H S RIKHY MANOHAR LAL MR P GOYLE Vs. NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question for determination in these three appeals, on certificates of fitness granted by the High Court of Punjab under Art. 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution, is whether the provisions of S. 8 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act (XXXVIII of 1952) (which hereinafter will be referred to as the Act) apply to the transactions in question between the appellants in each case and the New Delhi Municipal Committee (which for the sake of brevity we shall call 'the Committee' in the course of this judgment).

(2.) It is necessary to state the following facts in order to bring out the nature and scope of the controversy. It is not necessary to refer in detail to the facts of each case separately for the purpose of these appeals. The Committee built in 1945 what is known as the Central Municipal Market Lodi Colony. This Market has 32 shops, with residential flats on 28 of them. In April 1945, the Committee, in pursuance of a resolution passed by it, invited tenders from intending bidders for those shops and premises. On receipt of tenders, the highest bidders were allotted various shops on rents varying from Rs. 135-8-0 to Rs. 520 per mensem. The allottees occupied the shops and the premises in accordance with the allotments made by the Committee and continued to pay the respective amounts which may be characterised as rents, without prejudice to our decision on the question whether it was legally a 'rent' because as will presently appear, one of the controversies between the parties is whether it is 'rent' within the meaning of the Act. Towards the end of 1952, 30 of the occupants filed applications under S. 8 of the Act praying for the fixation of standard rent in respect of the premises in their respective occupation. The Committee raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the aforesaid applications on the ground that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the applicants and the Committee, within the meaning of the Act. The Trial Court accordingly framed the following issue for determination in the first instance:

(3.) It has been argued on behalf of the appellants that the Transfer of Property Act does not apply to the transactions in question, and that, therefore, the High Court was not justified in insisting upon a registered lease, or even a written lease, executed between the parties. It was enough that the tenants in each case had given a written Kabuliyat from which the terms of the respective tenancies could be ascertained. It was also contended that the High Court was in error in relying upon the provisions of S. 47 of the Punjab Municipal Act which, it was contended, was subject to the provisions of the Act, in view of the overriding provisions of S. 38 of the Act. It was further contended that the definitions of 'landlord' (S. 2 (c)), of 'premises' (S. 2 (g)), and of 'tenant' (S. 2 (j)) in the Act were comprehensive enough to take in the transactions between the appellants and the Committee. Reference was also made to S. 3 of the Act to show that a public body like the Committee was not intended to be excluded from the operation of the Act.