S GUIN Vs. GRINDLAYS BANK LIMITED

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by special leave is filed by the appellants against the judgment and order dated December 19, 1984 in Criminal Appeal No. 315 of 1978 on the file of the Calcutta High Court setting aside the judgment of acquittal passed in C-3064 of 1977 on the file of the Metropolitan Magistrate, 12th Court, Calcutta.

(2.) This appeal arises out of a complaint filed before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta by one Manindra Narayan Choudhury, Operation Manager of the Grindlays Bank Ltd. against the twelve appellants, referred to above, for offences punishable under section 341, Indian Penal Code and section 36AD of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 said to have been committed by them on October 31, 1977. The complaint alleged that the appellants had without reasonable cause obstructed the officers of the Bank, particularly Shri G. Vaidya from lawfully entering the premises of the branch of the Bank at 41, Chowringhee Road, Calcutta and had obstructed the transaction of normal business at the said branch. It was also alleged that they had thereby committed the offence punishable under section 147, Indian Penal Code. The prosecution further alleged that all of them were constructively liable for the offences said to have been committed by them under section 34, Indian Penal Code. It was urged that these acts had been committed by the appellants pursuant to a call of strike given by the employees of the Bank. The Magistrate issued summons to the appellants for offences punishable under section 341, Indian Penal Code and under section 36AD, of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. After trial, the Magistrate by his judgment dated June 27, 1978 acquitted all the appellants. Against the said judgment of acquittal an appeal was filed by the Grindlays Bank Ltd. before the High Court of Calcutta in Criminal Appeal No. 315 of 1978. The said appeal came to be disposed of after nearly six years on December 19, 1984. The High Court felt that the trial Court had missed the essence of the offences with which the appellants had been charged and therefore there was failure of justice. Hence it set aside the judgment of acquittal passed by the Magistrate and remanded the case for retrial for offences punishable under section 341 read with section 34 or section 149, Indian Penal Code. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the appellants have filed this appeal.

(3.) After going through the judgment of the Magistrate and of the High Court we feel that whatever might have been the error committed by the Magistrate, in the circumstances of the case, it was not just and proper for the High Court to have remanded the case for fresh trial, when the order of acquittal had been passed nearly six years before the judgment of the High Court. The pendency of the Criminal Appeal for six years before the High Court is itself a regrettable feature of this case. In addition to it, the order directing retrial has resulted in serious prejudice to the appellants. We are of the view that having regard to the nature of the acts alleged to have been committed by the appellants and other attendant circumstances, this was a case in which the High Court should have directed the dropping of the proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code even if for some reason it came to the conclusion that the acquittal was wrong. A fresh trial nearly seven years after the alleged incident is bound to result in harassment and abuse of judicial process. We may at this stage refer to the decision of this Court in S. Veerabadran Chettiar v. E. V. Ramaswami Naicker, (1959) SCR 1211. In that case this Court disagreed with the High Court on the interpretation of section, 295 of the Indian Penal Code and the order of dismissal of complaint by the Courts below, but it proceeded to observe at page 1218 thus: