P. K. BAHRI, J. - (1.)This judgment shall dispose of both the appeals brought under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Two eviction petitions were brought by the respondent against the appellant on the ground of non-payment of rent. The complete ground floor of house No. E-36, Kalindi Colony, New Delhi, was stated to have been let out to the appellant at the rental of Rs. 2400 per mouth. Initially the letting took place vide lease agreement dated Juily II, 1980, and the same was renewed vide agreement dated July 1, 1982. The arrears of rent was stated to be due with effect from January 1, 1984. which were allegedly not paid by the appellant in spite of service of notice of demand dated March 12, 1985. In the second eviction petition, it was pleaded that the complete basement of the same honye stood let out to the appellant a the rental of Rs. 1,000 per month vide lease deed dated October 1. 1982, with a stipulation that the rent was to be increased to Rs. 1,200 per month with effect from January 1, 1983, and it was pleaded that arrears of rent were due with effect from January 1, 1984, which were neither paid nor tendered in spite of service of notice of demand dated March 12, 1985. The ground of mis-user covered by clause (c) of proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act was also pleaded but that ground was negatived and no longer survives for decision in these appeals.
(2.)In the first case, the appellant pleaded that he, in fact, was not the tenant on the ground floor of the s.:id building and the premises were actually let out to M/s. Wadbrow India (P) Limped and thus, the eviction petition against him was not maintainable. On merits, the plea taken was that the rate of rent was Rs. 2,000 per month and there were no arrears payable as alleged in the petition. The receipt of the notice of demand was also denied. Similarly, in the second petition, the appellant took the plea that in fact, M/s. Spectra India is the tenant and he took the plea that the rate of rent is Rs. 1,000 per month and no arrears of rent, as claimed in the petition, were due. In replications, the respondent conll-overted the pleas of the appellant and reiterated her own pleas and in the other case she pleaded that M/s. Spectra India is not a legal entity as the appellant is the proprietor of the said firm. It was controverted in respect of the first petition that M/s. Wadbrow India (P) Ltd. is the tenant. In both the cases separate orders under Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act were made on October 18, 1986. The appellant filed appeals against those orders but ultimately he withdrew those appeals which came to be dismissed as withdrawn vide orders of the Rent Control Tribunal dated November 24, 1986. However, the Tribunal granted time till December 31, 1986, for complying with the order made under Section 15(1). The appellant did not deposit any rent whatsoever in compliance with the said orders made under Section 15(1). Applications under Section 15(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act were moved for striking out the defence of the appellant in both the cases. In spite of the fact that adjournments were sought for filing the reply to the said applications but no reply was filed. On January 5, 1987, no one appeared on behalf of the appellant and defence of the appellant in both the cases was struck out as the appellant had not deposited even single paisa in compliance with the. orders made under Section 15(1). After recording the statement of M. S. Chaturvedi, father of the respondent, who also claimed to be attorney of the respondent, the eviction orders were passed against the appellant which were challenged by filing the appeals before the Tribunal. The Tribunal while admitting the appeals granted stay of dispossession of the appellant in both the case subject to the appellant depositing the entire arrears of rent and month to month rent. The appellant, in order to save himself from being dispossessed, admittedly deposited the arrears of rent and month to month rent in both the cases. Ultimately the Tribunal came to dismiss both the appeals vide judgment dated October 13, 1987.
(3.)Counsel for the appellant has, at first, contended that interim order under Section 15(1) should not have been made inasmuch as the appellant had disputed the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the respondent in both the cases and if both the orders are set aside then the eviction orders also have to fail because no final order had been made under Section 15(1) requiring the appellant to deposit the arrears of lent within one month. It is now settled law that an order under Section 15(1) in an eviction petition brought on the ground of non-payment of rent can be made on the prima facie view of the disputed facts pleaded before the Controller. In the first case, the respondent had placed on record the agreement of lease duly signed by the appellant and by respondent's father on behalf of the respondent which clearly shows that the appellant is the tenant. He has been described in the lease deed as Managing Director of M/s. Wadbrow India (P) Ltd. but the whole of the lease-deed makes it evident that it is the appellant who is the tenant in the premises and not the company. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the lease-deed being not executed on a proper stamp paper and being not registered could not have been looked into for any purpose. The lease-deed was impounded and the duty and the penalty have been paid. So, it could be taken into consideration. The only point to be seen is whether the unregistered lease-deed could be taken into consideration or not in order to see the nature of possession, meaning thereby whether a particular person is in possession as a tenant or not ? Under Section 49 of the Registration Act, an unregistered lease-deed, which in law is required to be registered compulsorily, could be seen for collateral purposes i.e. to see the nature and character of the possession.
3 (a). Counsel for the appellant has cited Fatelal Shah & others v. Dayalal Bishrambhai, AIR 1949 Nag 218(1.) in support of his contention that an unregistered lease-deed cannot be seen whether the possession of the appellant is that of tenant or not ? It is true that in this judgment it has been observed that the question as to who is the tenant and on what terms he has been created a tenant are not collateral facts and they are impertant terms of the contract of tenancy which cannot be proved by admission of an unregistered lease-deed into evidence. However it is no possible to countenance to the view expressed in this judgement as it has been laid down repeatedly by the Saptenie Court that the nature arid character of the possession of the premises is a collateral purpose. In Padma Vithoba Chakkayya v. Mohd. Multani & Another, AIR 1963 SC 70(2), it was observed as fellows : "Proof as to the nature or character of a person's possession is really a proof of a transaction showing in what character a person has come upon the land. Such a transaction is really a collateral one which by itself does not require to be effected by a registered deed. An unregistered document is, therefore, held to be admissible as evidence of the nature or character of a person's possession."
Saine view has been reiterated in Satish Chand Makhan & Others v. Govardhan Das Byas & Others, (1984) 1 SCC 369 (3). In Mangal Singh v. Tek Ram & Others, AIR 1975 Delhi 267(4), a similar question arose and Avadh Behari, J., after making reference to the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court and two judgments of this Court in J. N. Banerjee v. S. L. Bhargava, AIR 1971 Delhi 243 (5), Shalimar Tar Products India Ud. v. H. C. Sharing ILR (1974) 1 Delhi 389, (6) and to an unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Rana Vidya Bhushan Singh v. Rati Ram, 1969 U.T (SC) S6 (7), clearly held 'that in cider to see whether a person has come into possession as atenant, an unregistered document can be seen under proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act. In the cited case, a panchayatnama had been executed which purported to create a permanent lease. The question which arose was whether a person who came into possession of the immovable property on the basis of the said panchayatnama was a tenant or not ? This Court held as follows :
"The Panchayatnama in the present case, therefore, is not admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the permanent lease which it seeks to create. That is an interest in immovable property. The document being unregistered is inadmissible. But for the nature of possession reference can certainly be made to the document. It can be read in evidence. A reading of the document shows that the defendant's possession is permissive. They admitted that the land on which they had built the mud huts belongs to the plaintiffs. They agreed to become tenants under the plaintiffs. Therefore, in order to explain the present possession of the defendants and its nature and character the document can be admitted in evidence. This will be a collateral purpose."