SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J. - (1.)CM No.7435/2012 (Exemption) Allowed subject to just exceptions. FAO (OS) No.177/2012 A suit was laid by respondent No.1 as original plaintiff against respondents 2 & 3 as original defendants for specific performance of a Receipt-cum-Agreement dated 24.12.2009 for sale of immovable property bearing flat No.84-D, Entire 1st floor, Malcha Marg, Chanakya Puri, New Delhi for an apparent consideration of Rs.12.51 crore. It is the say of the original plaintiff that a sum of Rs.1.21 crore was paid to the original defendants but the amount is disputed by the original defendants who claimed only Rs.1,08,50,000.00 was received. It is, however, not disputed that as per the said Receipt-cum-Agreement the balance payment was to be made on or before 27.7.2010.
(2.)THE original defendants prior to this crucial date claim to have entered into an agreement to sell with the appellant on 7.1.2010 which culminated into a sale deed executed on 28.4.2010. THE controversy in the appeal has arisen on account of the endeavour of the original plaintiff to amend the plaint and to add the appellant as a party in the suit. THE learned single Judge in terms of the impugned order dated 13.2.2012 has allowed the application.
Learned senior counsel for the appellant assails the judgement and contends that the controversy arising out of the execution of the sale deed in favour of the appellant cannot be adjudicated in the suit filed by the original plaintiff and that the appellant is neither a necessary nor a property party to the suit, the appellant not being a party to the agreement of which the specific performance is sought. It is, thus, pleaded that the appellant is a third party to the transaction in question and, thus, cannot assist the Court in any manner whatsoever in deciding the controversy in the present suit. It is, of course, his contention that the appellant is a bonafide purchaser for consideration. We may note that the apparent consideration for which the property has been sold to the appellant is Rs.6.00 crore, i.e., less than half the value alleged to be agreed consideration between the original plaintiff and the original defendants.

In support of his plea learned counsel has relied upon the judgement of the Supreme Court in Bharat Karsondas Thakkar Vs. Kiran Construction Company & Ors. (2008) 13 SCC 658. The only facts which need to be set out are that in pursuance of termination of an agreement, a suit was instituted for specific performance of the agreement which resulted in a consent decree. Subsequently the endeavour of the third party to seek specific performance on the basis of a prior agreement and also seek cancellation of the decree was called into question. Learned senior counsel has invited our attention to the observations made in paragraph 13 of the said judgement where it has been observed that whether in a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale of immovable property instituted by the beneficiary of the agreement against the vendor, a stranger or a third party to the agreement who had acquired an interest in the same property is either a necessary or a proper party to the suit was the issue in question as in the present case. The Court elucidated the controversy by stating that really the same revolved around the issue as to whether the person who had acquired an independent right in the suit property by way of a separate decree but was not a party to the agreement between the other two parties be added as a party in the suit for specific performance. In our considered view this was the crucial question which had to be answered. It is, thus, in that context that while placing reliance on the earlier judgement of the Supreme Court in Kasturi Vs. Iyyamperumal & Ors. (2005) 6 SCC 733 observations have been made qua the status of a stranger to an agreement and it has been found that the nature, character of the suit was sought to be changed by calling into question the decree passed earlier.

(3.)THE reason we have set out the aforesaid ration is that a judgement cannot be read like a statute and, thus, one has to see what is the ratio of the judgement as applicable to a given factual situation. We may usefully refer to in this behalf to the judgement of the Supreme Court in Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) & Ors. Vs. State of T.N. & Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533 where in paragraph 9 it is observed as under:
"9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. THEre is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case, said Lord Morris in Herrington Vs. British Railways Board (1972) 2 WLR 537.Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases."

Similarly the other judgement relied upon by learned senior counsel which has also been referred to in Bharat Karsondas Thakkar case (supra) is Kasturi Vs. Iyyamperumal & Ors. The question to be examined was posed in the second paragraph of the judgement as to whether in a suit for specific performance of contract for sale of a property instituted by a purchaser against the vendor, a stranger or a third party to the contract claiming an independent title and possession over the contracted property, is entitled to be added as party-defendant in the said suit. This question is to be read with the factual matrix where the said third party itself sought impleadment as a party in the proceedings. It is trite to say that a plaintiff is a dominus litis in any legal proceedings and if the plaintiff chooses not to add a party and take the consequences thereof, the plaintiff cannot be compelled to add as a party who claims rights under a separate contract. In order to ensure that the party seeking impleadment was not prejudiciously affected the rights of such a party have been safeguarded by making observations in paragraph 15 of the judgement to the effect that such a party would be at liberty either to obstruct the execution in order to protect their possession by taking recourse to relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ,,said Code) if they are available to them or file an independent suit for declaration and possession against those parties. In the present case it is the plaintiff himself who is seeking the addition of a party in view of provisions of Section 19 (b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.