P. N. Bakshi, J. - (1.)APPLICANT has been convicted under Sections 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentenced to 6 months' R. I., and a fine of Rs. 1000/-. In default of payment of fine, he is to undergo further 3 months' R.I. His conviction and sentence has been maintained in appeal by the Sessions Judge, Kanpur, hence this revision. I have heard learned counsel for the APPLICANT and have also perused the impugned orders. I have scrutinized the record of the case. According to the prosecution version, Sri Virendra Singh, Food Inspector purchased Barfi which the APPLICANT was selling near old Panki Temple Kanpur at 10 A.M. on 24th August, 1976, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. The sample was divided in 3 equal parts, duly sealed and labelled in three different containers. One of the sample-phials was sent for analysis to the Public Analyst, whose report disclosed that Tartrazin and blue VRS has been used for colouring it. The use of blue VRS is prohibited under the Rules. As such the sample was found adulterated. After obtaining sanction, the APPLICANT has been prosecuted and convicted as above. Both the courts below on a consideration of the evidence on the record and the circumstance of the case have held the guilt of the accused established beyond all doubt. They have concurrently arrived at a finding that the sample in question was adulterated. Learned counsel for the APPLICANT has argued a number of points which I shall deal hereinafter. The first submission put forward is that the Nagar Swasthya Adhikari, Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, who has filed the complaint (Ex. Ka b) in the court of Munsif-Magistrate, Kanpur was not competent to file the complaint. In this connection, a reference has been made to Section 20 of the Prevention of Adulteration Act, which runs as follows : 20 (Section); No prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence under Section 14, or Section 14A, shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of, the Central Government, or the State Government, or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government. Provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in Section 12, if he produces in Court a copy of the report of the Public Analyst along with the complaint". It is argued that under the aforesaid Section the Central Government, the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf by a general for special order, or the three authorities without whose written consent a prosecution cannot be instituted. The Nagar Swasthya Adhikari is a person authorized to grant written consent for prosecution. He is not empowered to file a complaint for the institution of the prosecution himself. This question has to be treated from two angles. The first aspect is that on 16th December, 1955, the State Government issued Notification No. 10305/XVI (PH)-461-52, which is as follows : "Under this Notification all Municipal Medical Officers of Health in Uttar Pradesh were authorised to institute or to give written consent for instituting prosecutions in all Municipal areas within their jurisdiction. Counsel for the APPLICANT has argued that this Notification does not have the force of law, and therefore, the Nagar Swasthya Adhakari would have no power to institute a complaint. The above notification came up for consideration in Chaturbhuj v. State, (1. 1967 A.C.C. 107), in which Hon'ble Satish Chandra, J. (as he then was) made the following observations : - "Section 20 of the Act provides that no prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the State Government, or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government or the local authority. The State Government issued a Notification dated December 16, 1955, to institute prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, Section 8 General Clauses Act would apply to the Statutory order dated December, 16, 1966. So construed the aforesaid Noti-fiction, would even after the repeal of the Municipalities Act, continue to govern the corresponding functionaries under the Nagar Mahapalika Act, viz., the Nagar Swasthya Adhikaris and the reference to Municipal areas in that Notification would be construed as referring to Nagar Mahapalika areas. The prosecutions launched by the Nagar Swasthya Adhikaries would be competent and valid." The question again cropped-in Ram Singh v. State, of U. P., (1968 Cr. L.J. 240) in which Hon'ble Gyanendra Kumar J, again made the following observations: - "Reading the instrument of Notification dated 16-12-55, in the light of the provisions of Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, the reference to Municipal Medical Officers of Health in the U. P. Municipalities Act, since repealed, would apply with equal force to the corres ponding officers now designated as 'Nagar Swathya Adhikaris, in the repealing Adhiniyam. In fact the powers of Municipal Medical Officers of Health and Nagar Swasthya Adhikaris are similar under the new Act. It appears to be a case of only change of nomenclature and designation from English into Hindi. Previously the Officer in charge of the Health Department in the Municipal Board was known as Municipal Medical Officer of Health. Under the Adhiniyam the Officer-in-charge of the Health Department of the Mahapalika is to be known as Nagar Swasthya Adhikari." The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act has been the target of repeated amendments from time to time to meet the exigencies of the situation. By Act no. 34 of 1976 the word 'Local Authority' who was one of the authorities mentioned in Section 20 of the Act prior to the Amendment authorised to grant sanction was deleted. By Notification no. 6000/XVI-722-55 dated 18th September, 1976, the Governor was phased to appoint with effect from the date of publication in the Official Gazette, all the Chief Medical Officers, as Local Health Authorities to be incharge of the Health Administration under the said Act for the whole of District, to which they were posted including Nagar Mahapalika, Nagar Palika, Notified and Town Area. Then again by Notification No. 6001/XVI-X-722-55 dated 18th Sep. 1976, the Governor was pleased to authorise all the Local Health Authorities appointed under the State Government Notification no. 6000/-PVI-X-722-55 dated 18th September, 1976 to sanction prosecution for offences committed against the provisions of the said Act, within their districts, except for five Nagar Mahapalikas (Lucknow, Varanasi, Allahabad, Kanpur, and Agra) where such prosecutions could be sanctioned by the Nagar Swasthya Adhikari of the respective Nagar Mahapalikas. It is thus clear that apart from the power, which had already been conferred upon Nagar Swasthya Adhikaris for filing the complaint, they were also authorised by the aforesaid two Government Notifications to grant sanction for prosecution. While considering the Notifications dated 16th December, 1955, and 18th September, 1976, their application to Section 2u of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, I have also held earlier in Nyaz Ahmad v. State of U. P., (1979 P. F. C. 244),that the Notification dated 16 December 1955 was in no manner affected by the Notification of 18th September, 1976. This opinion is obviously based upon a consideration of the Saving Clause in Section 25 (2. 1968 Cr. L.J. 240) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, which runs as follows: Section 25; - "Notwithstanding the repeal by this Act of any corresponding law, all rules, regulations and bye-laws relating to the prevention of adulteration of food, made under such corresponding law and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall, except where and so far as they are inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of this Act, continue in force until altered, amended or repealed by rules made under this Act." For the reasons given above, I am of the opinion that Nagar Swasthya Adhikari is possessed of dual powers. He has the power to file a complaint as also a power to grant written consent for prosecution. Before he filed a complaint himself, it would be absurd to hold that the Nagar Swasthya Adhikari, must pass another order earlier to the filing of the complaint granting himself written permission to file the same. A few observations made by Justice S. D. Sen J, (as he then was) of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Mohan Lal Ram Singh Thakur v. Chief Executive Officer, Corporation, Jabalpur, (A. I. R. 1952 M. P. 17), would be enlightening in this connection; Section 20 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act speaks about the written consent. When the complaint has been filed in writing, it can certainly be held that he has given his consent. When the Chief Executive Officer himself has signed the complaint, it is ludicrous to contend that it requires separate sanction, the sanctioning authority and the complaining authority being the same. Sanction is nothing but a permission that the complaint be filed. The Chief Executive Officer need not give permission separately to himself when he himself becomes the complainant before the court. This point too has, therefore, no substance." The question at hand can be dealt with in another way. Section 20 of the Act has already been quoted by me above. It is not necessary to repeat it again. Suffice it to say that under the aforesaid section, no prosecution for an offence under the Act shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of the Central Government, the State Government and the person authorised in this behalf by the said Governments. The words 'except by' or 'with' must be given due emphasis. These words are not redundant. It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that every single word which is included in the section has been included with an intention and it must be given its due meaning and import in connection therewith. Reading the section in this light, it appears to me that, there are two methods for the institution of prosecution against an accused for an offence under this Act. The prosecution under this Act cannot be instituted 'except by' the Central Government, the State Government, or a person authorised in this behalf. The use of the word 'or' indicates a second alternative for the institution of prosecution and that method is with the written consent of the Central Government, the