D.N. Patel, J. - (1.) The final hearing of this Letters Patent Appeal is taken place with the consent of the Advocates for both the sides.
(2.) This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original respondents, because the writ petition preferred by the respondent (original petitioner) being W.P. (S) No. 1462 of 2011 was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 11th September, 2015, whereby, the punishment inflicted upon this respondent (original petitioner) by the appellants because of theft committed by him was quashed and set aside and, hence, the original respondents have preferred present Letters Patent Appeal.3. Factual matrix: The incident of theft, of the articles of the appellants-company has taken place on 16th January, 2006. Immediately, the respondent (original petitioner) was suspended from the services of the appellants on 14th March, 2006. Departmental proceedings were initiated against the respondent and charge sheet was issued on 14th March, 2006, which is at Annexure-1 to the memo of the writ petition. Simultaneously, criminal proceedings were also initiated against the respondent because of theft committed by him. There was conviction under Section 411 (Dishonestly receiving stolen property) of the Indian Penal Code and there was acquittal under Section 379 (Punishment for theft) of the Indian Penal Code. Thereafter, in the criminal appeal preferred by the respondent, there was acquittal even under Section 411 of the Indian Penal Code. Departmental proceedings were continued after giving adequate opportunity of being heard to the respondent before the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer has concluded the enquiry with the observations that charges levelled against the respondent (original petitioner) have been proved on the basis of the evidences on record. The Management has examined their witnesses. On the basis of the evidences, the charges levelled against the respondent have been held as proved. Disciplinary authority after giving adequate opportunity of being heard to the respondent, imposed punishment of reduction to the minimum of the Grade, which is known as S-9 Grade. The order of disciplinary authority is dated 30th September, 2010, which was challenged by the respondent by way of writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 1462 of 2011. The writ petition preferred by the respondent was allowed by the learned Single Judge mainly on the ground that there were acquittal in the criminal proceedings and, hence, the order of disciplinary authority dated 30th September, 2010 was quashed and set aside and, therefore, original respondents have preferred present Letters Patent Appeal challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 11th September, 2015.4. Arguments canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellants: Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that for the grave misconduct committed by the respondent of theft of articles of the appellants-company, charge-sheet was issued on 14th March, 2006 (Annexure-1 to the memo of the writ petition). By this misconduct, he befits not to be an employee of the appellants-company. There is dereliction on duty by the respondent and that too by committing theft of the articles of the appellants-company. Thus, the main charge upon the respondent is that he is not fit to be continued as an employee. There is lack of confidence in the respondent, for which, departmental proceedings were initiated and after giving adequate opportunity of being heard to the respondent, departmental proceedings were concluded and the charges levelled against the respondent-employee was held as proved. The disciplinary authority has passed an order on 30th September, 2010 by taking lenient view instead of his dismissal from the services, he has been punished of reduction to the minimum of the Grade, which is known as S-9 Grade. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that this Court is not sitting in appeal upon the finding of the Enquiry Officer. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that even if there is acquittal in criminal proceedings, departmental proceedings can always be continued and can also be concluded because the standard of evaluation of the evidence is entirely different. There can be acquittal in the criminal proceeding, but, the charges levelled against the respondent of theft of articles of the appellants-company can be held as proved because the method of evaluation of evidence is entirely different. In the criminal proceeding, the charges are bound to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, whereas, in the departmental proceeding, charges can be held as proved on the basis of preponderance of probability. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondent. In fact, the quantum of punishment also cannot be held as unreasonably excessive nor it can be labelled as shockingly disproportionate. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that now in catena of decisions, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that both criminal proceeding and departmental proceeding upon the employee can go together. In the criminal proceeding, there can be acquittal, but, in the departmental proceeding, the charges can be held as proved because of different method of evaluation of evidences. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the decision rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 and other decisions. On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that once in the departmental proceeding the charges have been held as proved on the basis of the evidences then, even though there is acquittal in the criminal proceeding, the respondent can be punished by the Management because of the misconduct committed by the respondent in a case of theft of articles of the employer, by the employee. If the charges are proved, there is lack of confidence and faith in the employee by the employer and such employee, in fact, cannot be continued in the services. Nonetheless looking to the overall circumstances of the case, much lenient view was taken by the Management by imposing punishment of reduction of rank or pay scale. