CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NAGPUR CIVIL LINES NAGPUR Vs. RAMCHANDRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by special leave is directed against an order of the High Court of Bombay of 2/3rd October, 1979 by which an order passed suspending the two respondents was quashed on the ground that the order of suspension pending a departmental inquiry was passed by the Municipal Commissioner who was not competent to suspend the respondents pending a departmental inquiry. The High Court was of the view that under the Rules and Bye-taws of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') as amended up-to-date, the competent authority to Pass order of suspension against the respondents was the Corporation itself and not the Chief Executive Officer. It appears that originally the order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on the 23rd September, 1974 which was confirmed by the Coroporation by its order dated 23rd September, 1974. It is alleged by the respondents that latter order was not communicated to them .The suspension was ordered in connection with a departmental inquiry relating to two accidents which occurred during the construction of a stadium called the Yeshwant Stadium, which was being looked after by the respondents and which resulted in the death of seven persons and injuries to eight others. A complaint was also filed before the police as a result of which a charge-sheet under Section 304-A IPC was filed against the respondents, on the 25th September, 1976. In view of the charge-sheet submitted by the police another order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on 13-1-77 with effect from 8-10-76. The respondents filed an appeal to departmental appellate authority which was dismissed on the 20th July, 1977. Thereafter, the respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court which allowed the petition and quashed the order of suspension and directed the respondents to be paid their full salary and further directed the reinstatement of the respondents. Hence this appeal.

(2.) The short point taken by Mr. Sanghi was that under Section 59 (3) of the Act, the Municipal Commissioner is the competent authority to suspend the respondents pending a departmental inquiry. On a perusal of Section 59 (3) we are of the opinion that the contention is well founded and must prevail. Section 59 (3) may be extracted thus:

(3.) Thus Clause (b) of Section 59 (3) in express terms authorises and clothes the Municipal Commissioner with the power to exercise supervision and control over the acts of Municipal officers and servants. It may be noticed that the said Clause (b) is preceded by the words 'vests in the Commissioner'. When the words 'control, and 'vests' are read together they are strong terms which convey an absolute control in the authority in order to effectuate the policy underlying the rules and makes the authority concerned the sole custodian of the control of the servants and officers of the Municipal Corporation. In the case of State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, (1966) 1 SCR 771 while interpreting a similar language employed in Article 235 of the Constitution of India which confers control by the High Court over District Courts, this Court held that the word 'control' would include the power to take disciplinary action and all other incidental or consequential steps to effectuate this end and made the following observations (at pages 453 and 455 at AIR) "The word "control", as we have seen, was used for the first time in the Constitution and it is accompanied by the word "vest" which is a strong word. It shows that the High Court is made the sole custodian of the control over the judiciary. Control, therefore, is not merely the power to arrange the day to day working of the court but contemplates disciplinary jurisdiction over the presiding Judge."