M.KARPAGA VINAYAGAM, J. - (1.) RAJEEV Kumar, the petitioner herein, who was appointed as Additional District and Sessions Judge as against the temporary post of Presiding Officer of Fast Track Court in the year 2003, was terminated by the order of the State of Jharkhand dated 11.3.2006. Challenging the same, the petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking for quashing the said order dated 11.3.2006.
(2.) THE short facts, which are relevant for disposal of the writ petition, are as follows. - An advertisement was issued by the High Court on 23.5.2001 inviting applications for appointment to the post of Additional District & Sessions Judge from Bar quota. The petitioner, who was a practising Lawyer, sent his application. He was called for writing examination. Accordingly, he wrote the written examination. On 19.8.2001, he was informed that he secured minimum qualification marks in the examination and was called for interview. Accordingly, he attended the interview on 6.10.2001. The petitioner was finally selected on 17.10.2001. His selection was published by the Gazette Notification on 2.2.2002. He thereupon joined on 6.2.2002 in Garhwa. On 24.6.2003 he was transferred to Daltanganj. In 2004 he was transferred to Hazaribagh. On noticing that some persons, who were not eligible, were selected for appointment to the post of Additional District & Sessions Judge, he sent a representation to the High Court drawing its attention about their selection and requesting for the cancellation of their appointment. However, no action was taken on the said representation. Therefore, he filed a writ petition before the High Court. However, the same was dismissed on 25.1.2006 for non -prosecution. However, the matter was not pursued further. At that stage, the High Court, on noticing a news -report published in the newspaper about an extremist carrying a prize of Rs. 1 lac on his head had been granted bail by the petitioner's court, called for the records of the bail application and the order and found the petitioner granted bail to the said accused. Thereafter the High Court on 23.2.2006 sent recommendation note to the Government for the termination of the petitioner. On 11.3.2006, the Government, accepting the recommendation terminated the service of the petitioner through the order of the Governor. Challenging the termination, this writ petition has been filed. The submission, assailing the order of termination dated 11.3.2006, made by the petitioner, who appeared as party in person, is summarised as follows: (A) The appointment in the ad hoc capacity on an ex cadre temporary post of Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, was only initial arrangement. The probation period under Rule 6 of the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Condition of Service) Rules, 2001, is for two years. The petitioner was serving as Judicial Officer for four years. After expiry of two years, it must be deemed that it is confirmed. Till his termination, there was no adverse remarks in his confidential remarks. It is for the first time mentioned in the removal order that his service is not satisfactory. Earlier the High Court never communicated to the petitioner that his service was not satisfactory. Even if the Judicial Officer has committed some mistake, opportunity must have been given to explain the said mistake or rectify the same. Without giving such an opportunity, recommending for termination of the petitioner from service without complying Article 311(2) of the Constitution is illegal. (B) The recommendation letter dated 23.2.2006 sent by the High Court for termination of the petitioner to the Government would show that the High Court's recommendation for his removal was in the public interest. The termination order dated 11.3.2006 would show that his service was not satisfactory. Thus, it is clear that the recommendation letter as well as the termination order carry with stigma of inefficiency and his removal was in the public interest. The above order is based upon some enquiry by the High Court through verification of the records which would indicate that the petitioner had granted bail to the extremist without valid reasons. Thus, it is clear that the termination order indicating the conduct of the petitioner in granting bail, on the basis of the newspaper report as not satisfactory on verification of records, is stigmatic, and the same was passed without conducting any departmental enquiry, which is violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution.
(3.) REPLYING to the above contention, both the counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 would make the following contention: (A) The petitioner's service admittedly was purely on temporary basis against the post created for a limited period. The service of the petitioner was net confirmed, after the probation period of two years was over. If the Officer continued beyond probation, he cannot be deemed to be confirmed. Prior to confirmation of the service, any order of termination does not make the petitioner entitled to any show cause or explanation. From bare perusal of the impugned order, it would be evident that the order is simplicitor. It is imperative that the work and conduct of every Judicial Officer are always kept under watch by the High Court. In that way, the performance of the petitioner as a probationer was Judged by the High Court periodically. On being satisfied that his service was not satisfied, his service was dispensed with through termination. (B) The High Court called for the records and looked into the orders and judgments passed by the petitioner only to make a preliminary enquiry to ascertain the suitability and desirability for continuance of the petitioner in service. In other words, it is necessary for the High Court to assess the service of the temporary probationer in order to find out as to whether he should be confirmed or not. In this case, the service and performance of the Judicial Officers, the petitioner herein, was judged by the High Court and decision has been taken by the Committee of the High Court and thereafter Full Court considered the same and recommended his termination to the Government and consequently, an order was passed on 11.3.2006 by the Government for his removal. As such, it did not contain any stigma against him. Therefore, the departmental enquiry was neither necessary, nor required. Where the intention behind the enquiry against the probationer was not to hold a full -fledged departmental enquiry to punish but to hold mere a summary enquiry to determine only the suitability of the petitioner being a probationer to continue in service, an order of termination following such a summary enquiry cannot be said to be an order of punishment. As such, it does not attract Article 311(2) of the Constitution. ;