AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH,J. - (1.)This intra court appeal has been preferred by the appellant - GBA Workers Union (hereinafter referred to as 'Union') challenging the order dtd. 15/3/2022 passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge dismissing the writ petition preferred by it, where directions were sought to quash the order dtd. 1/3/2021 (Annexure P-6) passed by the Secretary, Labour, Chandigarh Administration - respondent No.1, stating therein that application under Sec. 25 N(1)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, filed by M/s Groz-Beckert Asia Private Limited - respondent No.2 on 1/12/2020, seeking permission to retrench 37 workmen, the said permission is deemed to have been granted on expiry of 60 days from the date of filing of the application.
(2.)It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate and take into consideration the Division Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Jayhind Engineering and another Vs. State of Karnataka and others 2004 (2) S.C.T. 443, wherein it has been held that once enquiry notice is issued by the State Government on receipt of an application, running of the period of 60 days, as provided under the statute, stands arrested and unless an order is passed on the said enquiry, the deeming fiction as provided for under the statute would not operate. His further contention is that the challenge to the Division Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court by way of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.11255-11256 of 2004, titled as 'Jayhind Engineering and another Vs. State of Karnataka and others', stands dismissed vide order dtd. 16/12/2004 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. He, on this basis, submits that the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge cannot sustain as the deeming fiction would not come into effect till a decision is taken by the Competent Authority on an enquiry which has been initiated within a period of 60 days from the date of submission of an application by the Employer for retrenchment of the employees.
In any case, he asserts that when an undertaking had been given and a statement made in this Court by the counsel for the Chandigarh Administration i.e. in CWP No.3886 of 2021, which was preferred by the appellant - Union and decided by the learned Single Judge of this Court vide order dtd. 24/2/2021, where counsel for the Chandigarh Administration, on instructions from the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Union Territory Chandigarh, stated that the application under Sec. 25 N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, moved by respondent No.2 - company was under consideration of the authority and the appropriate order shall be passed before 28/2/2021, the authorities were required to pass an order on the enquiry, which had been initiated by the Secretary, Labour especially when the parties have been heard on 25/1/2021, which is much prior to the expiry of the period of 60 days from the date of submission of the application dtd. 1/12/2020. His submission is that there has been intentional delay on the part of the Chandigarh Administration in passing the order on the enquiry to help out respondent No.2 - company and granting it the benefit of the deemed permission on expiry of the period of 60 days from the date of submission of the application.

Learned counsel for the appellant has further contended that the learned Single Judge has misread the provisions as contained in Sec. 25 N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and has proceeded on mere technicalities without taking into consideration the intent and purpose for which the said provisions have been enacted. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment of Constitution Bench of five judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s Orissa Textile and Steel Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa 2002 (1) S.C.T. 1017 to contend that the Government is bound to make an enquiry before passing the order, the requirement to make an enquiry postulates an enquiry into the correctness of the facts stated by the Employer for the notice served by him and also all other relevant facts and circumstances including the bona fide of the Employer. An opportunity of being heard has to be afforded to the Employer and the workman and all persons interested. It is after that only, the Government shall proceed to pass an appropriate order on the application seeking permission for retrenchment of the employees. He contends that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. etc. Vs. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. and another AIR 1994 Supreme Court 2696 had not ruled out or taken away the powers of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India of judicial review in adequate protection against arbitrary action in the matter and exercise of power by the appropriate Government or authority under the provisions of Sec. 25 N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is available and the Court should have so exercised the same in the given facts and circumstances of the case. Prayer has, thus, been made for setting aside the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge as also the impugned order in the writ petition by allowing the same as preferred by the appellant - Union.

(3.)On the other hand, learned senior counsel for caveator - respondent No.2 submits that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is based upon proper appreciation of the provisions of Sec. 25 N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He contends that the learned Single Judge has not only referred to and relied upon the various judgments which have been passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with and interpreting not only Sec. 25 N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but also Sec. 25 M and 25-O of the said Act, which are para materia to the provisions which is the subject matter of the present lis. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant with regard to the effective remedy of judicial review in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is concerned, learned senior counsel states that the learned Single Judge has rightly and appropriately left the matter open for the appellant - Union and the workmen to avail of their remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It, therefore, cannot be said that there is no effective appropriate statutory remedy available to the appellant - Union especially in the light of the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment in Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd.'s case (supra).