- (1.) THE main thrust of the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the punishment imposed is disproportionate to the charges. With a view to elaboratet to submission, it is stated that the inquiry officer exonerated the petitioner from all the charges injured into. However, disciplinary authority after serving the notice has passed the impugned order dated 25.3.2003 holding three charges against the petitioner as proved.
(2.) THE appellate authority" however, set aside the order of the disciplinary authority in respect to one .Charge i.e. Charge No.2. While concurring with the finding in respect to other two charges, even the revisional authority has confirmed the order of the appellate authority. The Writ Court while exercising the power of judicial review in respect to the disciplinary authority cannot Sit as a Court of appeal. The judicial scrutiny has to be confined to the contravention of any statutory provisions or non -observance of principles of natural justice. Rule 15 of C.CA Rule requires the disciplinary authority to record reasons for his disagreement and formulate tentative opinion in the notice served to the delinquent officers where he is required to consider the report of the inquiry presented to him, if the disciplinary authority decides to disagree with the findings of the inquiry officer. In the present case, disciplinary authority has served notice upon the petitioner communicating the tentative opinion for imposing punishment and even in the order passed has recorded reasons for his disagreement with the inquiry officer.
(3.) MRS . Ritu Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove the charge. This argument de -serves to be rejected as the High Court In exercise of power of judicial review under Article 226 cannot reappraise the evidence or assess the adequacy or quantum of evidence before the inquiry officer. It is only where the inquiry report is perverse i.e. without any evidence, the Court has jurisdiction to interfere. In the resent case,after having glance of the evidence. I am satisfied that it is not a case of no evidence. The disciplinary authority has recorded reasons for disagreement with the inquiry officer and has passed the impgned order after serving a notice to the petitioner. There is no contravention of any statutory provisions warranting interference by this Court. In so far the contention of the learned counsel regarding the punishment being disproportionate to the charge, suffice it say facts of this case do net warrant any interference. Hon 'ble Supreme Court has clearly ruled that the High Court should not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless it is arbitrary and/or is so shocking that no reasonable person can expect the same. In the present case, I am of the considered opinion that none of the circumstances exists to enable this Court to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority and upheld, by the appellate and the revisional authorities.;