STATE OFBIHAR Vs. KAMESHWAR SINGH:STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH:GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH:KAMESHWAR SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE appeals and petitions which fall into three groups, raise the issue of the constitutional validity of three State enactments called

(2.) IT will be noted, however,, that Arts. 31-A and 31-B afford only limited protection against one ground of challenge, namely, that the law in question 15 "Inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of this Part". This is made further clear by the opening words of Art. 31-A "notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part". The Amendment Act thus provides no immunity from attacks based on the lack of legislative competence under Art. 246, read with the entries in list2 or list3 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution to enact the three impugned statutes, as the Amendment Act did not in any way affect the Lists. Mr. P. R. Das, leading counsel for the zemindars, accordingly based his main argument in these proceedings on entry No. 36 of list2 and entry No. 42 of lists which read as follows:

(3.) DR. Ambedkar, who appeared for some of the zamindars in the Uttar Pradesh batch of cases, advanced a different line of argument. He placed no reliance upon entry38 of list2 or entry43 of list3. He appeared to concede what Mr. Das so strenuously contested, that those entries, concerned as they were with the grant of power to the State Legislature to legislate with respect to matters specified therein, could not be taken, as a matter of construction, to import an obligation to pay compensation. But he maintained that a constitutional prohibition against compulsory acquisition of property without public necessity and payment of compensation was deducible from what he called the "spirit of the Constitution", which, according to him, was a valid test for judging the constitutionality of a statute. The Constitution, being avowedly one for establishing liberty, justice and equality and a government of a tree people with only limited powers, must be held to contain an implied prohibition against taking private property without just compensation and in the absence of a public purpose. He relied on certain American decisions and text-books as supporting the view that a constitutional prohibition can be derived by implication from the spirit of the Constitution where no express prohibition has been enacted in that behalf. Articles 31-A and 31-B barred only objections based on alleged infringements of the fundamental right conferred by Part III, but if, from the other provisions thereof. It could be inferred that there must be a public purpose and payment of compensation before private property could be compulsorily acquired by the State, there was nothing in the two articles aforesaid to preclude objection on the ground that the impugned Acts do not satisfy these requirements and are, therefore, unconstitutional.