Aparesh Kumar Singh, J. - (1.) Heard learned counsel for the petitioners.
(2.) Both these civil review petitions are being heard together as the common impugned order dated 25th November, 2014 passed in W.P.(S) No. 4982 of 2013 in the case of these two petitioners herein have been challenged.
(3.) For better appreciation, the order dated 25th November, 2014 is reproduced hereunder: "Heard learned counsel for the parties. The petitioners have prayed for quashing of the order contained in Memo No. 3880 dated 27th July, 1993, whereby and whereunder the services of the petitioners were terminated allegedly without any notice or opportunity of hearing. Reliance has been placed upon a judgment rendered in the case of Uma Shankar Singh v.The State of Jharkhand & Ors. in L.P.A. No. 255 of 2008, Annexure8 dated 26th April, 2012, to submit that the said appellant had also been removed from service on 7th December, 1993. After protracted litigation, learned Division Bench of this Court was inclined to quash the order of termination and direct the said appellant to be taken back in service, however, without any back wages. On the face of it, it appears that the said appellant had approached Patna High Court being C.W.J.C No. 1539 of 1994 and when his representation was rejected he again preferred another writ petition being C.W.J.C No. 5199 of 1996 (P). That writ petition was decided against him by learned Single Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 1st May, 2008, which was under challenge in L.P.A No. 255 of 2008 by the said appellant. The present petitioners do not appear to have raised their grievances after their termination any time earlier though impugned letter is dated 27th July, 1993. The petitioners therefore appear to be in slumber and have now chosen to seek relief which has been granted to a person who was conscious enough to agitate his grievances right since the order of his termination in 1993 by filing successive writ petitions in 1994 and 1996 which led to the judgment rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No. 255 of 2008. The petitioners therefore cannot claim to be benefited by the judgment rendered in the case of Uma Shankar Singh (supra). Learned Senior Standing Counsel No. 1 has also brought to the notice of the Court a judgment passed on 5th March, 2014 in C.W.J.C No. 584 of 2008 in the case of Md. Asiruddin and another where also the order of termination of 7th December, 1993 was challenged. This Court after considering the sequence of events and the fact that the said petitioners had also chosen to raise their cause of action after 15 years only upon a judgment having been rendered in the case of one Sadanand Thakur by this Court in L.P.A. No. 397 of 2003 refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. It appears from the judgment dated 5th March, 2014 passed in the said case that the writ petition was dismissed as being barred by gross delay and laches as well. The said judgment is also quoted hereinbelow: "The petitioners, in the present writ petition in the year 2008, are challenging reasoned order contained in Memo No. 1398 dated 07.12.1993 which was passed pursuant to the observation made in the petitioners' own writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 6819 of 1991. The petitioners' services were terminated vide order dated 11.01.1989. He was appointed on purely temporary basis on the post of Clerk by the order of District Education Officer, Sahibganj, which is at Annexure-1 dated 17.06.1988. The petitioners perhaps were waiting for outcome of another writ petition preferred by one Sadanand Thakur, who was incidentally appointed in the year 1989 and was subsequently terminated in the year 1997. He was also reinstated in service by the order of Regional Deputy Director of Education vide order dated 29.12.1997. Again his services were terminated vide Memo dated 24.12.1999. The said person had approached this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1752 of 2001 which was decided vide judgment dated 10.03.2003 quashing the impugned order of termination of the said person. The State went in appeal being L.P.A. No. 397 of 2003. After noticing the facts of the case vide judgment dated 14.07.2005, the Letters Patent Appeal was disposed of with observation that the said petitioner will not be entitled to salary for the period from 27.05.2000 i.e. the order of his termination from service till the date of his rejoining duties. Learned Division Bench of this Court also took into account that after 16 years had elapsed since the petitioner was initially appointed and thereafter terminated and again reinstated in service and after 10 years of his appointment, his services were once again sought to be terminated. In the aforesaid light of facts, the learned Division Bench upheld the judgment of the learned single Judge and the Special Leave to Appeal preferred by the State was also dismissed. The judgment rendered by the learned Single Bench in the case of Sadanand Thakur and judgment of Letters Patent Court are annexed as Annexures 7 and 8 to the writ petition. Thereafter vide order dated 15.09.2005, Annexure-9, the said person was reinstated in service. It is obvious that after reinstatement of the said person, the present writ petition has been preferred in the year 2008. This Court, in the aforesaid circumstances when the petitioners have slept over their right for more than 15 years and filed the present writ petition in the year 2008, is not inclined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. The march of time does not get arrested after the cause of action has arisen in the year 1993 and the petitioners have all along waited for judgment of the Hon'ble Courts in the case of another person to agitate their own grievances. Therefore, this Court refrains from exercising discretionary jurisdiction in the matter, which is barred by gross delay and laches. Accordingly, this writ petition, is dismissed." It appears that the facts of the present case and the relief claimed thereupon are similar to those decided in the case of Md. Asiruddin and another (supra) who also invoked jurisdiction of the Court after long lapse of time. The present petitioners also appear to have preferred the writ petition in 2013 i.e. 20 years after passing of the order of termination. Therefore, this Court in the aforesaid facts and circumstances, is not inclined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to interfere in the matter which is barred by gross delay and latches. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed.;