JUDGEMENT
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(1.)This is a defendant's appeal, on a certification of the case, under Article 133 (1) (a) and (c) of the Constitution,granted by the Delhi High Court.
(2.)The plaintiff-respondent had sued for a declaration that the annual rent of Rs. 365/- payable on a piece of land situated in Basti Ara Kashan, Paharganj, New Delhi, leased to him from 1-4-31 for a period of 90 years on behalf of the Secretary of State for India could not be enhanced during the subsistence of the lease for the grant of which he had paid a premium of Rs. 18,054/-. The plot of land leased was entrusted for management on behalf of the Government of India to the Delhi Improvement Trust, and, thereafter, after the abolition of the Delhi Improvement Trust in 1957, to the Delhi Development Authority under Section 60 of the Delhi Development Act of 1957. The plaintiff also claimed refund of Rs. 5,935.25 ps. which had been retrospectively demanded and realised from him as arrears of enhanced rent from 1-1-52 to 30-6-63 after issuing a warrant of arrest dated 2-6-64 against him. Furthermore, the plaintiff prayed for an injunction to restrain the appellant, acting on behalf of the lessor, from realising an annual rent in excess of Rs. 365/- for the duration of the lease claimed to be for 90 years.
(3.)The defendant-appellant pleaded, inter alia, that the suit was barred by the provisions of S. 453 (b) (2) of the Delhi Development Act. Want of notice under Section 80 C.P.C., upon the Union of India, a co-defendant, was also pleaded. These questions were decided against the defendants by a learned Judge of the Delhi High Court, who tried the case and dismissed the suit on merits, as well as by the Division Bench which had allowed the plaintiff's appeal and decreed the suit on merits. Questions decided against the defendants at both stages in the Delhi High Court are not before us for decision. The only question argued before us was whether the interpretation of the lease deed (Ex. P2), dated 17-9-31, between the Secretary of State for India and the appellant, by the learned Judge who tried the case and held that rent could be enhanced within the period of 90 years, was correct or the interpretation adopted by the Division Bench, which allowed plaintiff's appeal after holding that the enhancement clause could only operate upon the grant of a fresh lease, after the expiry of the first period of 90 years under the lease, was correct.