D.N. Patel, J. - (1.) This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the Original Respondent No.1 of the W.P.(S) No. 773 of 2012.
(2.) The aforesaid writ petition was preferred by the respondents (Original Petitioners) for getting employment because they have sold their land, admeasuring 3.66 Acres by registered sale deeds, dated 30th July, 1978 and 31st July, 1978, to the appellants and for execution of the so called promise given by these appellants dated 4th April, 1980. The execution of this agreement dated 4th April, 1980 was sought for in the year 2006 for getting employment for two persons. Thereafter, writ petition was preferred in the year 2012 for getting employment for two persons and this writ was allowed and hence, the present Letters Patent Appeal was preferred.3. Factual Matrix The appellants have purchased the land belonging to respondents (Original petitioners) by two different registered deeds, dated 30th July, 1978 and 31st July, 1978. The land in question, in total admeasuring 3.66 acres, is situated at Mauza Belakhonda, District of Dhanbad. It further appears from the facts of the case that previously also for some time this land was utilized by these appellants and some damage was caused to the land and hence, a letter was written on 16th May, 1978 (Annexure 4 to the memo of the writ petition, being W.P.(S) No. 773 of 2012) by the appellants to these respondents to give one employment and one employment was given on 21st December, 1978 to one Shri Satish Chandra Tiwary. The Trade Union made several representations espousing the cause of Respondents for giving employment on 10th December, 1981, 11th April, 1985 and 1st November,1999 (Annexure 3 series to the memo of the writ petition). It further appears from the facts of the case that several meetings were convened by the appellants on 3rd February, 1992, 15th April, 1992, 3rd September, 1997, 4th February, 2006, 29th January, 2008 and 8th July, 2008. The minutes of these meetings are Annexure 6 series to the memo of the writ petition in question. A Review Committee was constituted by the appellants and ultimately, the Review Committee could not decide the issue of giving two employments to the respondents in pursuance of the purchase of the land by registered sale deed and legal opinion was sought for. Minutes of this meeting dated 24th January, 2008 is at Annexure 5 to the memo of the writ petition. For execution of a so called agreement dated 4th April, 1980, writ petition was preferred. viz. W.P.(S) No. 773 of 2012 on 8th February, 2012. This writ petition was allowed and on the basis of the agreement, dated 4th April, 1980, one employment was directed to be given by the appellants to the respondents and hence, this Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the Original Respondent No.1.4. Arguments canvassed on behalf of the appellants: Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that there is no legal right vested in the respondents to get employment because the land in question was purchased by the appellants by two registered sale deeds, dated 30th July, 1978 and 31st July, 1978. Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the Appellant No.1 is a public sector undertaking. Employment cannot be given on the whims and caprice of any officer of the appellants. Public advertisement and procedure for recruitment ought to be followed even for Class IV employees. No charity can be done by any officer of the appellants. The so called agreement, dated 4th April, 1980, was entered into by one Shri S.K. Banerjee, the then Personnel Manager of Appellant No.1, who had no authority to give promise to the respondents to give employment because there was no policy at all for such employment to be given when the land is purchased by the appellants. This officer had no power, jurisdiction and authority to enter into such type of agreement and to give such type of promise and hence, the same cannot be executed after 37 years. It is further submitted by counsel for the appellants that court should have been slow in formulating the policy for the appellants for grant of employment. In absence of a policy, the order should not have been passed by the learned Single Judge for grant of employment to the respondents, viz. for execution of the so called agreement dated 4th April, 1980. Normally, whenever there is a land acquisition, generally citizens are demanding and the acquiring body is formulating a policy, but, in the facts of the present case, neither the land was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 nor any policy was floated by the appellants for grant of employment to the land losers. The court cannot be a policy maker. This aspect of the matter has not been appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondents. Hence, judgment, dated 3rd May, 2017, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 773 of 2012 deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellants that charity beyond law is cruelty to others. Already, necessarily or unnecessarily, one employment has been given to one Shri Satish Chandra Tiwari on 21st December, 1978. Enough is enough. No further employment can be given after 37 long years under the agreement dated 4th April,1980 because land was purchased by the appellants by a registered sale deed dated 