(1.) This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of the order of detention passed by the Distt. Magistrate, Agra, on 31st August, 1986, directing that the petitioner be detained in the District Jail, Agra, under sub-s. (3) of S. 3, National Security Act, 1980. The order of detention was served on the petitioner on 31st August, 1980, along with the grounds of detention. The grounds of detention set out only one ground in the following terms:
(2.) It is significant to note, and this was strongly, urged on behalf of the petitioner, that there is only one ground on which the order of detention is based, namely, that the petitioner along with others jointly committed murder of Athmaram Shukla by firing at him in broad day light near the clinic of Lakshminarayan Gupta with the object of getting the land vacated by him and by this act of his, he created panic in the area and consequently general public order was disturbed and from this one ground alone the detaining authority could not reasonably be satisfied that it was necessary to detain him with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Now, it cannot be laid down as a bald proposition that one ground can never be sufficient for founding the satisfaction of the detaining authority for detaining a person. There are cases where one ground may be regarded as sufficient if the activity alleged is of such a nature that the detaining authority could reasonably infer that the detenu must be habitually engaged in such activity or there may be other circumstances set out in the grounds of, detention from which the detaining authority could reasonably be satisfied even on the basis of one ground that unless the detenu is detained, he might indulge in such activity in future but here the only ground alleged against the petitioner is that he, along with others, jointly committed murder in broad day light. This is the only ground given in the grounds of detention without any other circumstances from which any inference could be drawn that the petitioner could be likely to commit such act, if left free. It is no doubt true that in the counter-affidavit filed by the District Magistrate several circumstances have been set out which might go to suggest that the petitioner is habitually indulging in criminal activity and some instances have also been set out by the District Magistrate in the counter-affidavit. But none of these circumstances, finds a place in the grounds of detention. It is well settled that the detaining authority cannot by an affidavit filed in Court supplement what is stated in the grounds of detention or add to it. It is difficult to infer from the solitary ground set out in the grounds of detention that the act alleged to have been committed by the petitioner would have disturbed public order as distinct from law and order or that one single act committed by the petitioner was of such a character that it could reasonably be inferred by the detaining authority that if not detained, he would be likely to indulge in such activity in future.
(3.) We are therefore of the view that the ground of detention given in support of the order of detention was irrelevant and no reasonable inference could be drawn from that ground which would justify the making of the order of detention. We accordingly allow the writ petition and direct that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith. But we may make it clear that if it is legally possible for the detaining authority to take any fresh preventive action against the petitioner it would be open to the detaining authority to do so.