PRABHUNATH SINGH Vs. STATE OF JHARKHAND
LAWS(JHAR)-2009-9-146
HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND
Decided on September 05,2009

PRABHUNATH SINGH Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF JHARKHAND Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) This application was initially filed for quashing the charge sheet no.83 of 1996 dated 21.6.1996 submitted in connection with Mashrakh P.S. case no.110 of 1991, corresponding to supplementary U.T.No.62 of 1998, pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribagh whereby the petitioner was sent up for trial for offences under section 364, 302, 201 and 120B of the Indian penal Code. Subsequently, by way of amendment petition, entire criminal proceeding of Mashrakh P.S. case no.110 of 1991 has been sought to be quashed. The facts giving rise this application are that on 23.6.1991 the informant Awadh Kumar Singh proceeded to village Dhanauti along with Manokamana Singh (the deceased) to bring one Jai Prakash, the servant of Ashok Singh. When they met with Jai Prakash, they asked him to go on his bi -cycle whereas the informant Awadh Kumar Singh along with Manokamana Singh (the deceased) proceeded on a motor cycle. When they reached near Dhanauti bridge, they came across with the accused Dina Singh, Nageshwar Singh, Pankaj Singh, Ajay Singh @ Engineer and Om Prakash Singh who had come over there on their motor cycles and some of them were having rifles with them. The accused persons having over powered them made Manokamana Singh to sit forcibly in the motor cycle of Dina Singh and then they proceeded towards Mashrakh. In the way some members of a Barat party saw accused persons taking Manokamana Singh. Thereafter Awadh Kumar Singh lodged a case which was instituted as Mashrakh P.S. case no.110 of 1991 under sections 363 and 364 of the Indian Penal Code. Subsequently when Manokamana Singh was found dead, section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was added in the first information report. Thereafter the case was taken up for investigation. The Investigating Officer submitted first charge sheet no.71 of 1991 on 20.9.1991 against Om Prakash Singh only and the investigation was kept open for rest of the accused persons. After some time second charge sheet, bearing no.8 of 1992 was submitted on 7.9.1992 against the accused Dina Nath Singh and Nageshwar Singh. Subsequently, investigation of the case was taken over by the CID, who submitted charge sheet, bearing no.83 of 1996 on 21.5.1996 against the petitioner and one Ajay Singh under sections 302, 201 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code. Thereafter under the order of the Honble Supreme Court, the case was transferred from Bihar to Jharkhand at Hazaribagh, which was registered as T.R.No.509 of 2003 and when the case was committed to the court of sessions, it was registered as Sessions Trial No.22 of 2004 but as the petitioner was shown absconder, his case was separated and was numbered as T.R.No.381 of 2004 and warrant of arrest was issued. However, when the charge sheet was submitted against this petitioner, the petitioner moved this Court for quashing of the charge sheet. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the case was registered in the year 1991 against the named accused persons against whom charge sheets were submitted in two phases but the name of the petitioner never figured in those charge sheets. However, when the investigation was taken over by the CID, charge sheet was submitted under the influence of the ruling party against the petitioner, who at the relevant point of time was a member of legislative assembly, though there was absolutely no material showing legal evidence of the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged offence. Learned counsel in this respect further submitted that the only material which was collected by the investigating agency is that the car which was used in the commission of the alleged offence belonged to the petitioner and that the motor cycle used was having registration number as that of the motor cycle belonging to the petitioner and that when one of the witnesses came to the house of the petitioner, he saw the accused persons present over there and saw blood mark over the shirt of one of the co -accused. Only on these materials which were never sufficient to show the culpability of the petitioner, charge sheet was submitted. Therefore, under this circumstance, the entire criminal proceeding is fit to be quashed so far the petitioner is concerned. Learned counsel further submitted that subsequent to filing of this application, a development having much bearing on this case, took place whereby all the four named accused persons, who had been put on trial in Sessions Trial No.22 of 2004 have been acquitted by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Hazaribagh and as such, the petitioner who has been sought to be tried with the aid of section 120(B) cannot be held guilty for the alleged offence. Learned counsel in support of his submission has referred to a decision rendered in a case of Yogesh alias Sachin Jagdish Joshi vs. State of Maharashtra[(2008) 10 SCC 394]. In the aforesaid circumstances, it was submitted that when there has been no sufficient material showing involvement of the petitioner in the alleged