30th July, 1978 and by another registered sale deed dated 31st July, 1978. It is further submitted by counsel appearing for the appellants that the learned Single Judge has observed in paragraph No. 8 of the judgment dated 3rd May, 2017, in last few lines, that the appellants have formulated Rehabilitation and Resettlement policy, which was implemented with effect from August, 2000. Thus, a policy, which is formulated and made enforceable from August, 2000, has been made effective with respect to the lands purchased by the appellants in the month of July, 1978. This is not permissible in the eye of law, Hence, also judgement dated 3rd May, 2017, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 773 of 2012 deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is further submitted by counsel for the appellants that the claim of the respondents (original petitioners) was entertained after 37 long years. This is also not permissible in the eye of law. Trade Union was representing from 1981 onwards (Annexure 3 series to the memo of the writ petition), but, the respondents maintained silence for their so called rights for years after years. It is further contended by the counsel for the appellants that series of meetings have taken place, as stated in Annexure 6 onwards to the memo of the writ petition, between appellants and the respondents and ultimately, Review Committee had pointed out in the meeting dated 24th January, 2008 (Annexure 5 to the memo of the writ petition) that no employment can be given without taking a legal opinion. Thus, from the very beginning, appellants were of the opinion that enough is enough and no employment can be given because this land was purchased by the appellants. There was no acquisition of the land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while deciding W.P.(S) No. 773 of 2012 vide order dated 3rd May, 2017 and therefore, the same deserves to be set aside.5. Arguments canvassed by the counsel for the respondents: Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge in appreciating the law and facts while deciding W.P. (S) No. 773 of 2012 vide order dated 3rd May, 2017 and hence, this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained by this Court, especially, when an agreement was entered into on 4th April, 1980 between appellants and respondents for grant of employment to two persons. it is further submitted by counsel for the respondents that there was a policy of the appellants to give one employment for one acre of land either purchased or acquired by the appellants, if the land is an agricultural land or paddy land and one employment was to be given for two acres of land purchased or acquired if the land is non-agricultural. In the facts of the present case, the land in question is an agricultural land and hence, minimum two employment ought to have been given by the appellants. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing W.P.(S) No. 773 of 2012 vide order dated 3rd May, 2017. It is further submitted by the counsel appearing for the respondents (original petitioners) that a letter, dated 16th May, 1978, was written (Annexure 4 to the memo of the writ petition, being W.P.(S) No. 773 of 2012) by these appellants to the respondents for grant of employment. Moreover, the Trade Union of the appellants has espoused the cause of the respondents by several representations, dated 10th December, 1981, 11th April, 1985 and 1st November, 1999 (Annexure 3 series to the memo of the writ petition) and hence, it cannot be said that the claim of the respondents (original petitioners) was raised at a much belated stage. It is further submitted by counsel for the respondents (original petitioners) that the talks of settlement has been going on for several years between the appellants and respondents. The meetings were held on 3rd February, 1992, 15th April, 1992, 3rd September, 1997, 4th February, 2006, 29th January, 2008 and 8th July, 2008. The minutes of these meetings are Annexure 6 series to the memo of the writ petition in question. Thus, there is no delay in filing the writ petition on 8th February, 2012 by the respondents. This aspect of the matter has also been appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing W.P.(S) No. 773 of 2012, vide judgment dated 3rd May, 2017, and hence, this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained by this Court. It is further submitted by the counsel appearing for the respondents that in terms of letter dated 16th May, 1978 (Annexure 4 to the memo of the writ petition, being W.P.(S) No. 773 of 2012), one employment has already been given by the appellants and two are yet to be given. This aspect of the matter has been appreciated by the learned Single Judge and hence, on this ground also this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained.Reasons: 6. Having heard counsels appearing for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we, hereby, quash and set aside the judgment dated 3rd May, 2017 in W.P.(S) No. 773 of 2012 for the following facts and reasons and judicial pronouncements. (I) The respondents are the original petitioners, whose land, totally 6 admeasuring 3.66 acres, were purchased by these appellants by two registered deeds, dated 30th July, 1978 and 31st July, 1978. These lands are situated at Mauza Belakhonda, District Dhanbad. (II) It further appears from the facts of the case that the appellants had used the land and caused some damages to the land and hence, letter was written on 16th May, 1978 (Annexure 4 to the memo of W.P.