- (1.) THIS application is for quashing the order dated 16.01.2003 passed by C.J.M., Bokaro in F.A. Case No. 1 of 2003 whereby and whereunder he took cognizance of the offence under the Factories Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the ˜Act').
(2.) IT is alleged that on 15.10.2002 at 13.30 hours an accident took place in the Steel Melting Shop No. 2 of Bokaro Steel Plant, while a Crane was operating in the said plant. In that accident one worker, namely, Chandrika Prasad died. It is stated that notice of aforesaid accident was given to the Inspector of Factories on 16.10.2002. It is further stated that thereafter the Inspector of Factory, Bokaro inspected the Factory Premises on 19.10.2002, 22.10.2002, 24.10.2002 and 28.10.2002 and found that as per the provisions contained under section 29 of the aforesaid ˜Act' read with Rule 56A of the Bihar Factories Rules, the Crane had not been thoroughly examined by competent person and the examination report had also not been entered in the relevant registers. It is stated that the inspector further found that the workers were asked to work in dangerous and insecure condition which was violative of Rule 55A of Bihar Factory Rules, 1956. Accordingly, it is stated that the aforesaid acts and omission of accused persons is punishable under section 92 of the Factories Act. Accordingly a complaint was filed on 16.1.2003 in the Court of CJM, Bokaro. On the basis of materials available in the complaint petition, learned CJM vide his order dated 16.01.2003 took cognizance of the offence. It is submitted by Sri Rajiv Ranjan, learned counsel for the petitioners that the notice regarding the accident was received in the office of Inspector of Factories on 16.10.2002, therefore, it will be presumed that the Inspector had knowledge about the commission of offence on 16.10.2002. It is submitted that as per section 106 of the Factories Act it is imperative for the court to take cognizance within three months of the date on which alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of Inspector. It is submitted that it is settled law that three months, under section 106 of Factories Act means 90 days calculated @ 30 days per month. It is further submitted that in the instant case, cognizance was taken by the CJM on 16.1.2003. It is submitted that admittedly 16.1.2003 is beyond the period of 90 days from 16.10.2002. Accordingly, it is submitted that the impugned order is barred by limitation. It is next submitted that as per section 92 of the aforesaid Act, occupier and manager of the Factory are liable to be punished for the offence committed under the Act. It is submitted that petitioner no. 3 is neither the manager nor the occupier of the factory and therefore no case is made out against him. Hence the cognizance order so far it relates to petitioner no. 3, is an abuse of the process of the court. Accordingly, it is submitted that the impugned order cannot be sustained by this Court.
(3.) ON the other hand, learned Additional P.P. submits that the Inspector had received no knowledge of the offence from the notice served upon him on 16.10.2002. It is submitted that in the said notice it is not mentioned that concerned factory had contravened mandatory provisions contained under section 29 of the Factories Act read with Rule 56A of the Bihar Factories Rules. It is submitted that said facts came to the knowledge of the Inspector, when he inspected the factory after receiving notice of accident. It is submitted that the Inspector visited the factory on 19.10.2002, 22.10.2002, 24.10.2002 and 28.10.2002 and found contravention of section 29 of the Act read with Rule 56A of the Bihar Factories Rules. Accordingly, it is submitted that commission of offence came to the knowledge of Inspector on the date of inspection. It is submitted that if 90 days is counted from the first date of inspection/ enquiry, impugned order of cognizance is within time. It is further submitted that the accident took place in Steel Melting Shop No. 2 of Bokaro Steel Plant and petitioner no. 3 is General Manager of that plant. Thus, he is Manager within the meaning of section 92 of the Act. In that view of the matter, the court below had rightly taken cognizance against the petitioner no. 3.;