- (1.)This is an appeal against an order of H.K. Bose, J. (as he then was) dated January 14, 1957. The facts are briefly as follows: The Appellant Surendra Nath Bhattacharyya became the owner of C.S. plot No. 217 recorded in khatiyan No. 189 of mouza Kankari in the district of 24-Parganas. He purchased the superior interest from one Rajendra Nath Dalai and others by a registered deed dated December 19, 1932, and also purchased the tenancy interest in the said plot of land from one Satish Chandra Bar by a registered kobala dated December 16, 1935. In the year 1350 B.S. he was dispossessed by one Hari Charan Dutta and brought a title suit No. 248 of 1948 in the Court of Munsif, Sealdah, for declaration of title, khas possession, etc. The said suit was decreed in favour of the Plaintiff and appeals which were preferred against the same were dismissed by the lower Appellate Court as well as the High Court, It is alleged that it was only when he made an application for execution that he came to know that land acquisition proceedings had been started for the acquisition of the said plot of land at the instance of the Calcutta Mineral Supply Co. Ltd., a private limited company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act (Respondent No. 3). The facts relating to the said acquisition are as follows: On November 25, 1950, notification was issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'said Act') to the effect that it appeared to the Governor that land was likely to be required to be taken by Government at the expense, of the Calcutta Mineral Supply Co. Ltd. for a public purpose, viz., for the extension of the existing factory of the Calcutta Mineral Supply Co. Ltd. in the village of Kankari, district 24-Parganas. This notification was published on November 30, 1950, in the Official Gazette and it is alleged that on or about February 27, 1951, substance of the notification was published as required under Section 4 of the said Act. On December 9, 1954, a declaration under Section 6 of the said Act was published in the Official Gazette. On November 29, 1954, an agreement was entered into as required by Section 41, appearing in Pt. VII of the said Act, between the Government of West Bengal in its department of Land and Land Revenue and Land Acquisition and the Respondent No. 3, the Calcutta Mineral Supply Co. Ltd. In the agreement it is recited that the said company had applied to the Government for the purpose of acquiring the land for the construction of an extension of its existing factory and that the Government, after holding an enquiry under Section 40 of the said Act, was satisfied that the work was likely to prove useful to the public and had consented to the acquisition being made wholly at the expense of the company. So far as the use by the public of the said land is concerned, it is confined to the provisions of Clause (8) of the said agreement, wherein it is stated that the company shall train up one apprentice per annum in the various processes carried on in the company's factories, such apprentice being nominated by the Director of Industries, West Bengal, or such other officer as may be authorised by him for that purpose. The period of training for each apprentice shall be two years, and in appointing officers and employees preference, shall be given to apprentices trained under the scheme contained in the said agreement. There is no other use by the public of the said land and the works to be constructed thereon contemplated in the said land agreement. Subsequently an affidavit has been filed to say that the company manufactures silicate of soda and plaster of Paris, which used to be the subject-matter of large scale import from foreign countries and that its manufactured materials are widely used by purchasers in India. On September 6, 1955, the Appellant made an application to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and a Rule was issued calling upon the opposite parties to show cause why a writ in the nature of certiorari should not be issued quashing and/or setting aside the notification dated November 25, 1950, and the declaration dated December 1, 1954, and why a writ in the nature of mandamus should not be issued directing the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 to forbear from proceeding with the land acquisition proceedings and for other reliefs. This Rule came up for hearing before Bose, J. (as he then was). The following points were urged before the learned Judge: The first point that was urged was that no personal notice of the proposed acquisition was served on the Appellant and secondly that the proper facts were not placed before the State Government, including the fact that there were other lands much more suitable for the purpose of the proposed extension of the works of the company and, therefore, the acquisition was invalid. Both these points were negatived by the learned Judge. Regarding the first point, it was held that under the said Act no individual notice was contemplated, and that the requisite notices contemplated under the Act were properly issued and served. As regards the second point, the learned Judge did not agree with the allegation that other lands were in existence which were more suitable for the purpose of the company and in any event held that the Government had properly applied its mind and the Court could not interfere. By an order dated January 14, 1957, the Rule was accordingly discharged. This appeal is directed against the said order. It is to be regretted that this appeal has to be determined on grounds which were not agitated in the Court below. In the matter of compulsory acquisition of land, however, there have been significant changes in the law and this Court is bound to take notice of the same. This may be explained as follows: Firstly, the Supreme Court has construed Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 40 of the said Act and laid down as to what work could be said to be 'likely to prove useful to the public' as mentioned in the said clause. This was done in what has come to be known as the 'first Arora case' - R.L. Arora v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., 1962 AIR(SC) 764 According to this decision, which will be dealt with in greater detail, presently the fact that the products of the company would be useful to the public was not sufficient to bring the acquisition within the provisions of Sections 40 and 41 of the said Act, and it was held that under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 40, the word 'useful' means that the work would be useful to the public only when it could directly be used by the public. This interpretation affected a large number of acquisitions made under the said Act and, accordingly, the said Act was amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1962 (31 of 1962), which came into force on September 12, 1962. The provisions of this amendment Act were challenged as ultra vires and on other grounds in another case which is known as the 'second Arora case' which came to be decided by the Supreme Court in R.L. Arora v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 1964 AIR(SC) 1230 It was held that the provisions of the amending Act were not ultra vires the Constitution. The reasonings given in the said judgment have been utilised on behalf of the Appellant and it has been argued that the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that it was not the object of the said Act to enable the Government to acquire lands for the purpose and benefit of private limited companies and that Pt. VII of the said Act does not apply to acquisition for such purposes. It has been argued that in consequence of this the acquisition in the present case should be struck down. It is admitted that Respondent No. 3 is a private limited company.
(2.)Under the said Act, Section 6 envisages the acquisition of land which is needed for a public purpose or for a company. The expression 'company' has been defined in Clause (2) of Section 3 of the said Act and includes a public and private limited company as also a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Acquisition of land for companies is governed by the provisions of Pt. VII of the said Act. A special procedure has to be adopted for that purpose. Firstly, the provisions of Sections 6 and 37 of the said Act are not to be put in force for the purposes of acquisition of land for any company unless with the previous consent of the appropriate Government, nor unless the company shall have executed the agreement mentioned in Section 41 of the said Act. The consent is controlled by the provisions of Section 40. The relevant terms thereof prior to the amendment of 1962 were as follows:
40(1) Such consent shall not be given unless the appropriate Government be satisfied either on the report of the Collector under Section 5A, Sub-section (2) or by an enquiry held as hereinafter provided

