STATE OF BIHAR Vs. UMA SHANKAR KETRIWAL
LAWS(SC)-1980-12-26
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (FROM: PATNA)
Decided on
December 18,1980
STATE OF BIHAR
Appellant
VERSUS
UMA SHANKAR KETRIWAL
Respondents
Cited Judgements :-
SANGHI BROTHERS INDORE LTD VS. GURUDEV SINGH GYANI AND SONS [LAWS(MPH)-2002-4-73] [REFERRED TO]ABDUL HAMID VS. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [LAWS(CAL)-1995-9-18] [REFERRED TO]
STATE OF BIHAR VS. RAMDARAS AHIR [LAWS(PAT)-1984-8-24] [REFERRED TO]
SYED AHMAD ALI RAZVI VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [LAWS(RAJ)-2009-3-26] [REFERRED TO]
AAZAM ALI VS. STATE OF BIHAR [LAWS(PAT)-2008-5-122] [REFERRED TO]
Narendra Luxmikant Nigalye VS. State of M.P. [LAWS(MPH)-1991-6-17] [REFERRED TO]
SEWA SINGH VS. K C KANUNGO [LAWS(CAL)-1991-12-12] [REFERRED TO]
HARPAL DUTT SHARMA VS. STATE [LAWS(ALL)-1990-1-56] [REFERRED TO]
G I PUNVANI VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH [LAWS(ALL)-1994-4-53] [REFERRED TO]
AMAN KANHAYALAL MAKHIJA VS. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [LAWS(BOM)-2000-3-112] [REFERRED TO]
STATE OF PUNJAB VS. TEJA SINGH [LAWS(P&H)-1989-11-118] [REFERRED]
UMESH KUMAR SINGH VS. STATE OF BIHAR THROUGH PRINCIPAL SECRETARY [LAWS(PAT)-2019-4-1] [REFERRED TO]
NARAYANDAS S O GOPIKISAN SARDA VS. INDIAN BANK [LAWS(BOM)-1989-7-38] [REFERRED TO]
SHYAM NARAYAN SINGH VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [LAWS(BOM)-1993-6-22] [REFERRED TO]
PRITAM DASS VS. STATE [LAWS(DLH)-1986-3-50] [REFERRED TO]
PARDEEP GOYAL VS. ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE [LAWS(DLH)-2007-9-220] [REFERRED TO]
MIHIR KUMAR GHOSH VS. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [LAWS(CAL)-1988-12-38] [REFERRED TO]
LAXMAN SINGH VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [LAWS(RAJ)-1987-3-59] [REFERRED TO]
MUNNA ALIASMAHENDRA VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [LAWS(RAJ)-1988-6-4] [REFERRED TO]
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA VS. CHANDRAKANT ANNAPPA SHYANBHAG [LAWS(BOM)-1993-1-22] [REFERRED TO]
ARCHANA GUHA VS. RANJIT ALIAS RUNU GUHA NEOGI [LAWS(CAL)-1990-3-20] [REFERRED TO]
P.P.KAUSHIK VS. STATE OF H.P. [LAWS(HPH)-1998-5-13] [REFERRED TO]
C I MATHEW VS. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA [LAWS(MAD)-1984-9-20] [REFERRED TO]
C E S VARAMANI DAVID VS. STATE [LAWS(MAD)-1992-11-21] [REFERRED TO]
SURYA NARAIN SINGH VS. STATE [LAWS(PAT)-1987-3-6] [REFERRED TO]
MADHESHWARDHARI SINGH VS. STATE OF BIHAR [LAWS(PAT)-1986-7-3] [REFERRED TO]
RAJENDRA SINGH VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [LAWS(RAJ)-1998-1-38] [REFFERED TO 1981 CRI LJ 159 : AIR 1981 SC 641 10]
ABDUL REHMAN ANTULAY VS. R S NAYAK [LAWS(SC)-1991-12-10] [CONSIDERED : 1981 2 SCR 402: 1981 SCC (CRI) 108]
SWAPAN KUMAR CHAKRAVORTI VS. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [LAWS(CAL)-1994-12-20] [REFERRED TO]
JAGANNATHRAO PUNJAJIRAO PAGAR VS. DIPAK DUBARI [LAWS(BOM)-1990-2-20] [REFERRED TO]
K K TIWARI VS. SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE CBI [LAWS(RAJ)-1989-1-21] [REFERRED TO]
ROOP NARAIN SINGH VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [LAWS(RAJ)-1990-7-47] [REFERRED TO]
K ACHUTA RAO VS. STATE OF ORISSA [LAWS(ORI)-1986-12-12] [RELIED ON]
M S KOCHAR VS. STATE [LAWS(DLH)-1986-3-14] [REFERRED]
CHANDOO ALIAS CHANDRAPRAKASH GUPTA VS. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [LAWS(MPH)-1989-3-35] [REFERRED TO]
SATNAM SINGH VS. STATE OF PUNJAB [LAWS(P&H)-2015-9-844] [REFERRED]
ARUN KUMAR GUPTA S/O KISHORI LAL GUPTA VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN THROUGH PP [LAWS(RAJ)-2018-5-33] [REFERRED TO]
