- (1.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submitted that the husband of the present petitioner retired on 1st July, 1995 as Constable, thereafter, the pension was paid by the State of Bihar to the husband of the present petitioner. Husband of the present petitioner expired on 24th April, 2004, thereafter, family pension is paid to the petitioner by the State of Bihar, even on today, but, several other retirement benefits like amount of Gratuity, Group Provident Fund amount, Leave Encashment amount, Group Insurance amount and such other retirement benefits have not yet been paid, which are legally payable to the petitioner and, therefore, let a suitable direction is given to the concerned respondent authorities so that legally payable dues to the petitioner, may be paid by the respondents. The petitioner is residing within the State of Jharkhand, therefore, the present petition has been instituted before this Court.
(2.) I have heard learned counsels for the respondents, who have vehemently submitted that no cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, much less part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Jharkhand High Court and, therefore, the writ petition is not tenable at law before this Court. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the State of Bihar as well as learned counsel on behalf of Accountant General Offices at Bihar as well as at Jharkhand that the petitioner's husband served with the State of Bihar, he retired from the State of Bihar on 1st July, 1995. After his retirement, pension was paid to him by the State of Bihar. Husband of the petitioner expired on 24th April, 2004, thereafter, family pension is also paid by the State of Bihar and, therefore, the amount of Gratuity, Group Provident Fund amount, Leave Encashment amount, Group Insurance amount and such other retirement benefits is payable, by the State of Bihar and, therefore, this petition is not tenable before this Court. No cause of action has arisen within the State of Jharkhand. Nonetheless, it is fairly submitted by learned counsel for the State of Bihar that they will consider this writ petition as a representation and the concerned respondent authorities of the State of Bihar will decide the legally payable amount of death -cum - retiral benefits to the petitioner and it will be communicated also to the petitioner, she will have to collect the amount from the office of the concerned respondent authority i.e. respondent no. 5. Having heard learned counsel for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that: - (i) The petitioner has served the State of Bihar and has retired from the State of Bihar on 1st July, 1995 as constable. The amount of pension was paid by the State of Bihar, thereafter, husband of the petitioner expired on 24th April, 2004 and the family pension was also paid to the petitioner by the State of Bihar. (ii) It has been decided by this Court in the case of Narayan Mochi V/s. M/s Eastern Coal Fields Ltd., Kolkata and Ors. as reported in 2009 (3) JLJR 114 that the situs of the petitioner is not a cause of action nor it can be termed as a part of cause of action. Paragraphs 16 and 17 thereof read as under: - "16. The expression "cause of action" means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. It means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. For every action there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily. The entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved before the petitioner can obtain a decree, is the material facts. The material facts is also known as integral part of the cause of action. Unless the facts pleaded are such as have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case, they cannot give rise to a cause of action within the court's territorial jurisdiction. The facts which have no bearing with the lis or dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to cause of action." "17. Thus, the petitioner, who resides within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, has no bearing with the dispute, involved in the case and, therefore, his situs in Jharkhand is not a cause of action, because it has no bearing with the lis and, therefore, his residence within the State of Jharkhand cannot confer a jurisdiction to this Court, if it is otherwise not having." (iii) Thus, residence of the petitioner within the State of Jharkhand has no relevance with the dispute and, therefore, residence of the present petitioner within the State of Jharkhand can not be labelled as part of cause of action and, hence, merely because the petitioner is staying within the State of Jharkhand, in background of the aforesaid facts, this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition, filed by the petitioner. (iv) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Addl. General Manager -Human Resources, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. V/s. Suresh Ramkrishna Burde, as reported in (2007) 5 SCC 336, especially in paragraph no. 15, as under: - "15. Before parting with the case we would like to observe that the order invalidating the caste certificate had been passed by the Scrutiny Committee at Nagpur and, therefore, the earlier two writ petitions filed by the respondent were maintainable before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court. However, in the third and final writ petition the order under challenge was the order of termination of service which was passed by the appellant on 16.7.2004 at Hyderabad as the respondent was working with Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd.'s Heavy Power Equipment Plant, Hyderabad. Therefore, the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition wherein challenge was raised to the said order. However, in order to cut short the litigation and settle the controversy we have decided the case on merits." (v) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Aligarh Muslim University V/s. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd., as reported in (1994) 4 SCC 710, especially in paragraph no. 2, as under: - "2. We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction. The contracts in question were executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, even the contracts provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction. The arbitrator was from Aligarh and was to function there. Merely because the respondent was a Calcutta -based firm, the High Court of Calcutta seems to have exercised jurisdiction where it had none by adopting a queer line of reasoning. We are constrained to say that this is a case of abuse of jurisdiction and we feel that the respondent deliberately moved the Calcutta High Court ignoring the fact that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of that Court. It clearly shows that the litigation filed in the Calcutta High Court was thoroughly unsustainable." (vi) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission V/s. Utpal Kumar Basu, as reported in (1994) 4 SCC 711, especially in paragraph no. 12, as under: - "12. Pointing out that after the issuance of the notification by the State Government under Section 52 (1) of the Act, the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances and hence it was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice under Section 52 (2) for the grant of an appropriate direction or order under Article 226 for quashing the notification acquiring the land. This Court, therefore, held that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. This Court, therefore, held that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. This Court deeply regretted and deprecated the practice prevalent in the High Court of exercising jurisdiction and passing interlocutory orders in matters where it lacked territorial jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the strong observations made by this Court in the aforesaid decision and in the earlier decisions referred to therein, we are distressed that the High Court of Calcutta persists in exercising jurisdiction even in cases where no part of the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction. It is indeed a great pity that one of the premier High Courts of the country should appear to have developed a tendency to assume jurisdiction on the sole ground that the petitioner before it resides in or carries on business from a registered office in the State of West Bengal. We feel all the more pained that notwithstanding the observations of this Court made time and again, some of the learned Judges continue to betray that tendency. Only recently while disposing of appeals arising out of SLP Nos. 10065 -66 of 1993, Aligarh Muslim University V/s. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd., this Court observed: - "We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction." In that case, the contract in question was executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, the contracts provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction, the arbitrator was appointed at Aligarh and was to function at Aligarh and yet merely because the respondent was a Calcutta based firm, it instituted proceedings in the Calcutta High Court and the High Court exercised jurisdiction where it had none whatsoever. It must be remembered that the image and prestige of a court depends on how the members of that institution conduct themselves. If an impression gains ground that even in cases which fall outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, certain members of the court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on the plea that some event, however trivial and unconnected with the cause of action had occurred within the jurisdiction of the said court, litigants would seek to abuse the process by carrying the cause before such members giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That would lower the dignity of the institution and put the entire system to ridicule. We are greatly pained to say so but if we do not strongly deprecate the growing tendency we will, we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution and the system of administration of justice. We do hope that we will not have another occasion to deal with such a situation." (Emphasis supplied)
(3.) IN view of the aforesaid decisions also, the present petition is not tenable at law before this Court for want of territorial jurisdiction as no cause of action or part of cause of action as said to have been arisen within the territorial region of the State of Jharkhand.;