(1.) Four accused - Meharban, Rugga Singh, Baje Singh and Jagannath - faced trial on the principal charge of murder of one Ranjit Singh on the night between 22nd and 23rd February, 1981. The charge against the first three accused was under Sections 302/34 and against the fourth under Sections 302/109, I. P. C. Meharban had faced trial also under Section 379, I. P. C. for the alleged offence of theft of a bicycle belonging to PW-3 Bhan Singh. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted all the accused under all the charges. The State preferred appeal against the first three accused and the High Court has come to convict them under Section 302/34. The acquittal of Meharban under Section 379 has been maintained. Hence this appeal under Section 2(a) of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appeal Jurisdiction) Act, 1970.
(2.) There is no dispute at the bar that the conviction is based primarily on the dying declaration of Ranjit Singh which has been deposed to by his sons PW 1, Meharban, PW 8 Sujan Singh; his widow PW 2, Reshamabai; and PW 3, Bhan Singh, A (would be) close relation. According to the prosecution, the dying declaration has received corroboration from finding of some materials from the possession or at the instance of the appellants which had contained human blood. The trial Court disbelieved the testimony of these witnesses relating to dying declaration on ten grounds noted in para 3 of the impugned judgment. The High Court has gone into each of the grounds and has taken the view that the trial Court was not right in rejecting the dying declaration for the reasons ascribed by it. Shri Bachawat, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, has contended that the view of the trial Court being also reasonable did not merit reversal. Shri Shukla, learned senior Advocate appearing for the State, has however, urged that the appreciation of the evidence by the High Court should receive our concurrence.
(3.) The basic reason which led the trial Court to disbelieve the evidence of the PWs is the improbability of recognising the assailants as the occurrence was on a dark night and inside a hut where the deceased was sleeping. Now, if the ocurrence had really taken place inside the hut we would agree with Shri Bachawat that it would not have been possible to recognise the assailants; but then, as pointed out by the High Court, and rightly, the trial Court missed the point that the assault had taken place about 160 yards away from the hut in open place. This conclusion of the High Court is based on the recovery of one blood-stained shoe of the deceased found at that place, which has been marked as (6) in the sketchmap prepared by the IO, PW. 10. Shri Bachawat has urged that this shoe, which was marked as MO 4, had not been identified by any of the PWs to have belonged to the deceased. The shoe to be identified, according to Shri Bachawat, was the one which was found inside the hut. This, however, is not so, as would appear from the evidence of the IO, to which we were referred by Shri Shukla, as in his evidence the IO stated in para 7 that "shoe item No. 4 was recovered from the sport, another shoe item No. 10 was recovered from Ranjit Singhs hut". P. W. 2 had in her evidence identified M. O. 4 to be her husbands shoe.