SHRIJEE SALES CORPORATION Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) He present appeal impugns the judgment of the High court of Delhi dated 16/3/1983 which dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants challenging the notification dated 16/10/1980 issued by the government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, being Notification No. 205/f-No. 355/141/80-Cus I. (hereinafter referred to as "notification No. 205"). This notification was issued in supersession of an earlier notification dated 15/3/1979 being Notification No. 66-Cus. dated 15/3/1979 (hereinafter referred to as "notification No. 66"). By the first Notification No. 66, the government gave exemption to imports of polyvinyl chloride resins (PVC) falling within Ch. 39 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 from the duty of customs leviable thereon specified in the First Schedule. The relevant part of the Notification No. 66.

(2.) The impugned judgment of the High court is quite brief. It relies entirely on a full bench decision of the same High court in the case of Bombay Conductors and Electricals Ltd. v. Govt. of lndia. The primary focus of the judgment in the case of Bombay Conductors' was that imposition of taxes and withdrawal thereof are legislative functions and since there can be no estoppel against the legislature, the withdrawal notification was not hit by the principles of estoppel. The impugned judgment, however, does not dispute that the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be attracted against the State. However, after an analysis of various previous judgments of this court on the question of promissory estoppel against public authorities, the judgment concludes that the question ofpromissory estoppel cannot be invoked when the public interest requires otherwise. The following part of the judgment in Bombay Conductors can be quoted with profit to identify the reasoning of the High court as to why the impugned notification could not be quashed, be it a legislative function or an executive one.

(3.) It is not necessary for us to go into a historical analysis of the case-law relating to promissory estoppel against the government. Suffice it to say that the principle of promissory estoppel is applicable against the government but in case there is a supervening public equity, the government would be allowed to change its stand; it would then be able to withdraw from representation made by it which induced persons to take certain steps which may have gone adverse to the interest of such persons on account of such withdrawal. However, the court must satisfy itself that such a public interest exists. The law on this aspect has been emphatically laid down in the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U. P. The portion relevant for our purpose is extracted below: