G.P.MATHUR, J. - (1.)This matter has come before us on a reference made by a learned single Judge. The relevant part of the referring order reads as under :
"A perusal of the first information report shows that a brutal murder has been committed. First chilli powder was put into the eyes of the deceased Rajesh and then the applicant and others dragged him and stabbed him several times. This version in the first information report is also corroborated by the post mortem report which shows large number of stabbing and incised wounds on vital parts. Learned counsel for the applicant has stated that Hon'ble S. N. Tewari, J. by order dated 21-8-96 has granted bail to co-accused Shankar whose case is on the sme footing. With profound respect, I cannot agree with the order of my learned brother. In my opinion this is a case of a brutal murder and since the application is directly involved, it is not a fit case for bail.. . .. . . . . . . . . . . "

(2.)After noticing the submission made on behalf of the applicant that an accused is entitled to bail if a co-accused similarly placed has been granted bail, the learned Judge has formulated the following questions for decision :
"Let the papers of this case be laid before Hon'ble The Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench to lay down guidelines as to what should be done in a case like this where bail has been granted to a co-accused, and whether in the present case (1) the bail application of the applicant should be rejected although bail has been granted to a co-acused whose case is on the same footing (2) whether bail granted to the co-accused should be cancelled."

(3.)Sri V. P. Srivastava, learned Counsel for the applicant, has submitted that if an accused is granted bail a similarly placed co-accused should also be granted bail on the principle of parity. He has further submitted that not granting bail to a similarly placed co-accused would amount to discrimination and would violate his fundamental right guaranteeed under Article 14 of the Constitution. The contention based on Article 14 does not impress us. In Naresh v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1, a decision rendered by a Bench of nine Judges, Chief Justice Gajendra Gadkar after referring to Parbhani Transport Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1960 SC 801, observed as follows in para 48 of the reports :
"... ...It is clear that the observations made by this Court in this case unambiguously indicate that it would be inappropriate to suggest that the decision rendered by a judicial tribunal can be described as offending Article 14 at all. It may be a right or wrong decision and if it is a wrong decision it can be corrected by appeal or revision as may be a permitted by law, but it cannot be said per se to contravene Article 14... .."
This authoritative pronouncement shows that Article 14 can have no application to judicial orders and a similarly placed co-accused cannot make any grievance on that account.