State Government, or a person authorised. In other words, when a complaint is instituted by the Central Government, the State Government and a person authorised in this behalf, then no written consent is necessary. But if it is instituted by an authority other than the three authorised agencies above-mentioned, then that authority has to obtain the written consent of the State Government, or the person authorised on this behalf. For this reason, it appears that when a complaint is lodged by a Food Inspector under his signature, or any other authority, the sanction is taken from the Chief Medical Officer who is now the person authorised in every Nagar Mahapalika for granting written consent of prosecution. So far as a complaint by private person is concerned, the proviso of Sec. 20 makes ample provision. Under that proviso a prosecution may be instituted by a purchaser, referred to in Section 12 of the Act, if he produces in court a copy of the report of the Public Analyst along with the complaint. In his case no written consent of the three authorities mentioned-above, would be required. The Supreme Court while considering the question of application of mind, under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, made the following observations in Dhyan Singh V. Municipal Board, Saharanpur, (A. I. R. 1970S. C. 318), "Under Section 20 no question of applying one's mind to the facts of case before the institution of the complaint arises as the authority to be conferred under that provision can be conferred long before a particular offence has taken place. It is a conferment of an authority to institute a particular case or even a class of cases. That section merely prescribes that persons or authorities designated in that section are alone competent to file complaints under the statute in question." In this view of the matter, also, lam of the view that the complaint instituted by the Nagar Swasthya Adhikari was competent and maintainable in law. Some other minor points have also been argued. One of them is that Rule 9 (j) framed under the P. F. A. Act, is mandatory and in the instant case it has not been complied with. I have already held earlier in several decisions that Rule 9 (j) of the P. F. Act, which has now been repealed by Act 34 of 1975, was merely directory and not mandatory. As such, its non-compliance, if any, would not vitiate the trial. It has also been argued before me that the Food Inspector concerned, had jurisdiction for ward no. 31-A and he had no jurisdiction to take sample in Ward no. 36. In that connection reliance is placed upon my own earlier decision reported in Ram Dulare v. State of U. P. (1979 F. A. J. 130). Unfortunately when I decided that case, the latest Notification was not placed before me In this connection, the Government of U. P. issued" Notification no. 7315/XV-X-722/55 dated 22nd November, 1973, which runs as follows : Notification : No. 7315/XVI-X-722/55 Lucknow, Dated Nov. 22, 1973. In exercise of the powers under subsection (1) of the Section 9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Act no. 37 of 1954)., read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act no. 10 of 1897), the Governor is pleased to appoint, with effect from the date of Publication of this 'Notification in the Gazette, all Chief Sanitary Inspectors, and Sanitary Inspectors referred to in Notification no. 1207/XVI-XI-722/55 dated 15th April, 1968, as amended by Notification no. U. O. 329/XVI-X-722/55 (T. C.) dated 15th December, 1971, who possess the qualification prescribed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, as 'Food Inspector' in Uttar Pradesh for the whole of the district in which they are for the time being posted. by order. (K. N. Srivastava.) Ayukta Avam Sachiv. It is clear from this Notification that my earlier decision was not correct, since the instant Notification was not placed before me. In my opinion, the Food Inspector, even though he belonged to a different Ward in the instant case, had jurisdiction for the whole District in which he was for the time being posted. There is no merit in this submission also. Laslty the APPLICANT's counsel has half heartedly argued that the trial in the instant case was a summary trial and not warrant trial as should have been done, and that Sri Saxena was not specially empowered by the State Government to hold a summary trial. I have carefully examined the record of the case. This argument is not borne out from this evidence on the record. This trial in the instant case was a regular trial in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. It was not a summary trial as suggested. I find no force in this submission also. As observed above, both courts have held the prosecution case established beyond all reasonable doubt. Pure findings of fact arrived at concurrently by the subordinate courts cannot be reversed in the exercise of my revisional jurisdiction. There is no merit in this revision, which is hereby dismissed. The APPLICANT is on bail. He shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the unexpired portion of the sentence of imprisonment. The interim order, passed by this court staying realization of fine is hereby vacated.