(S) No. 773 of 2012) by which offer was made to give three employments and the cost of land. One employment was given on 21st December, 1972 to one Shri Satish Chandra Tiwary. (III) It appears from the facts of the case that on 4th April, 1980, one agreement was entered into between one Shri S.K. Banerjee, Personal Manager of the appellants, with respondents for grant of employment. (IV) Thereafter, the Trade Union of the appellants had made several representations, dated 10th December, 1981, 11th April, 1985 and 1st November, 1999 (Annexure 3 series to the memo of the writ petition) espousing the cause of the respondents for grant of employment and there was several meetings between these appellants and respondents in the year 1992, 1997, 2006 and 2008 (minutes of these meetings are Annexure 6 series to the memo of the writ petition in question) and ultimately, Review Committee minute was drawn on 24th January, 2008 (annexure 5 to the memo of the writ petition) that legal opinion is to be sought for and without that no employment can be given. Later on, on 8th August, 2012, W.P.(S) No. 773 of 2012 was preferred for enforcement of an agreement dated 4th April, 1980 and this writ petition was allowed by an order dated 3rd May, 2017 and direction was given to the present appellants to give one employment to the respondents (original petitioners). Hence, the appellants (original respondents) have preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. (V) It appears that this land in question was sold to the appellants by two registered sale deeds, dated 30th and 31st July, 1978. There is no legal rights vested in the respondents (original petitioners) to get employment because the Appellant No.1 is a public sector undertaking. Sale and purchase of the land in question is with free consent of the respondents and in lieu of a consideration mentioned in the sale deeds. We cannot add a consideration which is not mentioned in the deed of sale. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition and hence order dated 3rd May, 2017, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 773 of 2012 deserves to be quashed and set aside. (VI) Appellant No.1 is a Public Sector Undertaking. Employment in a public sector undertaking cannot be given without there being a public advertisement and without there being a chance given to the public at large to compete with each other and without following the due procedure established by law for grant of employment. No officer of any rank of the appellant company can promise anyone an employment, without there being any public advertisement, merely because this land is purchased by the appellants from the seller of the land, especially, when such consideration was never mentioned in the sale deed. No officer of any rank of the appellants can do charity at the cost of others. Charity beyond law is cruelty to others and even if, such type of promise has been given by any of the officers of the appellant, it is not enforceable under law. Such a promise has got no value in the eye of law and on such promises no writ petition can be preferred by the respondents and that too after 36 long years. (VII) Much has been argued out by counsel for the respondents about the letter written by the appellants dated 16th May, 1978 (Annexure 4 to the memo of the writ petition), which gives promise to the respondents to purchase the land and to give three employment. This letter also cannot give any additional right to the original petitioners because: a) The so called promise was given on 16th May, 1978. In fact, it is not a promise. It is an invitation to offer the sale of the land, which was never accepted. "Invitation to an offer" is a quite different thing from the "promise" given by the appellants. What is written in the letter dated 16th May, 1978 is an invitation to offer. It is not a promise at all for grant of three employment. b) What is enforceable, are the registered sale deeds, dated 30th July and 31st July, 1978 for the land, admeasuring 3.66 acres in total. Court cannot go beyond the terms of the registered sale deed. There was no condition or promise in the sale deeds that three employment will be given by the purchasers of the land. Court cannot add a consideration. c) The invitation to offer-letter dated 16th May, 1978, was never incorporated as a terms of consideration in the registered sale deed. Thus, what is stated in the letter dated 16th May,1978 (annexure 4 to the memo of the writ petition) was never a promise. It was "an invitation to offer". What is promised, is written in the registered Sale deed, which can be executed by courts, viz. promise given by the appellants, whereas the learned Single Judge has executed an invitation to offer. This is not permissible in the eye of law and hence also the judgment and order dated 3rd May, 2017 delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 773 of 2012 deserves to be quashed and set aside. d) Even if any promise has been given by the appellants in their agreement dated 4th April, 1980, it has got no value in the eye of law because Public Sector Undertakings are the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. No promise can be given by any officer of the State to give employment without there being any public advertisement and without giving any opportunity to the public at large to compete for the public post and such type of agreement, and even, if it is entered into, by any officer of the appellants, is an unenforceable agreement. Such type of unenforceable agreement cannot be looked into by the courts. