Act, the word 'interlocutory order' has been used exactly in the same sense as the same word has been used in S. 397 (2) of the Code. The argument merits serious consideration and has various phases and facets to be gone into after a proper examination of the scheme and object of the Code and the Act. To begin with, it would appear that the Code has made revolutionary changes in the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 and has inserted additional provisions with a view to ensure speedy justice without impeding fairness of the trial. In this connection, the relevant portions of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Code may be extracted:-