(1.) This judgment has been divided into sections to facilitate analysis. They are :
(2.) Privacy, in its simplest sense, allows each human being to be left alone in a core which is inviolable. Yet the autonomy of the individual is conditioned by her relationships with the rest of society. Those relationships may and do often pose questions to autonomy and free choice. The overarching presence of state and nonstate entities regulates aspects of social existence which bear upon the freedom of the individual. The preservation of constitutional liberty is, so to speak, work in progress. Challenges have to be addressed to existing problems. Equally, new challenges have to be dealt with in terms of a constitutional understanding of where liberty places an individual in the context of a social order. The emergence of new challenges is exemplified by this case, where the debate on privacy is being analysed in the context of a global information based society. In an age where information technology governs virtually every aspect of our lives, the task before the Court is to impart constitutional meaning to individual liberty in an interconnected world. While we revisit the question whether our constitution protects privacy as an elemental principle, the Court has to be sensitive to the needs of and the opportunities and dangers posed to liberty in a digital world.
(3.) A Bench of three judges of this Court, while considering the constitutional challenge to the Aadhaar card scheme of the Union government noted in its order dated 11 August 2015 that the norms for and compilation of demographic biometric data by government was questioned on the ground that it violates the right to privacy. The Attorney General for India urged that the existence of a fundamental right of privacy is in doubt in view of two decisions : the first - M P Sharma v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi, (1954) SCR 1077 ("M P Sharma") was rendered by a Bench of eight judges and the second, in Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1964) 1 SCR 332 ("Kharak Singh") was rendered by a Bench of six judges. Each of these decisions, in the submission of the Attorney General, contained observations that the Indian Constitution does not specifically protect the right to privacy. On the other hand, the submission of the petitioners was that M P Sharma and Kharak Singh were founded on principles expounded in A K Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 ("Gopalan"). Gopalan, which construed each provision contained in the Chapter on fundamental rights as embodying a distinct protection, was held not to be good law by an eleven-judge Bench in Rustom Cavasji Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248 ("Cooper"). Hence the petitioners submitted that the basis of the two earlier decisions is not valid. Moreover, it was also urged that in the seven-judge Bench decision in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 ("Maneka"), the minority judgment of Justice Subba Rao in Kharak Singh was specifically approved of and the decision of the majority was overruled.