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondents. (VIII) It has been argued out by the counsel for the respondents (original petitioners) that there is no delay in filing the writ petition in the year 2012 because their cause was being espoused by the Trade Unions in the representation of the year 1981, 1985, 1999 (Annexure 3 series to the memo of the writ petition) and also because several meetings were held between the appellants and respondents, as stated hereinabove, (minutes are at Annexure 6 onwards to the writ petition). This contention is also not helpful to the respondents-original petitioners mainly for the reason that: a) The land in question was purchased by registered sale deeds in the month of July, 1978. One employment was already given on 21st December, 1978 to one Shri Satish Chandra Tiwary. If others were claiming employment as a right, the writ petition could have been preferred in the year 1978 itself or immediately afterwards, but, the writ petition was preferred after 34 long years. b) The so-called agreement dated 4th April, 1980 has been heavily relied upon by the respondents, which is nothing but a desire of one of the employees of this appellants, one Sri S.K. Banerjee (Personnel Manager of the public Sector undertaking). Said employee, has given a promise beyond consideration of the sale deed. Further, the employee has given his words, beyond any policy of the employer. Thus, the employee of the appellants is wiser than the employer and has entered into an agreement dated 4th May, 1980. He was holier than thou. Even after this so called agreement of the year 1980, writ petition was preferred in the year 2012, i.e. after 32 long years. c) Representations made by the Trade Union, which are at Annexure 3 series to the memo the writ petition, cannot extend, unreasonably, the time limit to prefer the writ petition. In fact, Trade Union cannot espouse the cause of the persons who are yet to be the employees. d) So-called series of meetings between the appellants and the respondents from the year 1992, which has been mentioned at Annexure 6 to the memo of the writ petition, also can neither extend a reasonable time limit for filing the writ petition nor does it explain the delay in filing the same. The respondents have waited unnecessarily, for more than three decades in filing the writ petition. Perhaps, those, who were in search of employment, must have attained the age of superannuation by now. Original petitioner No. 1 is aged about 65 years, as submitted by the counsel for the respondents (original petitioners). This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while issuing the writ of mandamus upon the appellants to give one employment for the land purchased in the year 1978, on the basis of a letter written in the year 1978 and a so-called agreement dated 4th April, 1980 between one Shri S.K. Banerjee, who was an employee of the appellants, and the respondents. Court helps those who are vigilant and not those who are lethargic. "Vigilantibus, et non dormientibus, jura sub veniunt: the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who are dormant" IX) It has also been contended by counsel for the respondents (original petitioner) that one Shri Satish Chandra Tiwary was employed in pursuance of the letter dated 16th May, 1978 (Annexure 4 to the memo of the writ petition) and hence one more employment has been directed to be given by the learned Single Judge. This argument is also of no help to the respondents (original petitioners) mainly for the reason that: a) As stated hereinabove, what is mentioned in the letter dated 16th May, 1978 is prior to the registered sale deed dated 30th July, 1978, 31st July, 1978 and is an invitation to offer and nothing beyond that. b) Over and above the purchase price of the land in question, no consideration, such as, "to give employment", has been mentioned in the registered sale deed. Court cannot add a consideration to be moved from the purchaser to the seller of the land. "Invitation to offer" cannot be executed by the court and_it creates no legitimate right in favour of the respondents (original petitioners). "Invitation to offer" is not enforceable at all. Therefore, though one employment is given to one Shri Satish Chandra Tiwary, no writ of mandamus can be issued by the learned Single Judge because no public duty is vested in the appellants. c) It has been stated by the appellants in paragraph 5 and 6 of the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition, viz. W.P.