SUKRI ORAIN Vs. STATE OF BIHAR (NOW JHARKHAND)
LAWS(JHAR)-2009-3-91
HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND
Decided on March 03,2009

Sukri Orain Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF BIHAR (NOW JHARKHAND) Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20.05.2000 passed in Sessions Trial No. 546 of 1986, whereby the Sessions Judge convicted the appellant under Section 363 of the I.P.C. and sentenced her to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years.
(2.) CHARGE against the appellant was that she alongwith the other co -accused, namely, Langari Orain had enticed two minor girls (P.Ws. 3 and 4) from the house and lawful custody of their guardians and took the girls alongwith them. Later, during search in course of investigation, both the girls were recovered from a brick kiln at Village -Nandpur, P.S. Manjhi, District Saran (Chapra). Additional charge under Section 366 of the I.P.C. was also framed but the appellant was not found guilty by the trial court for the aforesaid offence. As many as eight witnesses including the victim girls (P.Ws. 3 and 4), the informant (P.W. 1) who had stated regarding the missing of the victim girls from their respective house and the Doctor (P.W.9) who had medically examined the girls upon their recovery were examined. The Investigating Officer of the case has not been examined. The appellant had pleaded not guilty to the charge and preferred to be tried. The case in her defence was that she has been falsely implicated in the case and that she was innocent. The trial court upon considering the evidence of the witnesses particularly of the victim girls (P.Ws. 3 and 4) and relying upon their testimony, convicted the appellant for the offence under Section 363 of the I.P.C. and sentenced her accordingly. 4 Mr. A. K. Sahani, learned counsel for the appellant while assailing the impugned order of conviction and sentence, submits that the conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 363 of the I.P.C. is bad in law, as because even on the basis of the evidences of the witnesses including the statements of the victim girls, it cannot be said that the appellant had enticed the victim girls from the lawful custody of their guardians. Learned counsel would explain that even as admitted by the Prosecution, both the victim girls had accompanied the co[2] [Cr. Appeal No. 209 of 2000] accused, Langri Orain from their house, who, as per the evidence of P.W. 3 happens to be her paternal aunt and while they were in the custody of the said co -accused, all three of them had gone to the market and from there they had gone to the brick kiln in Chapra from where they were recovered. Learned counsel adds further that even the girls have themselves stated that they had gone to Chapra with the appellant on their own volition to work in the brick kiln and as such, it cannot be said that the appellant had by any means or in any manner, enticed away the minor girls from the lawful custody of their guardians from their house. 5. None appears on behalf of the Prosecution to argue the case. 6. On perusal of the impugned order as also of the evidences on record, the facts which emerge are that both the minor girls, aged ten years as confirmed by the medical evidence, were living in the lawful custody of their respective parents. On the date of occurrence, the co -accused Langri Orain by taking advantage of her proximity and relationship with the minor girls, had visited their house and on the pretext of going to the market, took both of them to the market place. There, both the minor girls were handed over to the present appellant. From the market place, in the District of Lohardaga in the State of Jharkhand, both the girls were taken to Chapra (a town situated in the northern part of the State of Bihar). The statement of the victim girls also indicates that the present appellant had not only taken both the victim girls to Chapra but at her instance, both of them were compelled to work at the brick kiln at Chapra and inspite of their wish they could not return to their house due to the pressure exerted by the appellant. These are the very facts, which the trial court has taken into consideration. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that for the period from the date when the girls went missing and till the date of their final recovery the information regarding the whereabouts of the girls, notwithstanding the explanations offered by them, may have been investigated by the Investigating Officer and the details whereof, could have been given by the Investigating Officer himself. In absence of his examination, the appellant has been deprived of the knowledge from the Investigating officer regarding the results of the investigation carried out by him on this issue and the appellant has thereby suffered prejudice in her defence. The above argument is hardly convincing. The appellant has not been able to demonstrate in clear and specific terms as to how the appellant has suffered any prejudice on account of the non -examination of the Investigating officer. As regards the details of the whereabouts and the transactions, which the minor girls had undergone from the date they had gone missing from their parents house and till the date of their final recovery, such details have been elaborately given by the minor girls themselves in their respective depositions. 8. The trial court has placed reliance on the testimony of both these girls. From a careful examination of their testimony, I do not find any error or infirmity in the trial courts observation that the testimony of both these girls is truthful and inspires confidence and is sufficient to place reliance for recording conviction of guilt against the appellant. Having considered the facts and circumstances, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment of conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 363 of the I.P.C. 2.9. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that when the order of conviction of the appellant was passed, she was 53 years old and today the appellant is aged about 62 years. It is further submitted that ever since the date of institution of the case in the year 1982, the appellant has been facing prosecution till the date of judgment passed in the year May, 2000 and had suffered thereby maximum mental torture on account of the protracted trial. 10. It appears from the impugned order of sentence that the learned trial court has considered this aspect also and after considering the same, sentence of three years has been imposed against the appellant. The sentence being commensurate with the guilt of the appellant, I do not find any infirmity in the order of sentence. For the reasons stated this Appeal having no merit, is dismissed. The trial court is directed to take the appellant in custody for undergoing the sentence forthwith. 11. Let this order be communicated to the trial court immediately.;


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