LAWS(HPH)-1996-7-1

ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. Vs. KHEM CHAND

Decided On July 16, 1996
ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. Appellant
V/S
KHEM CHAND Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal at the instance of the insurance company hereinafter referred to as respondent No. 3 is directed against the order dated 15.3.1995 passed by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (2), Kangra at Dharamshala in M.A.C.P. No. 30 P/95, whereby application under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') filed by the claimants, has been allowed and the appellant has been directed to pay a compensation of Rs. 50,000/ under no fault liability to respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (hereinafter referred to as the claimants).

(2.) THE sole question involved in the present appeal is as to whether the amendment of Section 140 (2) of the Act as amended vide Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 is applicable from the date of its amendment or is applicable retrospectively to the pending cases also. In the background of this case the facts are within very narrow campus.

(3.) DR . Lalit Sharma, appearing on behalf of the appellant, has submitted that provision allowing compensation under no fault liability in the sum of Rs. 50,000/ is applicable to accidents after 14.11.1994 and not to such accidents which are prior to this date. According to him cause of action had arisen to the claimants on the day of accident, i.e., 16.6.1994 and, as such, their right to claim compensation in law was crystallised on this date and law governing the same on this date would cover the instant case and thus according to learned Counsel for the appellant, the Tribunal below has fallen into error in allowing the compensation of Rs. 50,000 instead of Rs. 25,000/ . Dr. Sharma has further pointed out that the matter relating to payment of compensation under Section 166 or Section 140 of the Act is not a provision governing procedure and therefore cannot be made retrospectively applicable and according to him retrospectivity cannot be given to provisions of substantive law as in the present case.