NARAIN SINGH YADAV VS. DEPUTY CHIEF CONTROLLER OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS [LAWS(BOM)-1989-11-23] [REFERRED TO]
C T MATHEW VS. GOVT OF INDIA HOME DEPT C I B [LAWS(KER)-1984-9-3] [REFERRED TO]
AAJAM ALI VS. STATE OF BIHAR [LAWS(PAT)-2008-5-63] [REFERRED TO]
RABINDRANATH MOHANTY VS. STATE [LAWS(ORI)-1993-2-24] [REFERRED TO]
SMITA AMBALAL PATEL VS. ASSTT DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE [LAWS(BOM)-1991-12-35] [REFERRED TO]
SHRI T.R. MALIK VS. THE STATE & ANR. [LAWS(CAL)-1986-3-56] [REFERRED TO]
DEV KUMAR AGARWAL VS. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF REVENUE INTELLIGENCE [LAWS(BOM)-2025-3-99] [REFERRED TO]
STATE OF KARNATAKA VS. M S S NARAYAN [LAWS(KAR)-1990-10-51] [REFERREDTO ,REF ; 6.]
PAWAN KUMAR VS. STATE OF PUNJAB [LAWS(P&H)-1988-12-36] [REFERRED TO]
STATE OF PUNJAB VS. SAIN DASS [LAWS(P&H)-1988-9-87] [REFERRED TO]
PREMIER VEGETABLE PRODUCT PVT. LTD. VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS [LAWS(RAJ)-1991-4-69] [REFERRED TO]
JUDGEMENT
Koshal, J. -
(1.)This is an appeal by special leave against an order dated the 6th November, 1979 of a learned single Judge of the Patna High Court quashing the entire proceedings in a criminal case against the 7 respondents who were facing a charge under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act in the Court of a Magistrate at Bhagalpur.
(2.)The case was initiated through a report lodged with the police on the 9th of April 1960 with the allegation that the respondents' firm which held a licence for dealing in iron and steel had misappropriated a large quantity of G. C. sheets meant for distribution to quota and sub-quota holders. After investigation a police report was submitted on the 23rd December 1962 to a Bhagalpur Magistrate who took cognisance of the case on the 25th January 1963. However, the charge against the respondents was framed as late as 15th September 1967 and since then the progress of the case was very tardy as the orders passed therein were challenged in appeals or on the revisional side from time to time. Ultimately in 1979 the respondents made two applications to the High Court praying that the proceedings against them be quashed and the same were accepted through the impugned order. The High Court held for various reasons that the police report did not disclose any offence against any of the respondents, Another reason for accepting the two applications may be stated in the words of the learned single Judge:
"Another important aspect of the matter is that the prosecution commenced in the year 1963 and it is still going on in 1979. It is true that the accused persons themselves are to be partly blamed for this delay because several revision applications have been filed at their instance in the High Court and in the district court. The situation, however, continues to be unjustified because the last revision application was some time disposed in 1973 and the record was returned in 1974. This fact has been stated by the learned counsel for the petitioners and five years have elapsed since then. I am told that four witnesses have been examined and the last witness was examined in April, 1979 and after that no witness has been examined. It has been stated in the order sheet that prosecution is not in a position to know the addresses of the witnesses who are mostly Government Officials. Luxury of protracted trial cannot be allowed to the prosecution. If they did not know the addresses of their own witnesses and if the prosecution was not in a position to conclude its evidence by now it will be an abuse of the process of the court to allow the prosecution to go on any further."
