- (1.) HEARD counsel for the appellants and counsel for the legal representatives of original respondent No. 3. - -
(2.) THIS appeal is filed on behalf of the Bharat Coking Coal Limited challenging the decision of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants. The appellants initiated proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 for an order of eviction in respect of 30 decimals of land which according to the appellants, was in unauthorized occupation of original respondent No. 3. The original respondent No. 3 resisted the proceedings on the plea that the appellants had entered into an agreement for the purchase of the land in question on payment of compensation and having done so, they could not invoke the provisions of the Public Premises Act. The Estate Officer found that the land was the surface of a mine, a part of original lease hold granted for mining purposes to the erstwhile owner of the mine and the right, title and interest of the erstwhile owner having vested in the appellants, the appellants were entitled to invoke the provisions of the Act and since respondent No. 3 did not have any right to resist, the claim of the appellants was liable to be allowed. Thus, an order of eviction was passed. The original respondent No. 3 filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority under the Act, the Appellate Authority being the District Judge. The Appellate Authority also held that on the basis of the agreement for sale relied on by original respondent No. 3, he could not successfully resist the claim of the appellants. He as a fact found that the land was the subject matter of a lease for a mining purpose and was in fact the surface of a mine and had been recorded as gairabad malik land in the record of rights. More or less contradicting himself, the Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the surface right of village Sinidih had not been the subject of the lease granted in favour of ex -colliery owner and the right could not be said to be vested in the Central Government under the Vesting Act. Holding that the land involved did not come under the purview of the Premises Act in spite of the extended definition of Coal Mine as defined under Section 2(h) of the Coal Mines Nationalisation Act and since there was a substantive question of title involved, the proceeding under the Premises Act was not maintainable. Thus, he purported to reverse the decision of the Estate Officer and dismissed the proceeding initiated by the appellants. The appellants challenged the decision of the Appellate Authority in CWJC No. 3095 of 1999. The learned Single Judge referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bharat Coking Coal Limited v. Madan Lal Agarwal, (1997)] SCC 177 and the definition of mines under Section 2(h) of the Coal Mines Nationalisation Act. He did not properly advert to the effect of the finding rendered by the Appellate Authority in paragraph 15 of his order to the effect that the land was part of a mining land and was the surface of a mine. Propounding that there was a possible case of adverse possession available to be set up by original respondent No. 3 and his heirs, the learned Judge declined to interfere with the decision of the Appellate Authority and dismissed the writ petition giving liberty to the aggrieved party to move the appropriate Civil Court for relief. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the learned Single Judge, this appeal is filed by the Bharat Coking Limited.
(3.) LEARNED counsel for the appellant submits that on the finding by the Appellate Authority that this land was the subject matter of a mining lease of the year 1908, the learned Single Judge should have held that the land had vested in the Central Government under the Nationalisation Act and consequently, occupation by any one of that land had to be treated as unauthorized occupation within the meaning of Public Premises Act and the appellants were entitled to an order of eviction under that Act. Counsel pointed out that in paragraph 15, the Appellate Authority had himself clearly found the facts that justified the order of eviction passed by the Estate Officer and the interference by the Appellate Authority was based on untenable reasoning and after contradicting himself on the question as to whether the land was the subject matter of the original mining lease. He further submitted that the learned Single Judge was in error in not properly applying his mind to the relevant findings and the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, this was a case where the decision of the learned Single Judge and that of the Appellate Authority were liable to be interfered with. Obviously, surface of the mine comes within the definition of a mine and hence the order of the Estate Officer directing eviction was well within this jurisdiction and was fully justified. He also pointed out that the only argument advanced by original respondent No. 3 before the Estate Officer was based on an agreement for sale entered into with the appellants and the sale deeds taken by the appellants from certain others with a view to avoid delay and complication over the matter of continuing the mining operations by resorting to open cast mining. In that situation, the Appellate Authority was not justified in entering a finding that the land was not the subject matter of the original mining land even though earlier he had held that it was part of the mining land. Counsel for the legal representatives of original respondent No. 3, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 3 had been in possession of the land for well over the statutory period and had perfected a title by adverse possession and in that situation, the proceeding for eviction under the Public Premises Act was not sustainable. He submitted that there is no reason to interfere with the decision of the learned Single Judge.;