D.N. Patel, J. - (1.) This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 3235 days in preferring the present Letters Patent Appeal, and this Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in writ petition being W.P.(S) No.371 of 2009, dated 30.01.2009.
(2.) Having heard counsel for the appellant, and looking to the reasons stated in paragraph no.5 onwards, it appears that after the aforesaid writ petition was dismissed, though the appellant was well advised, as stated in para - 5 of this interlocutory application, no letters patent appeal was preferred and unnecessarily time was wasted by this appellant. The golden thread running throughout the argument is that on the guidance of others the appellant has taken wrong action. It is the prerogative power of this appellant that from whom he will obtain the guidance. He could have got guidance from able person. In fact, the reasons given in this interlocutory application are not reasonable reasons for condonation of delay of 3235 days in preferring the present Letters Patent Appeal, hence, I.A. No.5327 of 2018, is dismissed.
(3.) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 685, in paragraph nos.25 and 26, which read as under : "25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly." (Emphasis supplied) ;