(1.) This Civil Appeal and Writ Petition raise common questions which are capable of being disposed of by a common judgment. The facts in their abridged form may be noticed at the outset.
(2.) The respondent No. 1, a post-graduate in Political Science and Modern History, undertook studies in LL. B. course of the Calcutta University as a non-collegiate woman candidate under Regn. 35 of the Calcutta University, First Regulations, 1951 framed under the Calcutta University Act, 1951. The said Regulation may be extracted at this stage
(3.) When the Writ Petition came up for hearing before the learned single Judge, the attack on R. l(l)(c) of Part IV was two-fold, namely, that it violated Arts. 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and was ultra vires S. 49(l)(d) of the Act and since it was framed without consulting the University it was invalid and could not impinge on Regn. 35. The learned single Judge overruled all the aforesaid contentions and discharged the Rule Nisi. Against the said decision an appeal came to be preferred. The Division Bench held that R. 1(l)(c) did not lay down any standard of legal education but provided that after March 12, 1967 a law degree obtained from any University in India shall not be recognised for the purpose of S. 24(l)(c)(iii) of Act unless the conditions specified in clauses (a) to (d) were satisfied. It further held that section 49(1)(d) of the Act did not confer power to lay down conditions for enrolment, neither could such conditions be imposed under Ss. 7(i) and 24(l)(c)(iii) of the Act. Indeed, the Court held, it was not the function of the Bar Council of India to lay down such conditions for recognition of the law degree. It further pointed out that the purport of R. 1(1) was to amend S. 24(l)(c)(iii) and S. 7(i) of the Act which was clearly illegal. Thus the Division Bench held R. l(l)(c) ultra vires Ss. 7(i), 24(1)(c)(iii) and 49(l)(d) of the Act. On the plea that the rule was illegal as it was framed without prior consultation with the University, it declined to express any view. The appeal was thus allowed and hence this appeal by special leave.