(3.)Learned counsel for the appellant State has challenged the impugned order not only on the ground that its finding about the police report not disclosing any offence against the respondents was erroneous but also with the argument that the delay in the conclusion of the trial was not a justification for quashing the proceedings. We have heard him at length and although there is much to be said against the impugned order in so far as the finding about the police report is concerned, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the trial has not made much headway even though no less than 20 years have gone by. Such protraction itself means considerable harassment to the accused not only monetarily but also by way of constant attention to the case and repeated appearances in court, apart from anxiety. It may well be that the respondents themselves were responsible in a large measure for the slow pace of the case inasmuch as quite a few orders made by the trial Magistrate were challenged in higher courts, but then there has to be a limit to the period for which criminal litigation is allowed to go on at the trial stage. In this view of the matter we do not consider the present case a proper one for our interference in spite of the fact that we feel that the allegations disclosed the commission of an offence which we regard as quite serious.
(2.)The case was initiated through a report lodged with the police on the 9th of April 1960 with the allegation that the respondents' firm which held a licence for dealing in iron and steel had misappropriated a large quantity of G. C. sheets meant for distribution to quota and sub-quota holders. After investigation a police report was submitted on the 23rd December 1962 to a Bhagalpur Magistrate who took cognisance of the case on the 25th January 1963. However, the charge against the respondents was framed as late as 15th September 1967 and since then the progress of the case was very tardy as the orders passed therein were challenged in appeals or on the revisional side from time to time. Ultimately in 1979 the respondents made two applications to the High Court praying that the proceedings against them be quashed and the same were accepted through the impugned order. The High Court held for various reasons that the police report did not disclose any offence against any of the respondents, Another reason for accepting the two applications may be stated in the words of the learned single Judge:
"Another important aspect of the matter is that the prosecution commenced in the year 1963 and it is still going on in 1979. It is true that the accused persons themselves are to be partly blamed for this delay because several revision applications have been filed at their instance in the High Court and in the district court. The situation, however, continues to be unjustified because the last revision application was some time disposed in 1973 and the record was returned in 1974. This fact has been stated by the learned counsel for the petitioners and five years have elapsed since then. I am told that four witnesses have been examined and the last witness was examined in April, 1979 and after that no witness has been examined. It has been stated in the order sheet that prosecution is not in a position to know the addresses of the witnesses who are mostly Government Officials. Luxury of protracted trial cannot be allowed to the prosecution. If they did not know the addresses of their own witnesses and if the prosecution was not in a position to conclude its evidence by now it will be an abuse of the process of the court to allow the prosecution to go on any further."
(3.)Learned counsel for the appellant State has challenged the impugned order not only on the ground that its finding about the police report not disclosing any offence against the respondents was erroneous but also with the argument that the delay in the conclusion of the trial was not a justification for quashing the proceedings. We have heard him at length and although there is much to be said against the impugned order in so far as the finding about the police report is concerned, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the trial has not made much headway even though no less than 20 years have gone by. Such protraction itself means considerable harassment to the accused not only monetarily but also by way of constant attention to the case and repeated appearances in court, apart from anxiety. It may well be that the respondents themselves were responsible in a large measure for the slow pace of the case inasmuch as quite a few orders made by the trial Magistrate were challenged in higher courts, but then there has to be a limit to the period for which criminal litigation is allowed to go on at the trial stage. In this view of the matter we do not consider the present case a proper one for our interference in spite of the fact that we feel that the allegations disclosed the commission of an offence which we regard as quite serious.
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