P.K.BALASUBRAMANYAN, J. - (1.) THE petitioners in WP(C) No. 1603 of 2003 on the file of this Court are appellants in this appeal. They are the Accountant General Office Employees Cooperative House Construction Society Limited; its Managing Committee and a former Secretary of the Society. The Society is one governed by the Bihar Co -operative Societies Act. The appellants filed the writ petition challenging the order Annexure 7 to the writ petition, dated 11.12.2003 directing the holding up of the election to the Managing Committee of the Society, to quash Annexure 9 order superseding the Managing Committee of the Society and appointing the Circle Officer, Ranchi, as the Special Officer to be 'in -charge of the affairs of the Society and for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the concerned respondents to complete the process of election as per the programme fixed therefor. The learned single Judge interfered to the extent of permitting the election to go on, but declined to interfere with the direction made for holding an inquiry, but fixed a time limit to complete the same and further directed that until a decision is taken by the Government after the inquiry into the corn -plaint received by it, the present Managing Committee elected under the order of Court dated 19.12.2003, shall remain suspended. The parties were directed to cooperate with the inquiry. The learned single Judge made it clear that he was not entering into the merits of the controversy relating to the complaint received against the Society and its management. The Society and its managing committee feels aggrieved by the suspension of the newly elected Managing Committee until the proposed enquiry was completed and a decision was taken by the Government based on that inquiry.
(2.) THE learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants contended that power had been exercised by a Secretary to the Government who was not an authority under the Cooperative Societies Act and that the power to suspend the election, to appoint a special officer and to direct an inquiry has been drawn from Section 65 -A of the Act, which had been struck down as unconstitutional by the Patna High Court when the State of Jharkhand was not born and in view of that, the learned Single Judge should have straightaway quashed both Annexures 7 and 9 on the ground that the said orders lacked jurisdiction. Counsel further submitted that the learned Single Judge was not justified in observing that the power of the Government to act, could be found in Rule 27(4) of the Rules of Executive Business. Counsel contended that the Co -operative Societies Act, was a self contained Code, and it contained provisions to meet the contingencies that arise out of the alleged complaint in this case and the Act did not confer any over riding authority or power on the State Government or the Secretary to the Government and, therefore, it should be held that the order impugned were orders passed without authority. Counsel further contended that an election had been held, though as permitted by way of an interim order passed in the writ petition, but now that an election has been held and the Managing Committee has been elected, it was not just and proper to prevent the Managing Committee from taking charge of the affairs of the Society and running it and even if this Court were to hold that an inquiry was warranted on the complaint made by some disgruntled members of the Society that inquiry to be conducted cannot stand in the way of the newly elected office bearers being put in charge of the affairs of the Society. Counsel made it clear on behalf of the appellants that the appellants have no objection to the inquiry being conducted by the appropriate authority under the Cooperative Societies Act, which, according to the counsel, was the Registrar of Cooperative Societies and in that situation, this Court ought to allow the appeal and allow the newly elected Managing Committee to take charge of the affairs of the society. Counsel briefly touching upon the merits of the controversy, also submitted that the present complaint was nothing new, had been raised even in the year 1983, had been buried even then and there was no substance in the charge now made against the erstwhile Managing Committee of the Society. He stated that in any event the newly elected Managing Committee cannot be held responsible for any of those deeds or misdeeds. Learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of respondent 1 to 5 contended that the Society was a Cooperative House Construction Society formed for the benefit of the employees of the office of the Accountant General; that the land was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on the request of the Society on the basis of an agreement executed in that behalf under Sec. 41 of the Land Acquisition Act that the object of the acquisition was to provide housing for the employees of the office of the Accountant General as would be clear from the notification issued under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act; that the Society had no authority to make allotments of land to the persons who are not eligible to be member of the Society, not being employees of the Office of the Accountant General that there was no valid amendment of the bylaws of the Society permitting induction of non -employees of the Office of the Accountant General as members of the Society and that the complaints against the Society were of such a grave nature that it would be inappropriate for this Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to stall the inquiry as wanted by the appellants. He submitted that in terms of the agreement executed under Sec. 41 of the Land Acquisition Act, which was marked Annexure -1/2, in the application for intervention filed in the writ petition, the Government had the power to intervene when the land given over to the Society was misused; that the Government even had a right of re -entry on that ground and the only requirement was that the Government had to give notice and to conduct an inquiry before assuming possession or resuming possession of the land. Learned Advocate General pointed out that a notice was given, objection invited and it was only thereafter that the inquiry was ordered and an order passed appointing the Special Officer to be in charge of the affairs of the Society until the inquiry was completed. Of course, there was also an order to keep in abeyance the fresh election, but by the intervention of the learned Single Judge at the interlocutory stage, the election was conducted. He also submitted that de hors the Cooperative Societies Act, in the case on hand, the Government had an overriding power to order an inquiry when it received . a serious complaint against the management of the Society and the misutilisation of the land of the Society and the funds of the Society. Learned advocate General referred to the complaint and to the conduct of the Managing Committee of the Society in refusing to cooperate with the inquiry, notwithstanding the order passed by the Secretary to the Government in that behalf, notwithstanding the direction issued by the learned Single Judge in the judgment under appeal and notwithstanding the interim order passed by this Court in this appeal on 10.3.2004. He, therefore, submitted that this was not a fit case for interference by this Court against the exercise of discretion by the learned Single Judge or for exercise of its jurisdiction to come to the aid of the appellants who were 'allegedly guilty of serious misconduct in the conduct of the affairs of the society. In response to the order passed by us on 10.3.2004 the learned Advocated General submitted that there was no record in the department to show that the alleged amendment of the bye -laws permitting enrolment of non - employees of the Office of the Accountant General as members of the Society, was approved in terms of Sec.12 of the Act. He submitted that the documents relied on by the appellants to contend that there was an amendment, were all unreliable, nay even forged, and in that situation, there was no occasion for this Court to interfere with the decision of the learned Single Judge. Learned Advocate General submitted that the conduct of the Managing Committee was such that if the newly elected Managing Committee is put in charge of the affairs of the society, the inquiry ordered will be stultified by the Managing Committee and this Court should not permit that to happen, given the graveness of the charges made against the society.
(3.) LEARNED counsel for the intervener submitted that the alleged amendment of the byelaws expanding the membership of the Society was not validly passed and, in any event, it was never approved by the competent authority and in the circumstances, it was imperative that there should be an inquiry into the affairs of the Society and the management should not be given back to the newly elected Managing Committee. There was clear misutilisation of land by the Society and misapplication of funds and an inquiry was imperative. The intervener supported the arguments of the learned Advocate General.;