offence nor the petitioner could be found guilty for the offence of conspiracy, in view of the fact that other accused persons have already been acquitted, there would be abuse of the process of law, if the petitioner is relegated to face the trial and hence, the entire criminal proceeding is fit to be set aside. As against this, learned counsel appearing for the informant submitted that in course of investigation, motor cycle as well as car used in the commission of crime has been found to have belonged to this petitioner, in whose house the other accused, who was related to the petitioner was found present just after the occurrence and hence, the petitioners involvement of hatching conspiracy in the commission of offence cannot be ruled out and under this circumstance, the court would be very loath in quashing the entire criminal proceeding so far this petitioner is concerned. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and on perusal of the record, I do find that admittedly there has been no whisper about the involvement of the petitioner in the first information report and that after the investigation, when two charge sheets were placed before the court against the named accused persons, petitioners name never figured in those charge sheets. However, when the investigation was taken over by the CID, it submitted charge sheet against the petitioner and one other accused person under sections 302, 201 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code after lapse of five years from the date of occurrence for the reason that in course of investigation, it transpired that the motor cycle as well as car used in the commission of the crime, belonged to this petitioner and that when one of the witnesses came to the house of this petitioner just after the occurrence, she found that the accused persons present over there and one of the accused was having blood mark on his shirt. I am afraid in absence of any other circumstances whatsoever whether these materials would be sufficient to hold the petitioner guilty. At this stage, it would be apt to refer to a case of R.P.Kapur vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866) whereby the Honble Supreme Court summarized some categories of cases which are fit to be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power. They are as follows: (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g, want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirely do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. The circumstances, which are sought to be used against the petitioner even if are taken to be true, it would hardly prove the charge particularly when other named accused persons with whom the petitioner is said to have hatched criminal conspiracy for committing the offence of murder has been acquitted. At this stage, one needs to take notice of the essential features of the offence of conspiracy as enshrined under section 120 A of the Indian Penal Code reads as follows: "120 -A Definition of criminal conspiracy - When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done - (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy: Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. Explanation - It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object. Thus, it is manifest that the meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act by illegal means is sine qua non of criminal conspiracy. Since other named accused persons with whom the petitioner is said to have hatched conspiracy for committing offence has already been acquitted, sufficient ground be hardly there to proceed against the petitioner with an aid of section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, any continuance of the proceeding would amount to abuse of the process of law. Having come to such conclusion still the question would be as to whether the court in exercise of jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would go into the matter of sufficiency or insufficiency of the materials or to relegate to the petitioner to stage where he can plead for his discharge on account of insufficiency of the material. This question has been answered by the Honble Supreme Court rendered in a case of Ashok Chaturvedi and others vs. Shitul H. Chanchani and another [(1998) 7 SCC 698] holding therein that merely because the accused has right to plead at the time of framing of charges that there is no material for framing of charges he is not debarred from invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the court at the earliest point of time when the Magistrate has taken cognizance. Earlier also the Honble Supreme Court had expressed the same view in a case of State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and others [(1977) 2 SCC 699]. Thus, in the facts and circumstances as stated above, when no sufficient ground is there to proceed against the petitioner, there would be abuse of the process of law, if the petitioner is allowed to face rigour of the trial and hence, the entire criminal proceeding of Mashrakh P.S. case no.110 of 1991, corresponding to supplementary U.T no.62 of 1998, pending in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribagh is hereby quashed. In the result, this application is allowed.;


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