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and, hence, the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 1462 of 2011, dated 11th September, 2015 deserves to be quashed and set aside.5. Arguments canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent (original petitioner): Learned counsel appearing for the respondent (original petitioner) submitted that looking to the charge-sheet issued upon the respondent, the allegation is of theft committed by the respondent. For the very same charge, criminal proceedings were also initiated and in the criminal proceedings, there was acquittal from the charges under Section 379 (Punishment for theft) of the Indian Penal Code by the trial court and in the criminal appeal, there was acquittal from charge under Section 411 (Dishonestly receiving stolen property) of the Indian Penal Code. Thus, evaluation of evidences by the trial court is with an accurate eye which is appreciated by the learned Single Judge and, hence, no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge in relying upon the conclusion arrived at by the trial court rather than the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that whenever charge levelled against the employee on civil side or in the departmental proceeding is the same as on criminal side and if there is acquittal in the criminal matter, in such eventuality no punishment can be inflicted upon the respondent-employee. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondent and, hence, this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained by this Court.6. Reasons: Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we hereby quash and set aside the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 1462 of 2011, dated 11th September, 2015 mainly for the following facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements: (i) The incident of misconduct has taken place on 16th January, 2006. The nature of misconduct is of theft of articles of the appellants-company, committed by the respondent. He was caught red-handed at the outer gate of the appellants-company. Immediately thereafter, departmental proceedings were initiated by issuing a charge-sheet dated 14th March, 2006, which is at Annexure-1 to the memo of the writ petition. (ii) Looking to the nature of charges upon the respondent, it appears that theft of the articles of the appellants-company was committed by the respondent. Thus, the major charge upon the respondent is that he was not fit to hold the post and there is now "loss of faith and confidence" in the respondent-employee, because of, grave misconduct of theft committed by him. (iii) Criminal proceedings were also initiated against the respondent, where, different is the yardstick of evaluation of the evidence. There was acquittal from the charge under Section 379 (Punishment for theft) of the Indian Penal Code, but, there was conviction under Section 411 (Dishonestly receiving stolen property) of the Indian Penal Code. (iv) In the criminal appeal, there was acquittal even from the charge under Section 411 of the Indian Penal Code. (v) In the departmental proceedings, on the basis of the evidences on record, the Enquiry Officer has concluded that the charges levelled against the respondent have been proved. (vi) After giving further opportunity of being heard to the respondent, the disciplinary authority has imposed punishment of reduction to the minimum of the Grade, which is known as S-9 Grade on 30th September, 2010. (vii) Thus, the order of the disciplinary authority dated 30th September, 2010 was challenged by the respondent in the writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 1462 of 2011, which was allowed by the learned Single Judge and the order of disciplinary authority was quashed and set aside mainly for the reason that there was Hon'ble acquittal of the respondent-employee in the criminal proceeding. (viii) It appears from the facts of the case that the learned Single Judge has lost sight of the fact that the method of evaluation of the evidences in criminal proceedings and in the departmental proceedings are different. In the criminal proceedings, the charges levelled against the accused are to be proved "beyond reasonable doubt", whereas, in the departmental proceedings, the charges levelled against the delinquent are to be proved on the basis of "preponderance of probabilities". (ix) Even though, there is acquittal from the criminal charges against the accused, but, if the the same accused is delinquent in departmental proceeding, the charges can be held as proved. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge. In case of theft or any other offence, committed by an employee, both, civil as well as criminal proceedings can go together, because charge on criminal side will be an offence/offences under Indian Penal Code, whereas on civil side, the charges are- (a) violation of rules of discipline; (b) loss of faith in employee; (c) dereliction in duty by employee; (d) negligence in performing the duties by the employee; and (e) by the act/omission, of employee, he is not fit to hold the post. Even if, these charges have not been mentioned, categorically in the charge-sheet, by the employer, we can read into it, whenever, any offence/offences have been committed, by the delinquent for which, criminal as well as civil proceedings have been initiated, simultaneously. For these reasons, both the proceedings can go together. (x) Looking to the charge levelled against the respondent (original petitioner), it appears that as the respondent has committed theft of the articles of the employer, he was not befitting to hold the post. There is now "loss of faith and confidence" in the respondent-employee. In the departmental proceedings, adequate opportunity of being heard was given to the delinquent. The departmental proceedings were conducted by the Enquiry Officer and the charges have been held as proved. No error has been committed by the Enquiry Officer in holding the enquiry proceeding. No illegality has been committed in conducting the departmental proceedings. The report of the Enquiry Officer is based on evidences on record. We are not sitting in appeal against the finding arrived at by the Enquiry Officer. (xi) Once the departmental enquiry is held as legal or valid, the only question left out to be decided by the Court is quantum of punishment inflicted upon the delinquent. We have perused the nature of misconduct. The respondent was a Class-IV