R.K.MERATHIA, J. - (1.) THIS appeal, by the tenant, has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 25th June, 1998, passed by Shri Kamla Prasad, Additional District Judge, Koderma in Title (Eviction) Appeal No. 6 of 1991, whereby, learned lower appellate Court has reversed the judgment and decree dated 30-4-1991, passed by Sri Nishat Haider, Munsif, Koderma in Title (Eviction) Suit No. 61 of 1986.
(2.) THIS appeal was admitted on 13-4-1999 for hearing on the following questions of law : (1) Whether the lower appellate Court while reversing the judgment of the trial Court has properly appreciated the evidence adduced by the defendants- appellants ? (2) Whether a decree for eviction as against the trespasser under Section 14 of the B.B.C. Act can be sustained in law ? Plaintiff-appellant filed this suit on 19-12-1986 on the ground of personal necessity, against Smt. Reshmi Dugar, wife of late Bachraj Dugar and Sri Kamal Dugar. Plaintiffs case in short was that the suit premises was purchased by her under a registered sale-deed dated 16-2-1960. After death of the tenant- Bachraj Dugar, his widow, on her behalf and on behalf of her minor children, has been continuing as tenant. Kamal Dugar (defendant No. 2), brother of late Bachraj Dugar, was not a tenant but on the strength of purported orders passed by the Sub-divisional Officer and Deputy Commissioner, Koderma, he claimed concern in the suit premises and therefore, he was also added as defendant. The plaintiff required the suit premises for engaging her two sons, Umesh Singh and Ramesh Singh in business, which was suitable for the purpose.
(3.) THE case of the defendants in short was that Bachraj Dugar was never a tenant in his individual capacity. Rather the Firm 'Dugar Brothers' is the tenant was never a tenant. The Firm was reconstituted from time to time and certain family members of Dugar family were its partners. The defendants contended that the firm and all surviving heirs of Dugar family have not been made party in the suit. The defendants denied that plaintiffs required the suit premises for engagement of her sons as they were engaged in other business. It was further contended that the plaintiff could utilize other premises for engaging her sons.;