LAWS(MPH)-1986-7-10

ANWAR Vs. WAHIDAN

Decided On July 17, 1986
ANWAR Appellant
V/S
WAHIDAN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I was anxious to dispose of this matter finally to-day as a very short point indeed concerning jurisdictional competence of trial Court to entertain the suit filed in the year 1983 is involved. Because respondents' counsel, Shri R.D. Jain, has urged strenuously that I should first consider and dispose of today only the question of conversion of the instant petition under Sec. 115, CPC into one under Art.227 of the Constitution, the matter has remained again part-heard.

(2.) The application filed by the petitioner's counsel in this matter is I. A. No. 1125/86, I which was not traceable on the last date as the application did not carry correct particulars of the instant revision. Happily the same is traced out and is placed on record to-day. Shri Jain had prayed a week's time on the last date to file reply to the application and he has renewed the prayer to-day. I am not at all inclined to consider the prayer as I have no hesitation to hold at once that the question of law does not need any investigation of facts. The short ground on which conversion is urged is that the question agitated in the instant revision petition concerns jurisdictional competence of the trial Court and this fact is not at all denied by Shri Jain who rather himself submits that the trial Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit because the suit ought to have been valued at over 10,000 rupees and instituted in a Court having pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. It is not disputed by Shri Kaushik that in this case the suit is valued at less than 10,000 rupees and his contention is that the suit has been rightly valued and, therefore, the trial Court, namely, the Civil Judge, Class II, had jurisdiction in law to entertain and try the suit.

(3.) Shri Jain has made a two-fold contention to-day in reply to petitioner's application which require consideration. Firstly, counsel submits, there is divergence of judicial opinion on the question of conversion and, therefore, it is pre-eminently desirable that there should be an authoritative decision on the point by a larger Bench. In making this prayer, counsel rightly concedes, the view consistently taken by me in this Court is that when any question of pure jurisdictional competence arises in any matter it is not only competent, but pre-eminently desirable, for this Court, because of its constitutional duty of "superintendence" envisaged under Art.227, to correct jurisdictional errors of the subordinate Court. There should be no hesitation in such matter for this Court to act instantly and immediately to treat an application filed under S.115, CPC as one made under Art.227 of the Constitution. Indeed, a High Court is required to discharge its constitutional duty of superintending, functioning of "all courts and tribunals" within its territorial jurisdiction to ensure primarily that they do not transgress respective jurisdiction at limits prescribed by law in order that justice in the area over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction is administered in a smooth and orderly fashion. There is high authority for the proposition that Art.227 does not contemplate "administrative superintendence" merely of High Courts but the constitutional jurisdiction includes the "power of judicial revision" also even in such cases where no appellate or revisional jurisdiction statutorily empowers the Courts to act in any particular matter. Because, the power rather saddles the High Court with a duty to keep the inferior Courts and tribunals "within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner." [See, Waryam v. Amar, AIR 1954 SC 215 Nilkanth v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1135]. What, however, is of signal relevance to the determination of the question under consideration is Apex Court's view that the power under Art.227 can even be suo motu exercised, which indeed is inherent in the authority of the Court not only to quash a decision under Art.227 but also to issue further directions in the matter suo motu.