- (1.) MR . Rajesh Shankar, learned S.C. -I brought to our notice the order dated 30.04.2009 passed in L.P.A. No. 30 of 2009 and submitted that since similar question is involved in this appeal, it may also be disposed of in terms of the aforesaid order.
(2.) THE order dated 30.04.2009 passed in M.A. No. 30 of 2009 reads as under: - " This appeal has been preferred against the order dated 20.08.2008 passed by the learned Single Judge in a batch of three writ petitions bearing W.P.S. No. 2504 of 2008, W.P. (S) 3506 of 2008 and W.P.(S) 3563 of 2008, by which all the writ petitions were allowed and the impugned order passed by the respondent -State of Jharkhand the appellant herein, was quashed and set aside, by which the appellant -State of Jharkhand had ordered for recovery of the amount alleged to be the excess amount received by the petitioners -respondent herein by way of Reducible Pay Protection. The order for recovery was passed after more than 12 years of its receipt by the respondents -employees and that too without issuing any show cause notice to them or opportunity of hearing. This appeal itself has been filed after a delay of 124 days for which an explanation has been offered, which is the usual and a hackneyed one stating that these filed traveled from one department to the other, which does not make out a case for condonation of delay. In spite of this huge delay, we permitted the counsel for the appellants to address this Court on the merit of the matter, merely to avoid any injustice to the appellant -State that might result, in case it was dismissed merely on the ground of delay. This is how we have heard the matter also on the merit but we have not been able to find out any infirmity in the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge who has taken a just and reasonable view that the alleged excess amount could not be recovered after more than 12 years of the payment which the respondents had received by way of Reducible Pay Protection. Besides this, we have noticed that a large number of employees have retired in course of time and even the counsel for the appellant -State submitted that it would not be prudent to recover the amount from the retired employees, if at all it is fit to be recovered. If that is so, we fail to understand as to how the appellant -State can be allowed to recover the said amount from the employees who are still in service, especially when there is no apparent reason to recover the amount from them after 12 years of receipt of the amount. Learned counsel for the appellant -State however has offered several justifications to this Court by stating that the amount was fit to be recovered and in this context he has stated that there were limited circumstances only under which the Reducible Pay Protection could be granted to the employees and the respondents -employees did not fall into that category. Even if this submission were to be accepted as correct, it is difficult to brush aside the reasoning assigned by the learned Single Judge who has recorded on merit that the order for recovery of the amount could not have been made without opportunity of hearing to the petitioners respondents. The counsel representing the State submitted that the said opportunity may now be given to the respondents by remanding the matter. But, the appellant - State had never contended before the Single Judge that opportunity of hearing may now be allowed to be given by the appellant -State to the respondents -employees and at the stage of appeal, after 12 years of payment, if this opportunity is granted to the State of Jharkhand, it is bound to create a mushroom of litigation, resulting into misery to the employees who are still in service. We have also taken note of the fact that the amount which was received by the respondents was paid even before the creation of the State of Jharkhand and after creation of the State of Jharkhand in the year 2000, if liberty is still left to the appellant - State to grant opportunity of hearing to the Respondents in regard to their order for recovery, it is bound to open a Pandora Box' of litigation which is bound to drag on for unlimited number of years. We, therefore, disapprove this, especially in absence of a prima facie case in favour of the appellant -State. For all these reasons, we find no merit in this appeal, apart from the fact that the same is time bared by 124 days. As we permitted the counsel to address us on the merit of the appeal, the application for condonation of delay (I.A. No. 908 of 2009) be treated as allowed but in so far as the merit of this appeal is concerned, the same is devoid of substance and hence is dismissed at the admission stage itself." As submitted by learned counsel appearing for the appellant, this appeal is dismissed.;