(a) that the purpose of the acquisition is to obtain land for the erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the company or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith, or

(b) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some work, and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public.

(3.)If the appropriate Government was satisfied after considering the report of the Collector etc. that the proposed acquisition was for any of the purposes above-mentioned, the company concerned is required to enter into an agreement with the appropriate Government in terms of the provisions of Section 41. This agreement has to be published in accordance with the provisions of Section 42. In the first Arora case Supra the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the legal position under the provisions of the said Act as it stood before the amendment of 1962. Particularly it was called upon to explain the provisions of Clause (b) in Sub-section (1) of Section 40, which lays down that the acquisition that was contemplated must be one needed for the construction of some work, and that such work was likely to prove useful to the public. The question was as to what work was likely to prove useful to the public. This is the question that was answered by the Supreme Court. The facts in that case were as follows: The Appellant R.L. Arora was the owner of certain lands in village Auraiya, in Khera, U.P. A part of this land was being acquired by Government under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, as it was required for a company, Lakshmi Ratan Engineering Works Ltd., Kanpur, for the construction of a factory for the manufacture of textile machinery parts. Notifications under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 were issued, and in fact possession was handed over to the company. Thereupon Arora filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court challenging the acquisition and the issue of the notification and declaration. The question inter alia arose as to whether the provisions of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 40 were satisfied, and since the products of the company were going to be useful to the public, could it be said that the construction of the factory was a 'work' which was 'likely to be useful to the public'? It was contended on behalf of the Respondents that the word 'work' in Section 40(1)(b) was of wide amplitude and land could be acquired for the said work for any company when the work itself might be useful to the public or the product of the work might be useful to the public. Reliance was placed on the Privy Council decision of Ezra v. Secretary of State,1903 ILR(Cal) 36. On behalf of the Appellant it was contended that though the words of Section 40(1)(b) were of wide amplitude and provided for acquisition of land for construction of some work which was likely to prove useful to the public, this did not mean that if merely the products of the company which constructed the work was useful to the public land could be acquired for it. It was urged that acquisition could only be made for the construction of some work which was capable of being directly used by the public, and that the agreement should provide the terms upon which the public were entitled to have this kind of user. Wanchoo, J. said as follows:
Turning now to the opposing contentions as to the meaning of the relevant words in Sections 40 and 41 we have already said that the two provisions of Sections 40 and 41 must be read together to find out the intention of the Legislature when it provided for acquisition of land for a company through the agency of Government. It seems to us that it could not be the intention of the Legislature that the Government should be made a general agent for companies to acquire lands for them in order that the owners of companies may be able to carry on their activities for private profit. If that was the intention of the Legislature, it was entirely unnecessary to provide for the restrictions contained in Sections 40 and 41 on the powers of the Government to acquire lands for companies. If we were to give the wide interpretation contended for on behalf of the Respondents on the relevant words in Sections 40 and 41, it would amount to holding that the Legislature intended the Government to be a sort of general agent for companies to acquire lands for them, so that their owners may make profits. It can hardly be denied that a company which will satisfy the definition of that word in Section 3(e) will be producing something or other which will be useful to the public and which the public may need to purchase. So on the wide interpretation contended for on behalf of the Respondents we must come to the conclusion that the intention of the Legislature was that the Government should be an agent for acquiring land for all companies for such purpose as they might have provided the product intended to be produced is in a general manner useful to the public and if that is so, there would be clearly no point in providing the restrictive provisions in Sections 40 and 41.... We find it impossible to accept the argument that the intention of the Legislature could have been that individuals should be compelled to part with their lands for private profit of others who might be owners of companies through the Government, simply because the company might produce goods which would be useful to the public.... The very fact that there is no reference to the product of the works in Section 40(1)(b) shows that when the Legislature said that the work should be likely to prove useful to the public it meant that the work should be directly useful to the public through the public being able to use it instead of being indirectly useful to the public through the public being able to use its product.