- (1.)HEARD on IA No. 726/2006, which is an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the revision. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that, firstly, the applicant had filed an application under section 482 of CrPC against the impugned order, but the same was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file criminal revision. After the withdrawal of aforesaid petition on 3.8.2005, applicant filed the present revision on 17.1.2006 i.e. after about 4 months of the order passed by this Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 3227/05.
(2.)LEARNED counsel for the respondent on the other hand submits that no sufficient ground has been mentioned in the application filed by the applicant, therefore, the delay does not deserve to be condoned. He placed reliance in the case of Union of India v. M/s. Dimond Cement, Narsingarh reported in [2002 (1) Vidhi Bhasvar 157 = 2001 (3) MPLJ 371], wherein it has been observed that "Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statutes so prescribe and the Court have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds."
Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the impugned matter pertains to maintenance proceedings. The award was passed against the husband ex parte, but that ex parte order was set aside by the trial Court itself. In revision by the wife, that order was again set aside. Therefore, the impugned order was challenged by the applicant by filing petition under section 482 of CrPC. Since the petition under section 482 was withdrawn with liberty to move the present revision, the delay has been caused. After withdrawal of the petition u/s. 482 of CrPC this revision has been filed after about 4 months.

(3.)IN the case of Ramnath Sao v. Goberdhan Sao [AIR 2002 SC 1201], it has been held by the Supreme Court that expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to party. Earlier also, in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others [AIR 1987 SC 1353] it was held by the Supreme Court that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late and refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. The Supreme Court further held that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.