(S) No. 773 of 2012, that the person, who has given his words, viz. Mr. S.K. Banerjee, has no power, jurisdiction and authority to enter into the agreement dated 4th April, 1980 on behalf of the appellants because there was no policy of giving employment for purchase of the land. Purchase of the land is quite different from acquisition of the land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It appears that Mr. S.K. Banerjee is more charitable than the appellant employer. His promise was travelling beyond the terms of the registered Sale deed and his promise was travelling beyond any policy formulated by the appellants. His Promise was travelling in violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India because Appellant No.1 is a State within the meaning of the Article 12 of the Constitution of India. No public employment can be given by Mr. S.K. Banerjee, without there being any public advertisement. Hence, agreement dated 4th April, 1980, even if, it is entered into by an employee of the appellants, is not enforceable in any court of law. (X) It has been observed by the learned Single Judge, in last few lines of Para 8 of the judgment dated 3rd May, 2017, that a rehabilitation and resettlement policy was made effective from August, 2000. Even if such a policy has been floated by the appellants, no benefit can be given to the sellers of the land, who sold away their land in July, 1978, because consideration cannot be added by this court to be moved from the purchaser to the seller. Moreover, court cannot make such rehabilitation and resettlement, which has taken effect from August, 2000 to be applicable from the year 1978, viz. with a retrospective effect. Thus, no benefit can be given to the respondents of such a policy, which is brought into force from August, 2000. (XI) Also not a single circular is pointed out by the respondents (original petitioners), which has been floated by the appellants. The letter written by one of the employees of the appellants is not a policy decision of the appellants-employer. Thus, in absence of any written policy, no employment can be given to the sellers of the land (XII) It has been held by the Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Butu Prasad Kumbhar and Others v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Others reported in (1995) Supp.(2) SCCpage 225 Para 6 as under: "6. The constitutional challenge based on Article 21 does not appear to have any substance. In Olga Tellis it was observed by this court that the concept of right of life conferred was wide and far-reaching and the deprivation of the right to livelihood without following the procedure established by law was violative of the fundamental guarantee to a citizen. Needless to say that petitioners or their ancestors were not deprived of their land without following the procedure established in law. Their land was taken under the Land Acquisition Act. They were paid compensation for it. Therefore, the challenge raised on violation of Article 21 is devoid of any merit. Even otherwise the obligation of the State to ensure that no citizen is deprived of his livelihood does not extend to provide employment to every member of each family displaced in consequence of acquisition of land. Rourkela Plant was established for the growth of the country. It is one of the prestigious steel plants. It was established in public sector. The government has paid market value for the land acquired. Even if the Government or the steel plant would not have offered any employment to any person it would not have resulted in violation of any fundamental right. Yet considering the poverty of the persons who were displaced both the Central and the State Government took steps to ensure that each family was protected by giving employment to at least one member in the plant. We fail to appreciate how such a step by the Government is violative of Article 21. The claim of the petitioners that unless each adult member is given employment or the future generation is ensured of a preferential claim it would be arbitrary or contrary with the constitutional guarantee is indeed stretching Article 21 without any regard to its scope and ambit as explained by this Court. Truly speaking it is just the other way. Acceptance of such a demand would be against Article 14. Thus, in view of the aforesaid decision, even if, land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, there is no legal obligation on the part of the "State" within the meaning of Article 21 and 14 of the Constitution of India. Certainly, in case of purchase of a land, which is by the volition of the parties and where the consideration is already mentioned in the registered sale deed, the court can neither add the quantum of consideration nor court can create any right in favour of the respondents (original petitioners) to get employment, as there is no public duty vested in the appellants, which is a "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, to give employment to the sellers of the land and hence, no writ of mandamus can be issued by the learned Single Judge for enforcement of those rights which are yet to be created, which are never created by way of a registered sale deed, which are not created in any policy floated by the appellants and which is in violation of the article 14 to be read with article 16 (because public employment cannot be offered without there being any public advertisement). (XIII) We, therefore, quash and set aside the judgment dated 3rd May, 2017, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 773 of 2012. (XIV) This Letters patent Appeal is allowed and disposed of. ;