DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY UNION OF INDIA Vs. SUDAN SINGH:BALBIR SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These petitions, though bulky, show much ado about nothing. 73 writ petitions were allowed by a division bench of the Delhi High court on 18/11/1988 vide judgment reported as B. R. Gupta v. Union of India. Undeniably the petitioners then approaching that court were from eleven villages affected by notifications under S. 4 and 6 of the Land acquisition Act and none of those petitioners had challenged the acquisition in Village Saidul Azab, though it was one of the chain villages covered in the acquisition. It is true that Village Saidul Azab did figure to be mentionedin the judgment but apparently as a detail in the appreciation of facts. Later relying on the judgment in Gupta case a Single bench of the Delhi High court in CWs Nos. 2567-2568 of 1987 decided on 9/3/1989 accorded the same treatment to Village Saidul Azab. Resultantly, by these two decisions notification under Section 6 relating to 12 villages in its entirety stood quashed.

(2.) Another batch of petitions CW No. 1373 of 1989 etc. came up before another division bench of the High court in which grievance voiced by the writ petitioners was that despite notification under Section 6 of the Act relating to the villages in which their lands were situated (being part of 12 villages) having been quashed the judgment of the High court was not being followed and the writ petitioners were about to be dispossessed. To grant appropriate relief, the High court on 15/5/1989 when confronting the Delhi administration and Delhi Development Authority, on the subject, observed as follows:

(3.) The Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority sought a review of the said order on the ground that their counsel appearing then was not authorised to make a concession which concession seemingly was evident as suggested. The High court on 5/7/1990 saw through the gimmick of words and viewed that the counsel had rather made a contention and not a concession, being cognizant that the notification under Section 6 had been quashed and it was prudent to retrieve the situation keeping in view the ground realities which had intervened in the meantime such as the obligation to return compensation, change of possessions, etc. These aspects have adequately been noticed by the High court in its judgment and order afore-extracted. Hence these special leave petitions.