employee, who has committed theft of the articles of the present appellants-company. In fact, there is "loss of confidence in the employee" by the employer. Nonetheless looking to the position of the respondent-employee in the appellants-company and also looking to the quantum of punishment inflicted upon the respondent by the appellants vide order dated 30th September, 2010, which is a reduction to the minimum of the Grade (S-9 Grade), the same cannot be said to be unreasonably excessive nor it can be labelled as shockingly disproportionate. On the contrary, a lenient view has been taken by the employer. (xii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Bhola Nath Singh , reported in (1997) 3 SCC 657, in paragraph 6, which reads as under: "6. Under these circumstances, the question arises whether the High Court would be correct in law to appreciate the evidence and the manner in which the evidence was examined and to record a finding in that behalf. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. The High Court, in the proceedings under Article 226 does not act as an appellate authority but exercises within the limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. In this case, no such errors were pointed out nor any finding in that behalf was recorded by the High Court. On the other hand, the High Court examined the evidence as if it is a court of first appeal and reversed the finding of fact recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted by disciplinary authority. Under these circumstances, the question of examining the evidence, as was done by the High Court, as a first appellate court, is wholly illegal and cannot be sustained." (Emphasis supplied) (xiii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Govt. of A.P. v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan, reported in (2006) 2 SCC 373, in paragraphs 10 and 11, which read as under: "10. From the finding recorded by the High Court it clearly appears that the High Court reappreciated the evidence as an appellate authority. Apart from reappreciating the evidence, which is not permissible in law, the High Court also fell in grave error by directing the Government Pleader and the learned counsel for the respondent herein to again view the cassettes. It is on record that the inquiry officer relied on the video cassettes displayed during the inquiry as part of additional evidence. The finding has been clearly recorded by the inquiry officer on the basis of the evidence adduced by PWs 1, 2, 3 and 4 during the inquiry. 11. By now it is a well-established principle of law that the High Court exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by reappreciating the evidence as an appellate authority." (Emphasis supplied) (xiv) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of SBI v. Narendra Kumar Pandey, reported in (2013) 2 SCC 740, in paragraph 25, which reads as under: "25. The High Court, in our view, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not justified in interfering with the order of dismissal passed by the appointing authority after a full-fledged inquiry, especially when the Service Rules provide for an alternative remedy of appeal. It is a well-accepted principle of law that the High Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution does not act as an appellate authority. Of course, its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct an error of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of the principles of natural justice. In SBI v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde this Court held that the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence acting as a court of appeal. We have, on facts, found that no procedural irregularity has been committed either by the Bank, presenting officer or the inquiring authority. Disciplinary proceedings were conducted strictly in accordance with the Service Rules." (Emphasis supplied) (xv) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of U.P. SRTC v. Ram Kishan Arora, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 627, in paragraphs 6 and 7, which read as under: "6. It is now well settled that commission of a criminal breach of trust by a person holding a position of trust is a misconduct of serious nature. The charges levelled against the respondent having been proved, in our opinion, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not at all justified in reducing the punishment and imposing the punishment of stoppage of two increments only. 7. The High Court has not arrived at the conclusion that the quantum of punishment imposed upon the respondent was disproportionate to the gravity of his misconduct. Even in such a situation, the course which would have been ordinarily open to the High Court was to remit the matter to the employer for reconsideration of the question in regard to the quantum of punishment. The High Court without assigning any reason could not have substituted its opinion to that of the disciplinary authority." (Emphasis supplied) (xvi) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan v. J. Hussain, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 106, in paragraph 14, which reads as under: "14. Thus, in our view entering the school premises in working hours i.e. 11.30 a.m. in an inebriated condition and thereafter forcibly entering into the Principal's room would constitute a serious misconduct. Penalty of removal for such a misconduct cannot be treated as disproportionate. It does not seem to be unreasonable and does not shock the conscience of the court. Though it does not appear to be excessive either, but even if it were to be so, merely because the court feels that penalty should have been lighter than the one imposed, by itself is not a ground to interfere with the discretion of the disciplinary authorities. The penalty should not only be excessive but disproportionate as well, that too to the extent that it shocks the conscience of the court and the court is forced to find it as totally unreasonable and arbitrary thereby offending the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is stated at the cost of the repetition that discretion lies with the disciplinary/appellate authority to impose a particular penalty keeping in view the nature and gravity of charge. Once it is found that the penalty is not shockingly