LAWS(SC)-1988-3-3

G RAMEGOWDA MAJOR BASAVALINGAPPA Vs. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER BANGALORE:SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER BANGALORE

Decided On March 10, 1988
G.RAMEGOWDA,MAJOR Appellant
V/S
SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,BANGALORE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These three appeals, by the claimant-respondents in certain Land Acquisition Appeals before the High Court are preferred, by Special Leave, against the common order dated 14-6-1973 of the High Court of Mysore (Karnataka) condoning, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, certain delays on the part of the Land Acquisition Officer in preferring the three corresponding appeals in M.F.A. No. 290 of 1973, M.F.A. 293 of 1973 and M.F.A. No. 289 of 1973 respectively.

(2.) The common award, in the three land acquisition references was passed by the learned Civil Judge on 17-7-1970. Application for certified copies was made on 31-8-1971; copies obtained on 5-1-1972 and M.F.A. No. 289 of 1973 was lodged before the High Court on 19-1-1972 and the other two appeals viz., M.F.A. 290 of 1973 and 293 of 1973 on 10-4-1972. There were, thus, substantial delays in preferring the appeals. The Land Acquisition Officer, appellant before the High Court, filed applications to have these delays excused. The Division Bench of the High Court was persuaded to make an order condoning the delay.

(3.) Sri R. B. Datar, learned counsel appearing in support of these appeals assailed the order of the High Court on the ground that the High Court fell into a manifest error in condoning these inordinate and wholly unjustified delays and that explanation offered before, and accepted by, the High Court cannot, in law, be held to constitute 'sufficient cause' for purposes and within the meaning of, Section 5. Learned Counsel strenuously urged that the rights vesting in the successful parties to a litigation by the expiry of the period of limitation should not lightly be interfered with unless it was established that the appeal could not have been lodged in time despite the exercise of reasonable deligence on the part of the appellant. Learned counsel further contended that the fact that the Government Pleaders had not discharged their duty to the Government, even if true, would be wholly beside the point as that would be a matter of internal administration. If Government was not able to set its own house in order, says learned counsel, the opposite party, who had the benefit of the adjudication should not be exposed to a time barred appeal. There cannot, says counsel, be one standard for an ordinary litigant and another for Government.