MARTIN AND HARRIS PVT LTD Vs. PREM CHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) MARTIN and Harris Private Limited is the tenant-defendant whose defence was struck off by the order of the learned Munsif, Jaipur City (West), by his order dated December 30, 1972, under sec. 13 (6) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter called "the Act" ). Feeling aggrieved by that order the tenant moved a revision-application before this Court. Kan Singh J. , who heard the matter, on examination of the decided cases came to the conclusion that there was a conflict in the reported decisions of this Court and he has, therefore referred two questions for the opinion of a larger Bench.

(2.) IN order to appreciate the back-ground, in which these two questions arise it will be relevant to recall the broad facts of the case. The tenant took on lease a portion of the premises called "khinduka Bhavan" situate in New Colony, Jaipur for three years, by means of a registered lease-deed dated August 1, 1963, on a monthly rent of Rs. 200/ -. Another portion of the same premises was taken on lease by the same tenant on June 1, 1966 at the rate of Rs. 180/- per month. The landlord's case, as disclosed in the plaint,is that the rent amounting to Rs. 1,200/- for the period beginning on November 1, 1970 and ending on April 30, 1971 of the portion taken on lease in the year 1963 had fallen in arrears and, therefore, he was entitled to evict the tenant. The landlord had impleaded the tenant company at Calcutta and also its office at Jaipur as two distinct defendants. On August 31, 1971, the first date of hearing, a copy of the plaint was given to the defendant-company with the Calcutta address. On September 15, 1971, the tenant filed the written statement denying that any rent had fallen in arrears and contended that because the landlord had refused to accept rent since August, 1969 the tenant was depositing rent under sec. 19-A of the Act for both the portions' of the premises in the Court and the landlord was not entitled to a decree for eviction. The landlord, however, moved an application under sec. 13 (6) of the Act praying that the tenant's defence against eviction be struck off. The tenant answered the application saying that the landlord wanted to enhance the rent; that he had refused to accept the cheque dated August 23, 1969 representing the rent which was sent to him; that the landlord refused to accept the rent for September 1969 which the tenant had sent by means of a money order in the sum of Rs. 426. 85 and, therefore, the tenant deposited the rent for August, September and October, 1969 in the Court under sec. 19-A of the Act and he thereafter also deposited the rent for the subsequent months in the Court and his defence was, as such, not liable to be struck off under sec. 13 (6) of the Act.

(3.) IN interpreting a statute such as this, in our opinion, the rules in Heydon's case deserve to be remembered. IN Caries on Statute Law, Seventh Edition, at page 96, it has been stated: "the most firmly established rules for construing an obscure enactment are those laid down by the Barons of Exchequer in Heydon's Case which have been continuously cited with approval and acted upon, and are as follows : 'that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered; (1) What was the common law before the making of the Act? (2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide? (3) What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonweal. (4) The true reason of the remedy. And then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtile inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief and pro privato commodo and to add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the Act pro bono publico. ' These rules are still in full force and effect, with the addition that regard must now be had, not only to the common law, but also to prior legislation and to the judicial interpretation thereof. " The state of law prior to the Amendment Act of 1965 was such that it had no machinery to provide for the deposit of rent by an anxious tenant in court when a landlord declined to accept rent, presumably to fabricate a case of default to attain his coveted end, namely, a tenant's eviction. The legislature by amendment provided a machinery in sec. 19-A. The first subsection of sec. 19-A specifies the time when the rent is payable It provides that the contract shall be respected in regard to the time fixed thereby for the payment of rent but in the absence of a contract, rent is payable by a tenant by the fifteenth day of the month next following the month for which it is payable. Sub-sec. (2) envisages the situation where the landlord does not accept any rent tendered by the tenant within the time referred to in sub-sec. (1 ). Then the tenant may deposit such rent with the Court and such deposit of rent shall be a full discharge of the tenant from the liability to pay rent to the landlord. We are leaving out the other situation where a tenant is in a bonafide doubt as to the person or persons to whom the rent is payable, where also this step is permissible, because we are not concerned with a case of such a nature. Sub-sec. (3) lays down the procedure for making the payment and the contents of the application which is to accompany such a deposit in Court. Sub-sec. (4) provides for the court-fee on such an application and also that the application shall accompany the requisite postal stamps for sending a notice and a copy of the application under sub-sec. (5) to the landlord. Sub-sec. (5) provides that on such deposit of the rent, the Court shall send a notice of the deposit by registered post acknowledgment due and also send a copy or copies of the application to the landlord with an endorsement of the date of deposit; and a copy such notice shall be affixed on the notice board of the court. Sub sec. (6) provides that if an application is made for the withdrawal of any deposit of rent, the Court shall, if satisfied that the applicant is the person entitled to receive the rent deposited, order the amount of the rent to be paid to him and such payment shall be a full discharge from all liability of the tenant for the payment of rent. Then the explanation indicates the courts where such rent would be deposited. These provisions, as we read them, provide a machinery to immunise a tenant from being labelled as a defaulter if despite the tenants tender the landlord refuses to accept rent. The deposit of rent is notified to the landlord personally but is also published by its being fixed on the notice board. The landlord may, if he chooses, withdraw such rent. The payment to the Court by fiction of the law would mean payment to the landlord so far as the tenant's liability for rent is concerned.