disproportionate, merely because in the opinion of the Court lesser punishment could have been more justified, cannot be a reason to interfere with the said penalty." (Emphasis supplied) (xvii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh , reported in (2013) 12 SCC 372, in paragraph 19, which reads as under: "19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable." (Emphasis supplied) (xviii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679, in paragraphs 13 and 22, which read as under: "13. As we shall presently see, there is a consensus of judicial opinion amongst the High Courts whose decisions we do not intend to refer to in this case, and the various pronouncements of this Court, which shall be copiously referred to, on the basic principle that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings can proceed simultaneously with a little exception. As we understand, the basis for this proposition is that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings operate in distinct and different jurisdictional areas. Whereas in the departmental proceedings, where a charge relating to misconduct is being investigated, the factors operating in the mind of the disciplinary authority may be many such as enforcement of discipline or to investigate the level of integrity of the delinquent or the other staff, the standard of proof required in those proceedings is also different than that required in a criminal case. While in the departmental proceedings the standard of proof is one of preponderance of the probabilities, in a criminal case, the charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The little exception may be where the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common without there being a variance. 22. The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of this Court referred to above are: (i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately. (ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case. (iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet. (iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed. (v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest." (Emphasis supplied) (xix) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Sarvesh Berry, reported in (2005) 10 SCC 471, in paragraphs 7 and 8, which read as under: "7. It is a fairly well-settled position in law that on basic principles, proceedings in criminal case and departmental proceedings can go on simultaneously, except in some cases where departmental proceedings and criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common. It is in these cases, the court has to decide, taking into account the special features of the case, whether simultaneous continuance of both would be proper. 8. The purposes of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. Criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty the offender owes to the society, or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So, crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of a grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public duty, as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the Evidence Act"). Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances." (Emphasis supplied) (xx) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of NOIDA Entrepreneurs Assn. v. NOIDA, reported in (2007) 10 SCC 385, in paragraphs 11 and 16, which read as under: "11. A bare perusal of the order which has been quoted in its totality goes to show that the same is not based on any rational foundation. The conceptual difference between a departmental enquiry and criminal proceedings has not been kept in view. Even orders passed by the executive have to be tested on the touchstone of reasonableness. [See Tata Cellular v. Union of India and Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T., Chandigarh.] The conceptual difference between departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings have been highlighted by this Court in several cases. Reference may be made to Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. T. Srinivas , Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd . v. Sarvesh Berry and Uttaranchal RTC v. Mansaram Nainwal. "8. ... The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public duty, as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [in short 'the Evidence Act']. Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. ... Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances." 16. The standard of proof required in departmental proceedings is not the same as required to prove a criminal charge and even if there is an acquittal in the criminal proceedings the same does not bar departmental proceedings. That being so, the order of the State Government deciding not to continue the departmental proceedings is clearly untenable and is quashed. The departmental proceedings shall continue." (Emphasis supplied) (xxi) In view of the aforesaid decisions, even if there is acquittal from the criminal charges, especially, in cases like theft, a departmental proceedings can always be continued and if the Enquiry Officer comes to a conclusion that charge levelled against the delinquent is proved, disciplinary action can always be initiated against such type of delinquent, because in criminal proceeding, the charges are to be proved "beyond reasonable doubt", whereas, in the department proceeding, the charges are to be proved on the basis of "preponderance of probabilities". On criminal side, even though offence of theft is held as "not proved", on civil side, the charges of- (a) violation of rules of discipline; (b) loss of faith and confidence in the delinquent-employee; (c) dereliction in duty by employee; (d) negligence in performing the duties by the employee; and (e) by the act/omission, of the employee, he is not fit to hold the postcan be held as proved, by the Enquiry Officer. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondent (original petitioner) being W.P.(S) No. 1462 of 2011, vide judgment and order dated 11th September, 2015. 7. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, we hereby quash and set aside the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 1462 of 2011, dated 11th September, 2015. 8. This Letters Patent Appeal is, accordingly, allowed and disposed of. ;